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      MESSAGE FROM VICE CHANCELLOR 
 
PROFESSOR KATHERINE MITCHELL  
As the Vice Chancellor and Chief Executive of the University of 
Derby, it’s a great pleasure and honour for me to welcome you 
all to the International Conference on Diplomacy & International 
Relations (ICDIR) at the University of Derby hosted by the 
College of Law, Humanities and Social Sciences.   
 
The political events in the UK in the run up to and during the 
referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union and the growing 
uncertainties surrounding the outcome ever since, coupled with the growing social 
unrest, mass migration and fear of the rise of violent extremism, amongst many other 
world issues, make the theme of this conference - Diplomacy and the Politics of Fear 
- not only relevant but timely.  
 
Given the many intra-national and international armed conflicts around the world, 
political unrests, the rise of global terrorism and violent extremism by non-state actors, 
and other global issues threatening the peace, security and stability of the world in the 
21st century, diplomacy and international relations have become more relevant and 
essential now than at any other time in human history. 
 
At a time of fear, mistrust, political uncertainty and weakening ties amongst peoples 
and nations, diplomacy remains an effective tool in bring people together, healing a 
fractured world and binding up broken communities. The current political situation in 
the UK and around the world, makes a conference such as ICDIR particularly 
important. 
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From the keynote addresses and academic papers scheduled for presentation and 
discussion, this conference will engage with contemporary world issues and promote 
public understanding of diplomacy and international relations through academic 
debate and exchanges. 
 
We are delighted to have, here at Derby today,  a seasoned politician the RT Hon, 
Dame Margaret Beckett – Honourable Member of Parliament for Derby South, who 
will be sharing her wealth of understanding with us about the current state of politics 
in the UK and beyond. 
 
Mrs Beckett was first elected to Parliament in 1974 and held junior positions in the 
governments of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan. She lost her seat in 1979 but 
returned to the House of Commons in 1983 and became a senior member of the 
Labour Party. She was elected Deputy Leader of the Labour Party in 1992 and was 
briefly its leader in 1994 following the premature death of John Smith. Mrs Beckett is 
the first woman to serve as the Deputy and Leader of a major political party in the UK.  
After Labour's victory in the 1997 general election, Mrs Beckett became a member of 
Tony Blair's Cabinet. Initially the President of the Board of Trade, she was later the 
Leader of the House of Commons and Secretary of State for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs.  
 
In 2006, Mrs Beckett was appointed British Foreign Secretary, making her the first 
woman to hold the position, and, after Margaret Thatcher, the second woman to hold 
one of the Great Offices of State in British politics. Margaret Beckett is currently a 
member of the Top Level Group of UK Parliamentarians for Multilateral Nuclear 
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. 
 
We also have today His Excellency Mr. Euripides L Evriviades the High Commissioner 
for the Republic of Cyprus in our midst. Before assuming his current post, Mr 
Evriviades was Deputy Permanent Secretary/Political Director of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (Jan., 2012–Nov., 2013) serving intermittently as Acting Permanent 
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Secretary.   Prior to that, he served as Ambassador / Permanent Representative to 
the Council of Europe (Nov., 2008–Jan., 2012), having also chaired its Rapporteur 
Group on External Relations (2011).  
 
Previously, Mr. Evriviades was Political Director of the Ministry of foreign Affairs (2006- 
2008), having concurrent accreditation to the State of Kuwait.  He was Cyprus’ 
Ambassador to the United States of America and non-resident High Commissioner to 
Canada, serving concomitantly as: the Permanent Representative to the International 
Civil Aviation Organization; the Permanent Observer to the Organization of American 
States; and Representative to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(2003- 2006).  
 
He also served as Ambassador to the Netherlands (2000-2003) and to Israel (1997-
2000). Earlier in his career, he held positions at Cypriot embassies in Bonn, Germany 
(1986-1988); Moscow, USSR/Russia (1988-1993); and Tripoli, Libya (1995). 
 
On 20 April 2015 Mr. Evriviades was voted by his peers in London as Diplomat of 
Year. The Award for International Service was bestowed upon him by the Committee 
on the International Salute to the Life and Legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., A Man 
for All Nations.  
 
Mr. Evriviades was honored in The Hague as the “Ambassador of the Year" by the 
Stichting Vrienden van Saur ("Friends of Saur") Foundation, a Dutch social and 
philanthropic society (October 2003). His other awards include the Great Commander 
of the Order of the Orthodox Knights of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher (Jerusalem, 
February 2000); and the Order of Merit (First Class) of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (Bonn, March 1989).  
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Speaking to us later this afternoon at this conference is another distinguished guests, 
His Excellency, Ivan Romero-Martinez the Honduran Ambassador who will be sharing 
his experience with us on the role of diplomacy in global peace and security. Prior to 
his current appointment, Mr. Romero-Martinez, was posted as Ambassador, 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York. He is a career diplomat 
since 1971, having served as his country’s Ambassador to many countries, including 
Spain, Egypt, Morocco, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Haiti, Colombia, Belgium, 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Ireland. He also represented his country at the ambassadorial level at the United 
Nations in Switzerland and at the European Union.  
 
Other assignments in Mr. Romero-Martinez’s diplomatic service include the post of 
Deputy Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (OAS). He 
also held several positions at Honduras’ Embassy in the United States, including that 
of Counsellor, and at Honduras’ Embassy in Canada, where he served as Counsellor, 
Minister Counsellor and Chargé d’Affaires. 
 
In his native home in Honduras, Mr. Romero-Martinez served as Special Adviser to 
the President with the rank of Secretary of State.  Ambassador Romero-Martinez has 
been honoured with many awards by the governments of Brazil, Spain, Dominican 
Republic, Colombia, Mexico, Holy See, Panama and Taiwan.  
 
I am also delighted to welcome Professor Zafiris Tzannatos, a senior International 
Consultant for Development Strategy and Social Policy with considerable experience 
in the Middle East Politics. Professor Tzannatos will be joining the High Commissioner, 
the Ambassador and Rt. Honourable Margaret Beckett in setting the national and 
international policy context for the conference today. 
 
Professor Tzannatos is an economist living in Lebanon where he was previously 
Professor and Chair of the Economics Department at the American University of 
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Beirut. He has served as Advisor to the Managing Director of the World Bank where 
he was also Manager for the Middle East and North Africa region as well as Leader of 
the Global Child Labour  Programme that he initiated.  
 
More recently, Professor Tzannatos was Senior Advisor for all Arab States at the ILO 
office in Beirut and, before that, for governments in the Middle East and the GCC 
including Lebanon (Ministry of Social Affairs), Qatar (Planning Council), and the UAE 
(Abu Dhabi Executive Council). He has held senior academic and research 
appointments in the UK and the rest of Europe, visited more than 65 countries and 
worked with regional and international organisations as well as governments. 
 
The University of Derby, as a vibrant institution that promotes scholarship and 
knowledge in the field of diplomacy and international relations warmly welcomes all 
the distinguished, guests, students, academic staff and members of the diplomatic 
community and academics from other institutions who have gathered here today to 
take part in this conference.  
 
I wish you all a successful and resourceful conference as you engage in debates and 
academic exchanges of ideas on how to deal with some of the challenges facing 
society in the 21st Century.  I hope, through the ICDIR conference, our students here 
at Derby will be able to engage with all our guests to gain essential knowledge and 
insights into the work of career politicians, diplomats, ambassadors, members of the 
diplomatic community and other academics and policy makers who work in this 
important field of diplomacy and international relations. 
 
I am delighted to see the effort being made by the Department of Law, Criminology 
and Social Sciences in promoting research and scholarship activities amongst staff 
and students at the College.  Academic meeting such as the ICDIR conference 
provides a great opportunity and forum for exchanges of ideas with colleagues from 
other Universities and members of the diplomatic community in the UK and wider 
society at large. 
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With keynote addresses from four distinguished guest speakers together with 13 
papers scheduled for presentation and discussion over three sessions running 
concurrently this afternoon, (don’t worry we will have regular break intervals in 
between keynote addresses and paper presentations), today’s event promises to be 
a resourceful gathering that will enrich our understanding of diplomacy and 
international relations.  
 
It is a great pleasure, therefore, for me and my institution to host the ICDIR conference 
2016 that focuses on current issues of local, regional and global political and 
diplomatic significance. Given the wide range of issues that will be discussed at this 
conference today, ranging from reconnecting people with politics, counter terrorism, 
security of the Balkans, the role of religion and the practice of diplomacy, human 
trafficking, amongst many other issues, there is something for everyone at this 
conference. 
 
Thank you and enjoy the sessions and the discussions. 
Professor Kathryn Mitchell 
12 September 2016 
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     MESSAGE FROM HIS EXCELLENCY  
MR. EURIPIDES L EVRIVIADES 
HIGH COMMISSIONER OF THE REPUBLIC 
OF CYPRUS 
“Diplomacy and the Politics of Fear: The 21st Century Challenges to 
the Theory and Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations” - 
Reflections from a Practitioner 
 
Sir Henry Wotton was an English author and a diplomat. He served 
as Ambassador to Venice in the 17th century. He is known for his 
much used and abused maxim: “An ambassador is an honest 
gentleman sent to lie abroad for the good of his country.”  What is 
forgotten is that the same Sir Henry also said: “Tell the truth and 
so puzzle and confound your adversaries.” And this, I believe 
encapsulates, in many ways, modern diplomacy.    
 
Another anecdotal definition of a diplomat is:  “When a diplomat says ‘yes’, he means 
‘perhaps’. When he says ‘perhaps’ he means ‘no’. When he says ‘no’, he is no 
diplomat.”  
 
And my favourite which describes exactly how I feel ever since I assumed duties in 
London in November 2013: “An Ambassador [in the case of Commonwealth countries 
a High Commissioner; it is one and the same] is like a swan: poised and graceful 
above water and underneath pedalling like hell.” 
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I especially appreciate the wisdom inherent in Bosnian scholar and diplomat Drazen 
Pehar’s definition of diplomacy as “primarily words that prevent us from reaching for 
our swords”. This best reflects my philosophy. 
 
The life of a diplomat is indeed a peripatetic one. It is a life’s voyage. It is a long one; 
full of adventure; full of discovery; full of knowledge; analogous to the one mused by 
Constantine P. Cavafy in his classic poem Ithaca.  
 
And my journey has not been any different. A combination of contradictory emotions, 
recalling images and memories from an eventful span of more than 40 years in the 
service and in the mission of my country, floods over me as I recall my diplomatic 
postings in New York, Germany (Bonn), USSR/Russia, Libya, Israel, The Netherlands, 
Washington DC, Strasbourg (Council of Europe) and now as High Commissioner to 
the UK.  
 
What has my journey taught me? That diplomacy is by definition an art, a practice and 
a skill. It is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of foreign relations.  
The diplomat must inject his/her public persona into the foreign policy promotion of the 
country he/she represents. Diplomacy requires a thorough knowledge of both the 
country the diplomat is serving, and the country the diplomat is serving in. But a fine 
balance is required. Too much diplomacy with not enough knowledge may be 
dangerous; too much knowledge with too little diplomacy may be disastrous.  I will be 
one of the first to admit that diplomacy is not for the timid or for the weak. The sheer 
toll and tax on the diplomat is both physically and spiritually daunting. Yet despite 
frustrations, shortcomings and personal costs, the rewards and enrichment are 
immense and life transformative.   
 
One of the most pressing demands on the diplomat nowadays is the imperative to 
keep pace with the dynamics of change, including information technology and the 24 
hour news cycle.  Just as the world around us is changing rapidly in scale and scope, 
so too is diplomacy. Long gone are the days when President Jefferson (1801-1809) 
famously instructed his secretary of state: “We have heard nothing from our 
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ambassador in Spain for two years. If we do not hear from him this year, let us write 
him a letter.” 
 
Some of the more profound developments in diplomacy stem from such global change. 
All tools in the diplomatic tool box, including social media, must be used in concert.    
Whether we call it iDiplomacy or digital diplomacy, this does not mean that traditional 
forms of diplomacy are replaced.  We cannot and should not throw out the baby 
together with the bath water.  In some ways the more things change the more they 
remain the same.  
 
I would refer interested readers to read an article I recently penned on: 
“#Shakespeare400: To tweet or not to tweet? Is this the question?” published in the 
latest issue of the July/ August issue of DIPLOMAT magazine (est 1947).   
http://www.diplomatmagazine.com/issues/2016/july-august/1086-
shakespeare400.html 
 
Thus, modern diplomacy goes far beyond the traditional confines of relations between 
states, governments and international organisations. These are no longer the sole 
actors on the world stage. Diplomacy, for a number of years now, has increasingly 
been involving and incorporating the taxpayer and civil society.  The citizen is no 
longer a mere spectator; he/she is a stakeholder.  A plethora of international events 
have shown this vividly. Indicatively, one mentions the tumultuous events in Georgia, 
in Ukraine and, of course, the Arab spring. 
 
One of the key issues that modern diplomacy needs to address is also the politics of 
fear which is the theme of this year’s ICDIR 2016 Derby conference.   
 
A general sense of fear, anxiety and uneasiness, exists between a number of countries 
and within societies, caused by poly-parametric and entwined situations, including 
many exogenous factors.  
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Wars; climate change; terrorism; immigration; refugees; the haves and the have nots; 
bigotry; xenophobia; intolerance; ignorance; and economic disparities, to mention but 
a few, are constantly changing the matrix within which diplomats operate. Brexit has 
brought about a tectonic shift not only for the UK but for EU too.  
 
The nature of relations between peoples, communities, cultures, nation states and 
regions are in a constant state of flux.  New economic and social divides between 
nations and within countries and communities lead to political dissatisfaction. They 
often lead to extremism; interracial violence; disconnect and schism of the citizen with 
the elite; and apathy. These weaken the trust between states and citizens, threaten 
international peace, security, and development and pose herculean challenges to 
diplomats.    
  
As globalisation and interconnectivity are forging new and more rapid networks of 
global communication and interaction, some of them very negative too, diplomats and 
diplomacy are trying to adapt and adopt new ways to address them. While the avenues 
for diplomacy have widened, the vehicles for diplomacy must keep apace as well.  
 
Within the above context, diplomats have a central role in alleviating the politics of fear 
through their actions and narratives by turning policies into praxis.  In the wise words 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt: “So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing 
we have to fear is...fear itself — nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which 
paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance …” 
 
Mr. Euripides L Evriviades 
12 September 2016 
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MESSAGE FROM PROFESSOR ZAFIRIS     
TZANNATOS 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIST AND POLICY 
CONSULTANT; FELLOW, LEBANESE 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES 
The Failure of Diplomacy is the Failure of Economics  
 
 
Excellencies: Rt. Hon. Dame Margaret Beckett, Ambassadors 
of the Republic of Cyprus and Honduras,  
Distinguished guests,  
Colleagues from universities and speakers and participants in 
the sessions that follow, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
I first of all would like to express my deepest thanks for the 
invitation to participate in this important conference and also for the warmest welcome 
I have had from the organizers, in particular Dr Francis Jegede, Dr Philip Hodgson 
and Dr Sung-Hee Lee.  
 
It is great pleasure being today at Derby not only for the obvious reason but also for 
having the opportunity to come back to such an important policy relevant academic 
event in the UK where I studied and taught for nearly two decades before I left in 1992 
to first go to America, then Asia and now Africa.   
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I have limited time and perhaps this is not a bad thing as I am sure you do not want to 
be subjected to my accent for much longer.  I have now realized  that I am fully 
understood only by one person, my daughter, who I think was tempted to add 
Greeklish in her cv as yet another language she speaks.   Once she asked me “dad, 
how come you speak like that, after you have been speaking and teaching in English 
for forty years”.  To which I responded “on one hand, socially the Brits are too polite to 
correct someone and, on the other hand, professionally I failed all the students who 
did not say what I taught them”.   
 
I mentioned this as my accent somehow relates to one of the two things I will cover 
today, that is, people moving from one place to another.  On this, that is moving 
around, I would like to say two things.   
 First, in practical terms, had it not being for humans moving around, the world would have been 
very different today and perhaps we, humans, would have been already extinct as species long 
time ago. To make the point in extremis, I invite you to think what would happen to those who 
are starving if they cannot become economic migrants, or what would happen to those who are 
about to be slaughtered if they cannot become refugees 
 And second, in research and academic terms that are quite relevant to our conference, we 
know that evolution, human or not, does not take place quickly.  Living species take long time 
to adapt.  One case in point relates to our ancestors.  Our best knowledge on this does not 
come from static fossils but from the Laetoli footprints in Tanzania that were discovered by 
British paleoanthropologist Mary Leakey.  It was the foot prints that settled the debate as to 
which developed first in the human evolutionary time line and when: a larger brain or 
bipedalism?  We now know that the Laetoli hominins were fully bipedal more than one million 
years before the earliest known stone tools were made.  On the side, the footprints suggest 
whoever left the prints was burdened on one side and was possibly a female carrying an infant 
on her hip. Having said that I will refrain from saying that Eve was created before Adam.  
 
The other topic I will cover relates to economics.  To cut this introduction short, let me 
just say that what we ask of politics and diplomacy to do today is to correct the failures 
of economics, in particular those related to globalization.   
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Let me clarify that I fully support globalization but not quite the kind of globalization 
that was developed by one of the most influential persons of our times, Mrs Thatcher, 
who said “there's no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and 
there are families … people must look after themselves first. It is our duty to look after 
ourselves and then, also, to look after our neighbours."  This, then untested ideological 
position based on a false dilemma, as if individuals could live outside a society 
(something that had been already dismissed as early as in 4th century BC by Aristotle), 
showed its effects in 2008 when the concept of self-regulating markets collapsed 
spectacularly overnight.  What followed the crisis was, ironically, the banking sector 
and private sector failures were “socialized” – that is, they were passed on to ordinary 
citizens as public debt, that is, as a liability to be paid by taxing you and me.  And we 
have yet to recover and a long time before we fully pay back the neoliberal exuberance 
that governed us from the 1980s till the crisis.  And we now have to live with those 
who have embraced a logic that there can be more economic integration but less 
human integration. 
 
Let me address this issue by saying a few words on migration, refugees and the euro 
crisis.  
 
Economic Migrants  
 
I was playing a game with my 7 year old grandson, in particular a card game that had 
the footballers and national teams of the Euro Cup 2016.  Needless to say that, having 
split the number of cards equally at first, in no time he ended up getting all the cards 
though I almost scored some points half way through.  For example, I knew that Zlatan 
Ibrahimović plays for Manchester United.  It transpired I knew little more about him.  In 
the good old days, when life was simple and easy, I would have assumed he was 
Yugoslav.  In the more complicated present, his father turned out to be from Bosnia 
and his mother from Croatia.  To make things even more complicated, his father is 
Muslim and his mother Catholic.  And guess what: he plays for Sweden – being a 
Swedish national!  
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From my own experience living in the Middle East, it took me time to find out that 
Ibrahim is a name given also to Christian boys.  Moreover, when I was Chair of the 
Economics Department at the American University of Beirut I hired somebody whose 
name was Jihad.  I realized he was Christian only after he got married in a Maronite 
Church.  Of course, the Greek Orthodox in that part of the world refer to God as Allah– 
though the Malaysians want to ban other religions using that name for God.  All in all, 
since I mentioned Ibrahimović and I am Greek, let me conclude the world is as diverse 
as a “Macedonian salad”.  And I will not dwell on whether there is one Macedonia or 
two.  
 
I was thinking, what would Nicolas Sarkozy be doing today if such a mix up deprived 
him of being French.  He is the son of a Hungarian and a grandson of a Greek Jew.  
That he is the husband of an Italian lady makes no difference unless they have children 
– try to define nationality they could legitimately claim if Madame Le Pen were to write 
the rules.  
 
By the way, Nicolas can apply for a Greek passport anytime as the Greek constitution 
clearly prescribes that, if any of your ancestors no matter how many generations ago, 
were Greek, you are Greek. For example, Prince George and Princess Charlotte and 
all their descendants are eligible to get the Greek nationality, if they wanted, because 
their father, the Duke to Cambridge is the son of the Prince of Wales who is the son 
of the Duke of Edinburg, Prince Philip who is Greek.  In fact, possessing a Greek 
passport may prove handy for these members of the Royal Family if the Brexit comes 
with some restrictions on mobility and they do not want to use their official passport 
when they travels abroad.  
 
This mix up goes on.  I wonder how much British and how much German the children 
of Nigel Farage are. And what would London be like and, more importantly, what would 
the UK be like in terms of in- or out- of the EU, if the Caucasian, Turkish and French 
ancestry of Boris did not make him sufficiently British and he was disqualified from 
public office.  
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And talking of London, I wonder what kind of job would Sadiq Khan be doing this days?  
And how many Olympic medals some national teams would have won if foreign born 
athletes were excluded.  And how many nurses would have been around, if Ghana 
and Philippines and many other countries had asked for proper compensation for the 
brain drain they are subjected to through the high demand by the National Health 
Service systems of advanced countries?  
 
Let me conclude with two questions.  First, isn’t the economic immigration into Europe 
today the mirror image of the economic emigration of Europeans to their colonies?   
 
Second, with reference this map reflecting 
the situation last year, who would ever 
imagine that in Austria, which is  such a 
leader of  the anti-migration movement in 
Europe, most of its foreign born persons are 
Germans?  This is also the case in 
Switzerland with the frequent referendums 
on the issue – including the one that banned minarets by a popular vote of 60 percent 
– though this was not the case in French speaking cantons that proved to be the Scots 
of Switzerland.  
 
Refugees 
 
While economic migration comes practically under the exclusive jurisdiction of 
individual governments, this is not so in the case of refugees at least since 1951 when 
the United Nations passed the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.  
According to the convention, and the internationally accepted definition, a refugee is 
someone who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”   
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We, in Europe, have very much adhered to the Convention and until recently we have 
claimed the high moral ground and in many cases we are still giving lectures to others 
regarding human rights.  But things have changed recently.  Why has our attitude to 
refugees changed?  For two reasons, first the increasing numbers of refuges and, 
second, their alleged impact on citizens.   
 
With respect to the refugee numbers, a politician in North Italy labelled their flow into 
his country “a biblical exodus” and called upon his country to give up the illusion of 
being able to manage it.   As a side note, the “exodus” via the Mediterranean the year 
he referred to (in 2014) totaled 220,000 people, or less than 0.4 of 1 percent of that 
country’s, not Europe’s, population.  In terms of EU’s population of 500 million people, 
if the number of refugees in Europe were to reach the share of refugees in the national 
population in Jordan, they would total some 50 million.  And if they were to reach the 
share of refugees in the national population in Lebanon, they should reach 130 million 
people.  This leaving aside that neither does Jordan nor does Lebanon have the 
institutions and means needed to handle sudden and complex situations. This 
includes providing shelter, food distribution, medical aid and child protection, as well 
as addressing issues such as trafficking and gender violence. 
 
With respect to their impact, refugees are a contentious issue even in our part of the 
world where Christian values are touted often and loudly.  This is due to concerns 
(justified or not) of electorates that receiving refugees will lead to high unemployment 
and low wages. There is also displeasure with the possibility that foreigners may 
receive welfare benefits that are funded by taxing the hard-earned incomes of citizens.  
I would not attempt to summarize the empirical literature on the eventual impact of 
refugees in host countries and will only say that things can go both ways depending 
on whether we treated them as productive fellow humans or, I am tempted to say, 
scavengers and also on how we measure things.  
For example, who earned most medals in the Rio Olympics? Some say the US with 
121 medals with Britain coming second with 67. Others say the winners were the EU 
with 258 medals – excluding the British.  And others say the British Empire that 
collectively got 396 medals.  
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In any case, all boils down to whether the refugees drain the economy or not.  This in 
turn depends on the employment rights of refugees. The international legal position 
on this is pretty clear.  Those who live lawfully in a refuge country (that is, they have 
been admitted, have lodged their claim and await determination of their refugee status) 
have the right to self-employment. Those who stay lawfully in a country (that is, they 
have been declared refugees in a country of refuge and can stay or be resettled in 
another state at a later stage) are considered to have the same rights to wage 
employment as those accorded to the “most favorable nationals” of a foreign country 
who are permanent residents and in the same circumstances. And refugees who have 
resided in the asylum country for at least three years should face no more restrictions 
on their employment for the sake of protecting the national labor market of the country 
of refuge. Nor should restrictions be applied to refugees whose spouse or child is a 
national of the country of refuge.  Finally, a refugee with a legalized status should 
receive the same treatment in terms of public relief and social security as citizens of 
the country providing refuge. 
 
Ladies and gentlemen: The case is 
clear, either we adhere to the 
Convention on Refugees or not.  
There is no middle ground.  We 
should not have double standards.  It 
was us who to a large extent wrote 
the Convention.  Did we do so 
because we initially felt we will not be 
called to act upon it?   
 
Or was the 1951 Convention a hidden weapon at the onset of the cold war and we 
wanted to pass the message to those on the other side of the iron curtain that whoever 
defects he or she will be welcome and have the full protection and privileges as our 
own citizens?  If we wanted to show how bad the others were, and they were, now is 
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the time to show how good we are.  It is unacceptable for us to pay less for luxury that 
what the refugees pay to save the lives of their children.  
 
Diplomacy, bail out and bail in 
 
Having mentioned the price of life, let me conclude with how politics and diplomacy 
combine more directly with economics.  The case in point is the euro crisis with 
reference to the two Greek speaking countries in the world, Greece and Cyprus.  
 
Put it simply in the case of Greece, populist and corrupt politicians borrowed and 
borrowed and borrowed and created an Olympic debt that the country could no longer 
serve.  However, when one borrows, someone else lends.  And those who lent money 
to Greece were not Mafiosos but reputable institutions from reputable countries: the 
German banks and the French banks.  When Greece became insolvent in 2009 it 
became clear that Greece was is too big to fail and, worse, Italy that at the time was 
next in line, was too big to rescue.   Under such circumstances, economics, politics 
and diplomacy combined in what constitutes the biggest fraudulent conveyance in 
history.  
 
Fraudulent conveyance means avoiding debt by transferring money to another person 
or company. It arises in debtor/creditor relations with reference to insolvent debtors. 
In the case of Greece, the banks that lent to the Greek government should have lost 
their money.  This is the rule of the market system that was created across the globe 
after Mrs Thatcher’s initially successful experiment on the back of the British hoi polloi.   
This experiment proved to be a failure.   
 
As Alan Greenspan, the Fed Chair, said when the global financial crisis of 2008 broke 
out “I was shocked when the system broke down: I made a mistake in presuming that 
lenders themselves were more capable than regulators of protecting their finances. 
My ideology and model that I always believed in proved me wrong”.   
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So the lenders were wrong and the Greek crisis had to be addressed. European 
politicians acted through diplomacy, not through sending a gun boat.  The European 
diplomacy was met with eager Greek politicians who were willing to sign anything as 
long as they felt they would stay in power a bit longer or hoped to be the next ones to 
get into power. In other words, those who created the crisis in Greece were those who 
were entrusted by the international community to solve it! And they did.  How did they 
do it?  The IMF and the EU gave loans to Greece.  The loans were used against all 
rules to pay the French and German banks and other, albeit minor, creditors and the 
debt was pass on to ordinary Greek citizens.  Moreover, while the old Greek debt was 
then under Greek laws, which means it could have been written off as Greece was 
insolvent (and the IMF has said mea culpa but only now), the Greek politicians agreed 
the new debt came under English law, thus giving up – if you believe it - sovereignty.  
It seems in globalized times treason has been replaced by the more benign term 
“socialization of the debt”.  And if I am not wrong, the public debt in Britain has been 
socialized from 44 percent before the crisis in 2007 to almost 90 percent today.  
 
Of course, there are always two sides to the same coin and the EU says it acted to 
save the euro, the Eurozone, the EU and – it has to be said – the world economy: The 
Greek crisis was bigger than that of Lehman Brothers that triggered the 2008 global 
financial crisis.   
 
While the Greek case was based on bailing out banks, the Cypriot case was based on 
bail in. Bail-outs refer to the rescue of a financial institutions by external parties (such 
as public tax payers’ moneys or, in the case of Greece, the IMF and the EU).   
Bail-ins force the borrower's creditors to bear some of the burden by having part of the 
debt they are owed written off. This is what the Government of Cyprus resorted to in 
2013 and people with deposits larger than €100,000 lost almost half of their deposits 
(and in the case of the second largest Bank, Laiki, depositors lost everything as the 
bank failed).   
 
I would say that both in the Greek and Cypriot cases something had to be done for 
creditors not to lose everything and to avoid systemic shocks in the countries and at 
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EU level.  The issue is who would bear the costs.  Kudos to diplomacy that arrived at 
a solution without a war.  But is this the kind of diplomatic outcomes that one would 
like to have?  If I take my car to a friend’s house because I go abroad for a while and 
do not want to leave it in the street, and when I return she tells me “sorry I had to sell 
the car because my investment decisions and entrepreneurial risks I took proved to 
be lemons and you will have pay instead of me” how would you rate that act – other 
than theft?  
 
Conclusions 
 
What can diplomacy do in cases like economic migration, refugees or insolvency, like 
in Greece and Cyprus?   
 
I would say the first thing for diplomats to do is, of course, to be patriotic and never 
forget that their first duty is towards serving the interests of their countries.  But instead 
of being hard “colorless bureaucrats” and “yes men”, they can make their job a two-
way street by sensitizing their bosses to what is 
going at the other end of the road.  To give flesh 
to this proposition let me site George Horton 
(1859–1942) who was the U.S. Consul General 
in a Middle Eastern country and witnessed one 
of the first systematic ethnic cleansing in modern 
times.   
 
 He resigned just after the massacres of Christians peaked that included the public 
torture and mutilation of religious leaders before they died.  He raised his voice and 
used his pen to argue that the Allied Powers of the time (equivalent to the West in our 
days), shamefully ignored the plight of the beleaguered Christian populations "without 
even a word of protest by any civilized government".   
 
And he pointed out that pious western Christians were deluded in thinking they were 
making missionary headway in the Muslim world.  We all remember President Bush's 
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reference to a "crusade" against terrorism, which passed almost unnoticed by 
Americans, rang alarm bells in Europe. The then French foreign minister, Hubert 
Vedrine commented “"We have to avoid a clash of civilizations at all costs".  And the 
cafeteria in the US congress stop serving French fries.  Instead it started selling 
Freedom fries.  
 
Second, diplomats, politicians and all of us should recognize that all is about a never 
ending struggle for more “bread” – from food to things and moneys.  From the Laetoli 
chaps to the financial crisis and the Greek bail-out and Cypriot bail-in, the rich rely on 
power and fraud, and the weak on running away from trouble – let it be through 
economic migration or seeking refuge.  
 
Third, and finally, let us be honest. Let us just implement what we have and do so 
honestly.  The 1951 Convention on the Refugees is one starting point. And let us, the 
small fish, apply what the big fish does:  For example, the EU and the US have now 
legislation that restricts the use of government bail-outs.    
 
The sentiment against the “socialization of debt” is that citizens should not have to pay 
for entrepreneurial mistakes and rescuing the banks by losing their jobs, homes and 
incomes.  The trillions we have paid to avoid the consequences of the liberalization of 
the global market that started in Britain in the 1980s would have been more than 
enough to avoid what is looming in terms of local conflict becoming generalized and 
economic deprivation becoming universalized.   
 
If diplomacy is defined as “the first inexact science that remains the last of the fine 
arts” let’s keep it like that but on the basis of trust, honesty and universal human rights.  
Let’s stop embracing the logic of “it would be better to be alone”: The world is now 
globalized economically which means that it is globalized no matter if we like it or not 
– punto.   
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All in all: Let’s avoid creating new words ending in “xit”, like … Grexit. Instead let’s fi-
xit.  
 
Thank you.  
 
Professor Zafiris Tzannatos  
12 September 2016 
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       ABOUT KEYNOTE SPEAKER 1 
 
RT. HON. DAME MARGARET BECKETT 
HONOURABLE MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT 
FOR DERBY SOUTH 
 
Margaret Beckett MP is a British Labour Party politician who is 
the Member of Parliament for the constituency of Derby South. 
Mrs Beckett was first elected to Parliament in 1974 and held 
junior positions in the governments of Harold Wilson and James 
Callaghan. She lost her seat in 1979 but returned to the House 
of Commons in 1983 and became a senior member of the Labour 
Party.  
 
She was elected Deputy Leader of the Labour Party in 1992 and was briefly its leader 
in 1994 following the premature death of John Smith, the first woman to occupy either 
role. 
 
After Labour's victory in the 1997 general election, Mrs Beckett became a member of 
Tony Blair's Cabinet. Initially the President of the Board of Trade, she was later the 
Leader of the House of Commons and Secretary of State for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs.  
 
In 2006, Mrs Beckett was appointed British Foreign Secretary, making her the first 
woman to hold the position, and, after Margaret Thatcher, the second woman to hold 
one of the Great Offices of State. 
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Margaret Beckett is currently a member of the Top Level Group of UK 
Parliamentarians for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. 
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     ABOUT KEYNOTE SPEAKER 2 
HIS EXCELLENCY MR. EURIPIDES L 
EVRIVIADES 
HIGH COMMISSIONER OF THE REPUBLIC 
OF CYPRUS 
 
Euripides L Evriviades is the current High Commissioner for the 
Republic of Cyprus to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland. Before assuming this post, he was Deputy 
Permanent Secretary/Political Director of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (Jan., 2012–Nov., 2013) serving intermittently as Ag. 
Permanent Secretary. Prior, he served as Ambassador / 
Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe (Nov., 
2008–Jan., 2012), having also chaired its Rapporteur Group on 
External Relations (2011).  Previously, he was Political Director of the Ministry (2006-
2008), having concurrent accreditation to the State of Kuwait, pro tem Nicosia.   
 
Mr Evriviades was Ambassador to the United States of America and non-resident High 
Commissioner to Canada, serving concomitantly as: the Permanent Representative 
to the International Civil Aviation Organization; the Permanent Observer to the 
Organization of American States; and Representative to the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (2003-2006). He also served as Ambassador to the 
Netherlands (2000-2003) and to Israel (1997-2000). Earlier in his career, he held 
positions at Cypriot embassies in Bonn, Germany (1986-1988); Moscow, 
USSR/Russia (1988-1993); and Tripoli, Libya (1995).  
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On 20 April 2015 he was voted by his peers in London as Diplomat of Year from 
Europe, an award of The Diplomat Magazine (est. 1947). On 15 January 2006, he 
received in Washington, DC, the King Legacy Award for International Service, 
bestowed upon him by the Committee on the International Salute to the Life and 
Legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., A Man for All Nations.  He was honored in The 
Hague as the “Ambassador of the Year" by the Stichting Vrienden van Saur ("Friends 
of Saur") Foundation, a Dutch social and philanthropic society (October 2003).  
 
Other decorations include the Great Commander of the Order of the Orthodox Knights 
of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher (Jerusalem, February 2000); and the Order of 
Merit (First Class) of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bonn, March 1989). 
 
High Commissioner Evriviades holds a Master's degree in Public Administration 
(MPA-policy area of concentration: International Affairs and Security) from the John F 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (1984) which he attended as a 
Fulbright Fellow. He graduated (cum laude, 1976) with a Bachelor of Science degree 
in Business Administration from the University of New Hampshire.  
 
He received a Doctor of Laws, Honoris Causa, from his alma mater, the University of 
New Hampshire (21 May 2005).  He was born in Larnaca, Cyprus, on 6 August 1954.  
He is married to Anastasia Iacovidou-Evriviades, an attorney-at-law. He has an avid 
interest in the arts, especially music, as well as in antiquities, cartography and 
motorcycling.  
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               ABOUT KEYNOTE SPEAKER 3 
PROFESSOR ZAFIRIS TZANNATOS 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIST AND POLICY 
CONSULTANT; FELLOW, LEBANESE 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES 
Zafiris Tzannatos is an economist living in Lebanon where he 
was previously Professor and Chair of the Economics 
Department at the American University of Beirut.  He has served 
as Advisor to the Managing Director of the World Bank where he 
was also Manager for the Middle East and North Africa region 
as well as Leader of the Global Child Labour Programme that he 
initiated.  
 
More recently, he was Senior Advisor for all Arab States at the ILO office in Beirut and, 
before that, for governments in the Middle East and the GCC including Lebanon 
(Ministry of Social Affairs), Qatar (Planning Council), and the UAE (Abu Dhabi 
Executive Council).  He received his First Degree from the University of Athens, 
Doctorate from the University of London and Executive Education from Harvard/ 
INSEAD/ Stanford and the Kennedy School of Government.  
 
He has held senior academic and research appointments in the UK and the rest of 
Europe, visited more than 65 countries and worked with regional and international 
organisations as well as governments of industrialised, transition, emerging and 
developing economies across all continents.  
His publications include 14 books and monographs, and more than 200 reports and 
papers in the areas of development strategy, labour economics, education, gender, 
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child labour and broader social policy. His current research is on the euro-crisis and 
the post-2010 developments in the Arab region. 
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     ABOUT KEYNOTE SPEAKER 4 
HIS EXCELLENCY, IVAN ROMERO-
MARTINEZ 
HONDURAN AMBASSADOR 
Prior to his new appointment, Mr. Romero-
Martinez, was posted as Ambassador, 
Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations in New York. He is a career 
diplomat since 1971, having served as his 
country’s Ambassador to many countries, 
including Spain, Egypt, Morocco, Dominican 
Republic, Jamaica, Haiti, Colombia, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, United 
Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Ireland. He also represented his 
country at the ambassadorial level at the United Nations in Switzerland and at the 
European Union.  
 
Other assignments in his country’s diplomatic service include the post of Deputy 
Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (OAS). Mr. 
Romero-Martinez also held several positions at Honduras’ Embassy in the United 
States, including that of Counsellor, and at Honduras’ Embassy in Canada, where he 
served as Counsellor, Minister Counsellor and Chargé d’Affaires.  
 
At home, Mr. Romero-Martinez served as Special Adviser to the President of 
Honduras with the rank of Secretary of State.  
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Mr. Romero-Martinez received a degree in law and social sciences from the National 
University of Honduras. He went on to earn a Ph.D. in international relations from the 
Catholic University of Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic. His other areas of 
study include international law and integration politics at John Hopkins University in 
the United States; international commerce at the Centre of Compared Studies in 
Buenos Aires, Argentina; and studies on European integration at the University of 
Brussels in Belgium.  
 
Ambassador Romero-Martinez has been honoured by being bestowed with 
condecorations among others by the governments of Brazil, Spain, Dominican 
Republic, Colombia, Mexico, Holy See, Panama and Taiwan.  
 
Ambassador Romero-Martinez has published many works of which some are: Strikes 
in Honduran Legislation; Honduras and International Treaties; Cultural Aspects of 
Olanchito; Honduras is Another Thing; General Maximo Gomez in Honduras; 
Precedents and Perspectives of the Central American Common Market and various 
studies and articles in national and international newspapers and magazines.  
 
Born on 1 August 1949 in Olanchito, Honduras, Mr. Romero-Martinez is married with 
two children.  
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               CONFERENCE PROGRAMME 
MONDAY 12TH SEPTEMBER 2016 
 
 
9:00am   Registration - Reception 
9:30am   Welcome & Opening Address with Professor Kath Mitchell 
10am    Keynote Address 1 – Room FG101 
The Rt. Hon. Dame Margaret Beckett 
   Honourable Member of Parliament for Derby South  
    
11am    Keynote Address 2 – Room FG101 
Professor Zafiris Tzannatos 
Senior International Consultant for Development Strategy and 
Social Policy 
 
12pm    Refreshments 
 
12:15pm   Keynote Address 3 – Room FG101 
   His Excellency Mr. Euripides L Evriviades 
   High Commissioner for the Republic of Cyprus 
    
1:15pm – 2pm  Lunch 
 
2pm    Keynote Address 4 – Room FG101 
His Excellency, Ivan Romero-Martinez 
Honduran Ambassador
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  CONCURRENT PAPER PRESENTATION    
SESSIONS 
Session 1:  
 3pm – 4.30 p.m.  
Chair: Prof. Zafiris Tzannatos 
Venue: Room FG202 
Session 2:  
3pm – 4.30 p.m. 
Chair: Dr. David Patton 
Venue: Court Room 
Session 3:  
3pm – 4.30 p.m. 
Chair: Prof. Alexander Nunn 
Venue: Room FG204 
Paper 1: 
Reconnecting People with 
Politics:  Social Media & 
Changing Interaction Between 
Government and the Governed 
Presenters: Dr. Paul G. Nixon & 
Professor Rajash Rawal 
Head of Research (RESCU), 
Principal Lecturer in European 
Studies, The Hague University of 
Applied Sciences, Netherlands 
Paper 2 
An Assessment of the 
Prevent Strategy within UK 
Counter Terrorism & The 
Implications for Policy 
Makers, Communities and 
Law Enforcement 
Presenter: Dr. Phil Henry  
Director of Multi-Faith Centre 
and Senior Lecturer in 
Sociology, University of Derby 
Paper 3 
Current Security Implications 
in the Balkans, with a Focus on 
Macedonia 
 
Presenter: Prof. Robert Hudson  
 
Professor of European History 
and Cultural Politics, University of 
Derby 
Paper 4 
The Politics of Fear: Religion(s), 
Conflict and Diplomacy 
Presenter: Prof. Paul Weller:  
(Fractional) Professor, Centre for 
Trust, Peace and Social Relations, 
Coventry University; Emeritus 
Professor, University of Derby; and 
(Non-Stipendiary) Research Fellow 
in Religion and Society, Regent's 
Park College, University of Oxford. 
Paper 5 
The Dimensions of Rural 
Unrest: The Mediterranean 
Region in the 19th Century 
Presenter: Dr. Baris Cayli:  
 
Research Fellow in 
Criminology 
College of Law, Humanities 
and Social Sciences 
University of Derby 
Paper 6 
Perceptions of Psychological 
Coercion and Human 
Trafficking in England: 
Beginning to Know the 
Unknown 
Presenters: Dr David Walsh, 
(Dando, C., & Brierley, R.): 
 
Acting Head of College Research, 
College of Law Humanities and 
Social Sciences, University of 
Derby 
Paper 7 
Gender Mainstreaming in South 
Korea – a Critical Analysis 
Through Discursive 
Institutionalism Around the Issue 
of Childcare 
 
Presenter: Dr Sung-Hee Lee 
Lecturer in Sociology and Social 
Policy, University of Derby 
 
 
Paper 8 
The Efforts and Level of 
Success Achieved in 
Establishing international 
uniformity in Standards, 
Related to The Role of 
Company Auditors & 
Maintenance of Their 
Independent Position 
 
Presenter: Larry Mead 
Lecturer, College of Law, 
Humanities and Social 
Sciences 
 
Paper 9 
Financial Crime and Financial 
Investigation: The ISIL Model of 
Terrorist Financing & 
Opportunities to Target Hidden 
Economy 
 
Presenters: Dr David Hicks, 
Senior Lecturer in Criminology, 
University of Derby 
 
Mr Craig Hughes  
(PhD Candidate) University of 
Derby 
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Mr Nir Tolkovsky  
(PhD Candidate) University of 
Derby 
 
 
 
Paper 10 
Political Discontent and the 21st 
Century’s Threats to Global 
Peace, Security and Human 
Progress 
 
 
Presenter: Dr Francis Jegede  
Senior Lecturer and Programme 
Leader for International Relations & 
Diplomacy, College of Law, 
Humanities and Social Sciences 
University of Derby 
 
Paper 11 
The Need for New 
Emotionally Intelligent 
Criminal justice & 
Criminological Approaches 
to Help End the ‘War on 
Terror’ 
 
Presenter: Dr David Patton 
Positive Criminologist and 
Senior Lecturer, Learning, 
Teaching & Quality lead for 
Law, Criminology and Social 
and Political Sciences, 
University of Derby 
 
Paper 12 
Children, Humanitarianism and 
Diplomacy in a Digital Age 
 
Presenter: Dr Helen 
Brocklehurst  
Senior Lecturer in International 
Relations, College of Law, 
Humanities and Social Sciences 
University of Derby 
 
Paper 13 
Evolution of The Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine: A Case of 
Diplomacy in International 
Human Rights Adjudication?  
 
Presenter: Mrs Rachael Ita  
Lecturer in Law, College of Law, 
Humanities and Social Sciences 
University of Derby 
 
  
 
4.30pm – 4.45pm   Refreshments 
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 CONFERENCE PANEL SESSION:  
       
TOPIC: DIPLOMACY, RELIGION, VIOLENT 
EXTREMISM &  
THE POLITICS OF FEAR 
 
4.45 pm – 5.30pm JOINT – SPECIAL CONFERENCE PANEL SESSION (FG101) 
 
Chair: Prof Paul Weller, Professor of Inter-Religious Relations 
 
Panel Member/Speaker:  
 
Professor Kevin Bampton  
Director, Police Institute, Derby Law School, University of Derby 
 
Prof. Zafiris Tzannatos 
Senior International Consultant for Development Strategy and 
Social Policy 
 
Prof Alexander Nunn 
Professor of International Political Economy, Leeds Becket 
University 
 
Dr Phil Henry 
Director of Multi-Faith Centre, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, 
University of Derby 
 
Prof Robert Hudson 
Professor of European History and Cultural Politics 
 
Dr Helen Brocklehurst 
Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of Derby 
 
Mr Joel Klaff 
Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Derby 
 
 
5.30 pm   Closing Speech 
   Prof Malcolm Todd 
Dean College of Law, Humanities and Social Sciences 
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PAPER  1:  DISCUSSION PAPER 
RECONNECTING PEOPLE WITH 
POLITICS:  SOCIAL MEDIA & CHANGING 
INTERACTION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND 
THE GOVERNED 
Dr. Paul G. Nixon 
Head of Research (RESCU), Principal Lecturer in 
European Studies, The Hague University of Applied 
Sciences, Netherlands 
 
& 
 
Professor Rajash Rawal 
Professor of European Studies and Faculty Director, The 
Hague University of Applied Sciences, Netherlands 
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     PAPER  2:   
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PREVENT 
STRATEGY WITHIN UK COUNTER TERRORISM 
AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
MAKERS, COMMUNITIES AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
Dr Philip  Henry  
Director of the Multi-Faith Centre and Sociologist, 
University of Derby 
 
Abstract 
 
Prevent – the strategy – has become 
embedded in counter terrorism policy in 
the UK since 2007. It was reviewed and 
re-written in 2011 and has taken on 
even greater significance at the level of 
addressing questions of how to 
challenge and prevent ‘radicalisation’ in 
the context of managing security in the 
nation? This paper examines the 
tensions associated with the Prevent 
strategy and its legacy in the UK since 
2007. It will explore the juxtaposition of 
policy making, which on one hand sees 
the means-ends solutions of avoiding 
further instances of terrorism at all 
costs, set against a potential 
community-based and local authority 
engagement model that foregrounds 
safeguarding against radicalisation and 
extremism in all its forms as a priority  
 
 
when working with communities across 
the country. There are apparent 
tensions in the emphasis of 
implementation and deliver of this 
strategy, which continue to challenge 
perceptions against the growing 
strengthening of fears associated with 
the erosion of civil liberties. The paper 
argues for a significant change in 
awareness of the behaviours and 
attitudes associated with ‘radicalisation’ 
and suggests policy could better reflect 
practice as we move through the 
second decade of the century. 
 
Keywords: Prevent; terrorism; 
radicalisation; safeguarding; policy; 
identity; education.  
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Introduction 
‘Prevent’, as one area of four within the 
UK CONTEST counter-terrorism 
strategy (Home Office, 2003) 1  has 
been criticised, misconceived, 
misunderstood, often times 
communicated without clarity of 
purpose beyond the reading of the 
physical strategy document (Home 
Office, 2007, 2011) and open to a range 
of interpretations. Since 2007 it has 
been criticised by academics, the 
media and press, policy makers and 
members of civil society, not least by 
significant figures in Muslim 
communities (see House of Commons 
CLG Committee (2010) and Home 
Affairs Select Committee (2012) 
reports). Such criticism, ironically, has 
also been levelled at the first version of 
the Prevent Strategy (2007) (Prevent 1) 
by the former Home Secretary (and 
now Prime Minister) Theresa May in the 
Forward to Prevent 2 (2011) in which 
she states: 
                                                        
1 CONTEST includes four strategic elements: 
Pursue (Policing and state Intelligence Services 
MI5, MI6, with potential criminal justice 
outcomes), Prevent (counter terrorism options 
to stop or prevent individuals, being drawn into 
radicalisation/ extremism outside the criminal 
justice system), Protect (directed at 
infrastructure protection across the nation, 
includes transport, power,  borders - ports and 
airports, and contingencies in towns and cities 
The Prevent programme we 
inherited from the last 
Government was flawed. It 
confused the delivery of 
Government policy to promote 
integration with Government 
policy to prevent terrorism. It 
failed to confront the extremist 
ideology at the heart of the threat 
we face; and in trying to reach 
those at risk of radicalisation, 
funding sometimes even 
reached the very extremist 
organisations that Prevent 
should have been confronting.  
 
This paper seeks to bring the context, 
background and implementation of 
Prevent and the ever-shifting 
landscape of counter-terrorism in the 
UK into focus in 2016 2 . The current 
response academically has seen 
various iterations of academic attention 
since the pilot years of 2006 until 2014. 
In the last two years however, there has 
been less direct academic engagement 
with Prevent with a few exceptions: 
(O’Toole et al  2016; Quartermaine, 
2014; Saeed & Johnson, 2016; 
Thomas, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2016,). 
to reduce risks of terrorist attacks) and Prepare 
(in the event of terrorist incidents that cannot 
be stopped; mitigating potential harmful fallout, 
in cost to human life and minimise damage to 
infrastructure). 
2 The limitations of space in the production of 
this paper will result in an overview of the 
historic legacy of the Prevent Strategy, the detail 
of which can be seen in the articles cited, but 
only presented here in summary. 
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There is no logical explanation for fewer 
articles on the subject, suffice to think 
because of the rise of Islamic State it 
has shifted attention in many social 
science disciplines and it is still early in 
academic terms to see the results of 
recent manifestation from Syria and 
Iraq. The other issue of major 
significance (in counter-terrorism 
terms) that directly impacts on the 
Prevent Strategy, is the ‘Statutory Duty’ 
enacted in 2015, which does, like 
Islamic State, require our attention.  
 
The paper will argue that, in line with 
Cantle and Thomas (2015) and 
Thomas (2015, 2016) broader 
education in the classroom that 
involves non-stigmatising values led 
citizenship and anti-extremism 
educational projects through which 
teachers are empowered and have 
confidence to deliver difficult topic 
areas is not insurmountable, and is 
preferable in support of youth 
engagement with the Prevent strategy. 
However, unlike Thomas (2014, 2015, 
2016) and Ragazzi (2014) the author 
would like to suggest that the flaws of 
Prevent 1 (responsible for most of the 
critique of the strategy) are being put 
behind us at policy level and being 
recognised by the current government, 
who appear to be seeking a greater 
collaborative approach and potentially 
more meaningful partnership with 
Muslim communities and other 
stakeholders (see Middle East Eye 
[online] - Home Affairs Select 
Committee Report Aug, 2016) 
compared with early years 
manifestations. This may not however 
necessarily change some areas of 
public opinion, especially if rebranding 
not reconceptualising the strategy is the 
outcome?   
 
This study draws on a review of 
academic literature between 2006 and 
2016, spanning ten years from pilot 
programmes addressing the 
‘Prevention of Violent Extremism’ to 
date. The study works by summarising 
the impact and shift in policy and 
strategy in the UK in relation to Prevent 
1, and 2 and in the context of Islamic 
State’s emergence and its 
interpretation of religiously-inspired 
radical forms of Islam. It considers the 
impact of Islamic State on Prevent 2 in 
the UK. Within the review of academic 
studies are significant empirical works 
(Kundnani, 2009, 2012; Millings, 2013; 
Mythen, 2012; Pantazis & Pemberton, 
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2009; O’Toole et al 2013, 2016; 
Thomas, 2014) that help in 
consideration of how evidence at grass 
roots level connects with the thesis that 
academically, many authors are 
grounding their work in past flaws of 
early Prevent 1? It asks if too little 
attention is being given to the details of 
the shift towards widening 
professionalization post the 2015 
implementation of the duty on Prevent. 
This includes how best to grapple with 
problematic concepts like 
‘radicalisation’, both at the level of 
accumulating important knowledge that 
could impact on the safeguarding of 
individuals (under the duty) and at the 
level of dispelling myths that Muslim 
communities are both ‘risky and at risk’ 
(Heath-Kelly, 2013) in a prior 
homogenisation of collective religious 
and cultural identities which has 
occurred in unhelpful ways.  
 
Tensions, Academic and 
Societal? 
 
Broadly and in summary, the main 
critiques of Prevent between 2007 and 
its review by the former coalition 
government in 2010; what Thomas, 
(2014) calls Prevent 1, and its re-writing 
in 2011(Prevent 2), fall into four areas: 
1) An over emphasis on Muslim 
communities and individuals creating a 
‘suspect community’, including 
allegations of ‘spying’ or using Prevent 
as an intelligence gathering tool and/or 
form of discipline curtailing Muslim 
social and cultural capital (Birt, 2009; 
Heath-Kelly, 2013; Martin, 2014;  
Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; 
Thomas, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012, 
2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2016). Here the 
levels of scrutiny were described as 
disproportionate to the level of threat 
and ignoring other forms of extremism 
including a resurgent far-right; 2) 
specifically targeted funding for Muslim 
communities creating ‘resource envy’ 
(DCLG Committee, 2010) from other 
communities of minority and majority 
ethnicities; 3) much of the community 
development work within Muslim 
communities (between 2007-2010) 
appears to have been associated with 
Prevent 1 (counter-terrorism funding). 
Funding was provided to mainly 
conservative, or traditional Muslim 
leaders/groups which reinforced 
generational tensions and created 
divisions in communities; and 4) local 
authorities and the Department for 
Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG) responsible for the funding at 
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that time (2007-2010) appear to have 
conflated community cohesion on one 
hand with counter terrorism on the 
other3, which resulted in confusion both 
within and across Muslim communities, 
civil society broadly and within state 
agencies (police, local authorities and 
government departments). 
 
In 2011 the revised version of Prevent 
(Prevent 2) redefined both its content 
and the government department taking 
control of the agenda; now hosted by 
the Office for Security and Counter 
Terrorism (OSCT) within the Home 
Office. As a result there were some 
significant shifts in emphasis and 
Prevent 2 attempted to implement 
solutions to earlier criticism (outlined 
above). What followed was the 
adoption of many (if not all) of the 
recommendations of the coalition 
government’s 2011 review, which was 
based on evidence to earlier 
Parliamentary committees, which had 
examined the value and efficacy of 
Prevent between 2009 and 2011 and 
root causes for violent radicalisation 
between 2010 and 2012. 
                                                        
3 The conflation of these apparently opposed 
ideas (community cohesion and counter 
terrorism) will be discussed later in the paper. 
 
Criticism of Prevent 2 however shifted 
emphasis with that of the strategy. In 
other words, concerns about the 
securitisation and policy contradiction 
of the cohesion agenda (Ragazzi, 
2012, 2014; Thomas, 2012, 2014, 
2015. 2016) was shaped around a 
discourse that saw funds reduced for 
Prevent work and a tightening of access 
to resources, which had until that point 
been provided with little monitoring or 
accountability. In addition, Thomas 
(2016) claims the Prevent Statutory 
Duty in 2015 increased the 
securitisation threat through its 
unnecessary influence in the state 
education sector (Thomas, 2016), 
broadly impacting on Schools, Colleges 
and Higher Education Institutions 
(Thomas, 2015, 2016; Saeed & 
Johnson, 2016). References continued 
to ‘suspect communities’ under Prevent 
2, through a so-called essentialising 
approach to Muslims in the nation. This 
idea has its origins in Hillyard’s early 
thesis, (1993) and is reflected in 
Pantazis and Pemberton’s (2009) 
comparison of former Irish dissidents 
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being the ‘old suspects’, and Muslims 
under Prevent, being the ‘new 
suspects’ that replaced the Irish. In 
addition Heath-Kelly suggests that 
Muslims are seen as both ‘risky and at 
risk’ (2013). Greer’s (2010) rebuttal of 
the ‘suspect community thesis’ 
however, adds to a rich debate about 
how and to what extent is the empirical 
evidence both sufficient and specifically 
evidencing serious questions of 
generalising ‘Muslims as suspects’. He 
also critiques the idea of Muslim  
‘material discrimination’ – influencing 
extremism, and as a consequence, 
challenges the credibility of the idea 
that Muslims are the subject of 
wholesale ‘securitisation’. This raises a 
question we will address later - is the 
evidence sufficiently robust, is it 
representative, has it the validity in 
sample terms and what can we 
legitimately claim about responses from 
research populations?  
 
To add to the already vexed debates 
about securitisation of Muslim 
communities, in 2013/14 we saw the 
rise of Islamic State (IS) in Syria and 
Iraq. This was foreseen by security and 
intelligence services, but its impact 
domestically came much later. As 
Hewitt (2007) points out the security 
and intelligence services were playing 
catch up, as had been the case in the 
late 1990s when the emphasis moved 
from the IRA to international terrorism 
by the early 2000s. According to Hewitt 
that  ‘was no easy matter’ (2007:94), 
nor was the shift from Al Qa’eda (AQ) 
to IS in Iraq and the subsequent 
concern it created among security 
officials and government. The tensions 
in Iraq played out between Sunni and 
Shia militants under Abu Musab al 
Zarqawi (forming Islamic State in Iraq) 
from 2003, and affiliating with AQ in 
October 2004 (Stern and Berger, 2015) 
was a sign of things to come.  
 
In so far as translating the impact of IS 
to UK domestic life is concerned, 
specifically, challenging western liberal 
democratic values and importing 
transnational terror to UK shores, little 
was known at the level of policing about 
IS. Even less was known about its 
potential draw to many young people 
and families prepared to leave the UK 
to travel to Syria and/or Iraq. The 
reinforcing of a traditional historic 
model of Muslim civil society through 
the historic Caliphate, despite how it 
was set up and the implications of IS 
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taking violence to an extreme level, did 
not deter those who saw an opportunity 
they could not foresee, by staying at 
home. As a consequence the Prevent 2 
legislative upgrading of the Counter-
Terrorism and Security Act, 2015 (CTS 
- bringing about the Statutory Duty) was 
hastened along on the back of 
significant numbers travelling to Syria 
and Iraq between 2014-2016 - reported 
by the BBC as 850 travellers to date 
(BBC News database, 12th Aug, 2016). 
Of those approximately half have 
returned to the UK, while more than 200 
have died, been convicted or remain in 
Syria or Iraq. Known deaths are 
currently at 66, convictions 64 and 
believed to still be in Iraq or Syria 81. 
 
The ‘Digital Caliphate’ as it became 
known (Atwan, 2015) created a new 
and pervasive threat to national 
security under Prevent 2. The threat 
manifest in untold numbers of people 
having access to IS recruitment through 
social media platforms in everyday use, 
like for example: Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram, and one-to-one digitally 
encrypted platforms like Whats App, 
Ask fm, kick it etc. The threat from IS 
and the Caliphate ideal created a 
significant shift in attention for Prevent 
Police Case Management (PCM) and 
Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) officers, 
which for a time almost eclipsed 
concerns about AQ and continues to be 
the persistent threat according to the 
state. This additional complexity only 
added to even greater tensions in 
relation to civil liberties, as now the 
surveillance question on social media 
outlets, web-based services and one-
to-one messaging was firmly in the 
spotlight. 
 
What Does Prevent 2 ask us to 
consider? 
Prevent 2 in 2011 explicitly states in 
‘Guiding Principles; a Framework for 
Prevent’: that it addresses all forms of 
terrorism, prioritising against the 
greatest level of threat; it will not spy on 
or condone spying on anyone in 
community, stating:  
“Prevent must not be used as a 
means for covert spying on 
people or communities. Trust in 
Prevent must be improved” 
(Prevent, 20116 [3.15]). 
  
It will not fund extremists; it will protect 
freedoms of speech, but requires 
appropriate challenge to extremists 
(including non-violent extremists), and 
on the question of integration has this 
to say: 
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Prevent depends on a 
successful integration strategy. 
But integration alone will not 
meet Prevent objectives. And 
Prevent must not assume 
control of or allocate funding to 
integration projects, which have 
a value far wider than security 
and counter-terrorism: the 
Government will not securitise 
its integration strategy. This has 
been a mistake in the past 
(Prevent, 2011:6 [3.14]). 
 
Prevent 2 objectives state:  
Within this overall framework the 
new Prevent strategy will 
specifically: [1] respond to the 
ideological challenge of 
terrorism and the threat we face 
from those who promote it; [2] 
prevent people from being 
drawn into terrorism and 
ensure that they are given 
appropriate advice and support; 
and [3] work with sectors and 
institutions where there are 
risks of radicalisation which we 
need to address. 
 
On the face of things and based on the 
explicit response addressed above to 
previous criticism, Prevent 2 would 
appear to be making good (in large part 
and on paper) its previous misgivings, 
which are challenged and criticised by 
a number of academics cited in this 
paper (see list above). This making 
good does not however exonerate 
overzealous policing or the 
inappropriate use of power or influence 
in addressing the objectives or guiding 
principles. The strategy as written is 
extant and has not been altered since 
2011. In addition to the previous 
Prevent 1 version, Prevent 2 makes 
three fundamental changes in face of its 
critics: 1) It explicitly draws a line in the 
sand on secrecy, stating it will only work 
to intervene or offer advice and support 
overtly, transparently and with the 
knowledge and consent of the 
individual’s it works with; 2) It will only 
work in the non-criminal space, that is, 
in order to prevent criminalisation 
though the criminal justice system 
(CJS). For this to work individuals must 
cooperate by agreeing to work with 
either formal or informal intervention 
providers (subject to the Channel multi-
agency referral process, or informally 
outside it). Prevent will, through 
counselling and other support seek to 
work with individuals to keep them out 
of the CJS; and 3) emphasises local 
authority Prevent co-ordinators (many 
of whom are taking a lead) and multi-
agency function, both in relation to 
Channel referrals and local level 
community engagement.   
 
Prevent’s 2007-2010 legacy however, 
seems to carry the weight of academic 
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and other research participants critical 
opinions beyond the early period and to 
date. This raises the question, how 
widespread are these reported early 
misgivings in relation to the strategy 
and its implementation and are they 
being substantiated by the later Prevent 
2 version of the strategy? Prevent 2, as 
presented above, has documented its 
intention to change, learning from the 
previous mistakes. We will come back 
to this question and the representation 
issue that flows from it later, but first let 
us consider the one substantive change 
to Prevent 2 - the implementation of the 
Prevent Statutory Duty in 2015. 
 
There are significant changes brought 
about in the move that saw Prevent 
take on a statutory function relative to 
the implementation of the Statutory 
Duty for Prevent under new legislation 
(The Counter-Terrorism and Security 
Act, 2015). Prevent Duty Guidance 
(2015) states:  
Our Prevent work is intended to 
deal with all kinds of terrorist 
threats to the UK. The most 
significant of these threats is 
currently from terrorist 
organisations in Syria and Iraq, 
and Al Qa’ida associated 
groups. But terrorists associated 
with the extreme right also pose 
a continued threat to our safety 
and security (Prevent Duty 
Guidance, 2015:6). 
 
 
The guidance under the new duty sets 
out where the threats are likely to come 
from and takes a ‘risk-based approach’ 
in addressing the sector specific 
requirements for the ‘specified 
authorities’, which includes: Local 
Authorities, Police, Prisons and 
Probation, Schools, Further and Higher 
Education and Health. There are seven 
broad areas covered by the duty, which 
include, 1) Leadership, 2) productive 
cooperation, 3) staff understanding 
radicalisation and training in relation to 
risk/vulnerability, referral (into Channel 
or other programmes), 4) differentiating 
extremism from terrorism, 5) obtaining 
support, knowledge of challenge, 6) 
ICT safety and 7) monitoring and 
inspection, described as follows: 
[Under the heading of 
‘leadership’] establish or use 
existing mechanisms for 
understanding the risk of 
radicalisation; ensure staff 
understand the risk and build the 
capabilities to deal with it; 
communicate and promote the 
importance of the duty; and 
ensure staff implement the duty 
effectively. 
 
Demonstrate evidence of 
productive co-operation, in 
particular with local Prevent co-
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ordinators, the police and local 
authorities, and co-ordination 
through existing multi-agency 
forums, for example Community 
Safety Partnerships. 
 
Frontline staff who engage with 
the public should understand 
what radicalisation means and 
why people may be vulnerable to 
being drawn into terrorism as a 
consequence of it. They need to 
be aware of what we mean by 
the term “extremism” and the 
relationship between extremism 
and terrorism. 
 
Staff need to know what 
measures are available to 
prevent people from becoming 
drawn into terrorism and how to 
challenge the extremist ideology 
that can be associated with it. 
They need to understand how to 
obtain support for people who 
may be being exploited by 
radicalising influences. 
 
All specified authorities subject 
to the duty will need to ensure 
they provide appropriate training 
for staff involved in the 
implementation of this duty. 
Such training is now widely 
available (Prevent Duty 
Guidance, 2015: 6-8) 
 
Additionally, statutory workers need to 
know about Information sharing 
protocols monitoring and inspection by 
a sector specific inspector, for example, 
OFSTED in schools-based education, 
or HEFCE in the higher education 
sector. 
 
In principle much of what is required for 
compliance under the ‘duty’ appears to 
build on existing mechanisms within 
sectors, but assumes some prior 
knowledge, which is not always present 
in relation to Prevent more broadly. The 
need to risk assess and action plan and 
create some sense of partnership 
working (productive cooperation) with 
local Prevent coordinators (steering 
groups) or local authority equivalents in 
Community Safety, should not be too 
onerous a demand against existing 
safeguarding risk assessments. 
However, there are some ‘specified 
authorities’ under the ‘duty’, for 
example, schools, where an implicit 
response by the Department for 
Education (DfE 2015a, 2015b, 2015c) 
includes advice/guidance on 
safeguarding and Prevent and how to 
connect British Values with the 
Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural 
Development of children and young 
people (SMSC). In so doing 
foregrounding SMSC defined by British 
values against the definition of 
extremism in the statutory duty (and in 
Prevent 2). 
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The definition of extremism is defined 
as: 
vocal or active opposition to 
fundamental British values, 
including democracy, the rule of 
law, individual liberty and mutual 
respect and tolerance of 
different faiths and beliefs. 
Including calls for the death of 
members of the armed forces at 
home or overseas (Counter-
Terrorism & Security Act, 2015). 
 
The definition is too vague, requires a 
largely subjective test, and presents an 
unacceptable conclusion – that active 
or vocal opposition to democracy, rules 
of law, individual liberty or tolerance 
etc., equals extremism? This removes 
any context or consequence for exactly 
what constitutes vocal or active 
opposition, and in that sense appears 
unhelpfully arbitrary. In practical terms, 
it is unworkable for educationalists that 
cannot be expected to make 
judgements based on the definition 
above, and it will undoubtedly receive 
legal challenge at some future point in 
time.  
 
However, in so far as developing 
experiential learning experiences 
around democracy, rules, individual 
liberty and mutual respect and 
tolerance of different faiths and beliefs 
is concerned, and setting aside the 
extremism question for a moment, this 
definition does inculcate democratic 
and cohesive elements within it, given 
its universal potential to be applied to 
all. From the perspective of a fourfold 
model around which to develop SMSC 
this would, under any other 
circumstances provide a useful starting 
point for teachers in thinking about the 
background to citizenship teaching and 
learning experiences, using the 
principles of spiritual, moral, social and 
cultural development. The author would 
like to suggest in principle, that it could 
also form the basis for some of the 
more difficult and necessary debates 
that need to take place among 
educators and pupils in relation to 
radicalisation, its causes and concerns 
for all in schools and communities.  
 
There are however other issues 
reflected in what the Prevent Duty 
requires of professionals in ‘specified 
authorities’ including schools. From the 
perspective of managing risk, 
identifying best practice and under the 
duty of care to those under eighteen 
years in school, it presents a 
safeguarding dilemma. If the inference 
is that to make a decision about a pupils 
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physical and/or psychological well 
being is premised on ‘who is in vocal or 
active opposition to fundamental British 
Values’ – vis-à-vis the four elements of 
the definition above, is this something 
that teachers (including their 
designated safeguarding leads) can 
make a call on? Do they have the 
knowledge, skills and judgement to 
address these, now safeguarding 
aspects under the duty, relating to 
questions of radicalisation/extremism 
or moving into or out of terrorism? 
Having delivered a bespoke form of 
Prevent training to more than 1000 
teachers in Derby and Derbyshire 
schools in the last three years, the 
author would say not. 
 
Thomas (2016) raises very important 
issues in relation to education and the 
need for a wider level of open 
citizenship-based engagement with 
what he describes as ‘anti-extremism 
education’, using a human rights-based 
model in which more open debates 
without fear of sanction can take place. 
He states:  
 
Only through such citizenship 
education, with a human rights 
framework at its core, will young 
people be equipped with the 
individual and peer group 
resilience to examine and reject 
ideologies that promote hatred 
and violence (Thomas, 
2016:184).  
 
The author supports this idea, together 
with wider teacher training. Thomas 
(2014) also criticises Prevent 1, for 
attempting then failing to address the 
needs in education. It should be 
recognised that the statutory duty has 
changed the landscape irrevocably 
(subject to Parliamentary intervention), 
and the call for safeguarding training to 
be delivered with a national footprint put 
out by the Department For Education in 
the summer of 2016, is an indication (a 
year on from the advent of the Statutory 
Duty) of the lack of planning and 
foresight, by government to manage 
the teacher training aspects. Too few 
teachers have the knowledge, or 
confidence to develop open debates 
and ‘anti-extremism education’ and we 
should acknowledge (in line with 
Thomas, 2016) that by not learning the 
lessons of previous ‘white racist’ issues 
in our schools, allowed them to be 
driven underground. It would equally be 
an error not to correct the lack of 
educational engagement with the 
difficulties presented by extremism 
regardless of how unpalatable such 
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views might be (Phillips, Tse & 
Johnson, 2011). 
 
Implications for Policy Makers 
Communities and Law 
Enforcement 
 
The criticisms and questions raised by 
many academics, some policy makers, 
law enforcement and members of the 
public reflects the on going discussion 
about the efficacy and practicality of a 
forward thinking counter-terrorism 
policy framework in which Prevent, as 
pointed out by Pantucci  (when talking 
about counter-terrorism strategies) 
raises the security versus civil liberties 
question, stating: 
 
Unlike dictatorships or other 
authoritarian regimes, 
democracies are inherently fluid 
and must be responsive to their 
public’s demands, meaning that 
the parameters of the debate on 
where we draw the line between 
civil liberties and public 
protection is also likely to be a 
fluid one (Pantucci, 2010: 265). 
 
Critiques of the operationalisation of 
Prevent 2, as opposed to its policy 
position on paper, appear to be raising 
further questions, many of which are 
addressed in the literature covered in 
this paper, but often not 
incontrovertibly. For those who suggest 
Prevent is unworkable and needs a 
strategy change as the only solution, 
what does the alternative look like? Is 
then Prevent 2 a bridge too far for post-
industrial UK liberal democracy or has 
it been misconceived, confused with 
Pursue (in counter-terrorism terms) and 
associated with legislative tightening of 
government policy to impact terrorist 
threats (in the criminal justice context) 
to its detriment?  
 
The only substantial material change to 
Prevent 2, cannot be played down and 
the implications of the enactment of the 
duty under the Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Act 2015 (CTS) will continue to 
raise debate about it’s implementation, 
and as discussed above specifically, in 
how it impacts on education. There are 
similar conversations to be had about 
the duty’s impact on the other ‘specified 
authorities’ - health, local authorities, 
prisons and the police themselves. 
Prevent 2 has seen no updating or 
rewriting since 2011. In reviewing the 
critique presented earlier in relation to 
Prevent, the Prevent 2 Guiding 
Framework apparently addresses 
these criticisms directly, e.g. 
securitisation, spying and cohesion 
(described as integration).  The 
ICDIR 2016 – International Conference on Diplomacy & International Relations    
 
 
53 
derby.ac.uk/lhss 
strategy’s claims are however disputed 
by Cantle and Thomas (2015), 
Cockburn (2007), Davies (2008), 
Kundnani (2009) and Thomas, (2012, 
2014, 2015, 2016). This raises other 
important policy related questions - is 
Prevent driving community cohesion 
out of local authority agendas (Cantle 
and Thomas, 2015; Thomas, 2012, 
2014, 2015, 2016), or has that idea 
been arrested and reverted in the 
current landscape? Thomas (2016) 
suggests multiculturalism is alive and 
well and cohesion is a new form of 
multiculturalism and not its death. If that 
is the case, given the current 
community development agenda at 
local authority level it would appear to 
embrace social cohesion, regardless of 
central government’s steer on this. 
 
The author also contends that the 
impacts on multi-culturalism of Prevent 
2, are today, less of a ‘policed 
multiculturalism’ (Ragazzi, 2014) on the 
basis that Police Prevent Case 
Management (PCM) within regional 
Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs) has 
seen significant tightening of budgets 
and refocusing of strategy. In many 
cases officers have been removed 
almost completely from educative 
awareness raising (East Midlands 
Regional PCM), and even supporting 
Home Office core deliverables - WRAP 
3 (Workshop for Raising Awareness of 
Prevent). This seeming withdrawal is 
mainly associated with a shift in 
emphasis from Chief Police Officers 
Council due to the Islamic State risk 
and threat that has seen PCM 
resources increasingly used for 
collating and assessing Channel 
referrals (within a multi-agency context) 
and/or for disruption purposes.  
 
While being far from a perfect solution 
Prevent 2, may, as Thomas (2014) 
suggests be seeing an ‘end in sight’ 
finding a new trajectory in 2016, with 
calls for a review in Parliament (as yet 
unpublished Home Affairs Select 
Committee report, Aug 2016) stopping 
short of removing the statutory duty, but 
taking account of a wider 
professionalization and subsequent 
rationalisation of the earlier debates, 
flaws and problems. The emphasis 
would be to focus on a broader public 
need to understand ‘radicalisation’ 
despite its academic ambivalence and 
training and counselling in more 
targeted ways being a possibility 
(Middle East Eye [online] Aug, 2016).  
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The evidence of a necessity to better 
train professionals can be seen in the 
potential impacts of the Prevent Duty on 
Local Authorities, Health, Education, 
the Police, Prisons and Probation 
Services. The Multi-Faith Centre at the 
University of Derby led a bespoke multi-
agency training programme in the East 
Midlands for the last three years, called 
‘Bringing Prevent to the Public Space’. 
The Centre worked with frontline staff 
across the sectors described above. 
That training reveals evidence from 
participants of professional needs to 
better understand the concepts 
associated with terrorism in all its forms 
and specifically far right extremism (a 
feature in the locality); to examine 
pathways towards terrorism, which is 
reflected in the lingua franca of 
‘radicalisation’ and to better understand 
the mundane nature of everyday 
experience that influences individuals. 
Peter Neumann (2012 [online]) 
describes “the three common 
denominators that we know about 
[describing] how people radicalise 
[using] – grievances, ideology and 
mobilisation” and where each is 
influenced and influences the other. To 
deal with these influences requires a 
situational response from 
professionals; a response that by 
necessity, requires a deeper 
knowledge than can be provided by 
WRAP 3 training. Many of these 
professionals will be expected to 
support individuals and they may be 
called upon to make decisions based 
on their knowledge of safeguarding 
against radicalisation.  In addition the 
community and voluntary sector are 
also raising questions about the 
significance of cohesion and how it fits 
with the implementation of Prevent?  
 
These everyday and often mundane 
aspects of life create and shape our 
thinking, development and 
connectivity/interaction, with those to 
whom we feel we belong at a personal 
and collective level and with those we 
oppose and many layers of 
acceptance, tolerance and indifference 
along life’s journey. They include 
racism/discrimination, ideologies of 
politics/ religion and belief, secularising 
society, disillusionment, disassociation, 
disadvantage, exclusion, 
belongingness identity and the vexed 
topic of radicalisation.   
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The idea of radicalisation is often 
challenged (Thomas, 2014, 2015, 
2016). It may be seen as muddying the 
water between understanding terrorism 
and the pathways leading to and from 
terrorism. The topic of radicalisation is 
not made any easier as terrorism itself 
has over one hundred definitions and 
remains one of the most contested 
topics in the study of political violence. 
However, if you seek to remove 
radicalisation conceptually form the 
language that describes the process 
over time   (short or long) the author can 
only describe that which does not 
clearly breach the Terrorism legislation 
as ‘non-terrorism’. This appears 
unhelpful if you are trying to make 
sense of any pre-emptive preventative 
model to avoid the ‘non-terrorist’ 
becoming the terrorist. As a complex 
process radicalisation is just as likely to 
be manifest in everyday conversation 
with your friend in the gym, as it is 
through social media, hate preachers or 
speakers on You Tube and elsewhere. 
Radicalisation assumes and can 
consume those who see 
grievance/injustice, ideology and a way 
to mobilise (Neumann, 2012) how they 
feel. Unfortunately, like the baking of a 
cake, unless you have made one 
before you may be unaware (as are the 
state it seems) of what order the 
ingredients are mixed in, and whether 
the outcome is a so-called ‘radicalised 
individual’, as there are no parameters 
outside the legal tests by which to make 
the judgement. Radicalisation in the UK 
and Europe is associated with norms 
and values, and is subject specific, 
socially charged and difficult to 
articulate. It is often framed in Europe 
as the “rejection of key dimensions of 
modern democratic culture that are at 
the centre of the European value 
system” (Rabasa and Benard, 2015:3). 
This definition is not far from the UK 
version in Prevent 2, and associated 
ideas of democracy, rules, liberty and 
tolerance. 
 
Conclusion 
The paper has examined the critical 
contemporary conversation, which 
frames civil liberties against the 
background of national security. More 
questions than answers are ever likely 
to be the case in exploring an emotive 
and sensitive area like the 
implementation of a counter-terrorism 
strategy that has no parallel or 
equivalent, and has only been in place 
for ten years (including the pilot phase). 
ICDIR 2016 – International Conference on Diplomacy & International Relations    
 
 
56 
derby.ac.uk/lhss 
It was developed as the risk and threat 
unfolded and there is no denying it is 
fraught with mistakes, many of which 
however were identified in the early 
period of Prevent 1. Unfortunately, in 
the context of accuracy and on the face 
of the academic evidence examined 
here, authors of that literature are still 
citing the issues from the period 2007-
2011 as emblematic of Prevent 2, 
(2011-to date). Is there a reason for 
this? Perhaps media stories, and the 
mainly Muslim public’s concerns of the 
earlier period (well documented by 
academics and Parliamentary 
Committees and Reviews) continue to 
reinforce Prevent in the public 
perception as ‘a tainted brand’ as 
Thomas (2014) suggests?  
 
It seems Prevent 2 is unlikely to be 
treated any differently to Prevent 1 by 
its critics, even though there appears to 
be limited evidence, outside of the 
qualitative studies of relatively small 
numbers of participants reinforcing 
some of the specific community 
concerns. The media impact however 
cannot be underestimated and 
changing perceptions of a tainted brand 
is not easy to do. The impact of Prevent 
on individuals is likely to be based on 
the way people feel as a consequence 
of perceptions created by a number 
influencing factors, including collective 
memory. It could be argued that based 
on wider perceptions of Prevent as 
securitised by the state, and the 
influence of negative messaging that it 
is unlikely to change the way people 
appear to feel about it, particularly in 
Muslim communities. That is not to say 
that the criticisms of Prevent are 
unfounded, rather the opposite is likely 
to be the case, given the weight of 
potential evidence. However it would 
certainly help in assessing Prevent 
today, for a wider study to assist with 
quantifying and qualifying the critique 
and concerns by bringing together the 
literature with a national survey of 
communities and professionals in a 
wider study of public opinion.  
 
The significance of such a study has 
only one precedent, in a weighted 
random sample study of Muslim public 
opinion, commissioned by Channel 4 
for a documentary “What British 
Muslims Really Think?” in April 2016, 
(presented by Trevor Phillips - former 
Equality and Human Rights 
Commission chair). The programme 
was seen as controversial by some 
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(see Plunkett in The Guardian, 21st 
April 2016) but not by others 
(Dellingpole, The Spectator, 14th April 
2016). The programme was premised 
on a survey that reflects as close a form 
of Muslim representation as any recent 
study has been able to undertake, and 
has more detail than many others (ICM, 
[online] 2015). ICM Unlimited carried 
out the survey face-to-face, using 
Muslim researchers, polling during two 
periods in 2015. The results were more 
about integration than being security 
specific, but implicitly provided a more 
contented position for those British 
Muslims surveyed than much of the 
academic literature reviewed here 
attests too (see ‘What British Muslims 
Really Think’ Channel 4, 10pm 
Wednesday 13th April 2016 and ICM 
Unlimited [online] ‘C4/Juniper Survey of 
Muslims’ 2015). Methodologically the 
survey focused on a sampling frame 
that adopted areas where 20% of the 
population were Muslim and sought a 
representative random sample of 1008 
participants, described thus: 
  
ICM[s] analysis shows that there 
are 2,014 LSOAs [Lower Super 
Output Areas 4 ] with a 
                                                        
4 Lower Super Output Areas are geographical 
areas covering between 400 and 1,200 
households. 
penetration of at least 20% 
Muslim residents, and that these 
areas cover c.1.4 million 
Muslims – or 51% of Britain’s 
Muslim population. 
 
Results can be seen in greater detail at 
ICM Unlimited [online]. The headlines 
however, reflected in The Guardian, 
(Perraudin, 2016 [online]) suggest 
British Muslims are more likely to feel a 
stronger connection to Britain than the 
population at large (86% said this); and 
91% who took part said they felt a 
strong sense of belonging in their local 
area; additionally 88% of those 
surveyed said Britain was a good place 
for Muslims to live. On this basis the call 
for a more detailed community-focused 
attitudinal survey that addresses 
integration, security (including Prevent) 
and discrimination should be a future 
aspiration for amore nuanced 
understanding of who is speaking for 
who, when it comes to reporting Muslim 
opinions. 
 
We should ask ourselves, is Prevent 
today (in 2016), different to how it was 
conceived and delivered in its early 
years (2007-2011), and what a 
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democratic society might expect of 
governance at the political and 
executive levels given the context of the 
current global position and the UK’s 
relationship to transnational and 
domestic terrorism, including domestic 
aggressive forms of nationalism (and 
occasional violence) that play out in far-
right rhetoric? Should a policy that sits 
as one part of a four part counter-
terrorism strategy address, or seek to 
address, the overlapping and 
intertwined societal issues associated 
with and inclusive of many everyday 
aspects of life, that impact on the life 
choices of individuals (outlined above), 
or are there better ideas out there?  
 
We should not however shy away from 
the challenge to accurately assess 
public and professional feeling, beyond 
where we are currently and we should 
certainly find more opportunities for 
open debate in formal and informal 
education for both children/young 
people and adults, in what Thomas and 
Cantle (2015) and Thomas (2015, 
2016) refer to as “non-stigmatising 
values led citizenship and anti-
extremism educational projects”. 
 
There are a number of areas that 
should be examined in more depth in 
future papers, not least - impacts in 
Health, Education - including the FE 
and HE sectors, and what position do 
Local Authorities currently find 
themselves in, when considering the 
tension between Prevent and local 
community cohesion. Where too are 
the Police in this conversation and what 
are they planning in the context of 
managing Prevent 2; are they about to 
withdraw or reduce their involvement or 
increase their response?  Finally, how 
do Muslims in 2016 feel about Prevent, 
what personal experiences do they 
have of the strategy or wider counter-
terrorism policy, how do they know what 
they know about Prevent, and what 
influences their thinking about it? 
 
By assessing in detail these specific 
areas where Prevent is currently 
functioning we may draw closer to a 
policy implementation that might more 
closely resemble the realities on the 
ground. Research can seek to influence 
government to better understand that 
set of realities and consider how policy 
can better shape life for future 
generations, where openness and 
difficult discussions in all forms of 
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educative experience (formal, informal 
and public) are the norm. 
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Abstract 
 
A Macedonian friend in Skopje 
recently observed that his 
grandmother had lived in five different 
states without ever moving house! 
Macedonia is the smallest state in 
South Eastern Europe with a population 
of only two million inhabitants. Blighted 
by its economic geography, Macedonia 
is a land-locked state with poor 
infrastructure, scarce natural 
resources, and small market potential. 
The country was hit by the 2007 Euro 
crisis and the effects of high youth 
unemployment at 52 per cent continue 
to linger. There have been internal rifts, 
resulting in armed conflict between 
Albanian separatists and the 
Macedonian Army in 2001. Macedonia 
has also been deeply affected by 
migration. There were 90,000 from the 
war in Bosnia-Hercegovina between 
1992-95; then, in the spring of 2001 a 
further 360,000 refugees crossed over  
 
 
 
 
 
the borders from Kosovo, the 
equivalent of 17 per cent of  
Macedonia’s population, raising inter-
ethnic tensions  with the possibility of a 
permanent change to the ethnic 
balance of the country and stretching 
institutional capacities to their limits 
(Pendarovski, 2011) and Macedonia 
continues to be affected by the current 
European refugee crisis that grew 
exponentially throughout  2015 and 
2016. 
Macedonia is defined by its Foreign 
relations. It has problems with all five of 
its immediate neighbours. It has had a 
long dispute with Bulgaria, which 
denies the existence of the Macedonian 
nation and does not recognise the 
Macedonian language. Since 
independence in 1991, there has been 
a long-running naming dispute with 
Greece, which has delayed 
Macedonian entry into the European 
Union and NATO. Albania frequently 
raises concerns over the rights of the 
large ethnic Albanian community in 
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Macedonian which make up twenty per 
cent of the country’s population, added 
to which there have been security spill 
overs from Kosovo, dating from 
NATO’s conflict over Kosovo in 1999 
and the conflict in the north-west of 
Macedonia with the Albanian National 
Liberation Army in 2001. Meanwhile, 
Serbia, once the pivot state in the 
region, denies the autonomy of the 
Macedonian Orthodox Church.  
Twenty-five years into its political 
transition, Macedonia’s future is 
essential to the future European 
security architecture (Liotta and Jebb, 
2001, p.50). Yet, Macedonia’s 
problems are unique and quite different 
to those of all the other so-called 
Yugoslav successor states. This paper 
will set out to explain how this 
seemingly benighted European state is 
actually a poorly understood success. 
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Introduction 
As historical phenomena, religions (as 
well as ideologies) have played varied 
and often ambiguous roles in the 
context of international relations, violent 
conflicts, peace-making and diplomacy 
(Ferguson, 1977; Haynes, 1988), and 
especially so at the interface between 
civilisations informed by Christianity 
and those informed by Islam 
(Armstrong, 1988; Partner, 1997). This 
paper focuses on aspects of those roles 
as the context for these has changed 
over the past half a century within the 
context of a broader setting shaped by 
what has come to be known as the 
“politics of fear” (Furedi, 2006), 
originally shaped by the threat of 
nuclear Mutually Assured Destruction  
 
 
 
 
and now by the threat of global terror 
attacks.  
 
In the earlier part of the 20th century, 
state parties had constituted the 
principal arenas for, and provided the 
key actors in, diplomacy as classically 
understood. But at the same time, and 
especially in the light of the 
development of international human 
rights law and mechanisms that 
followed the end of the Second World 
War, non-state actors from civil society 
groups, movements and organisations 
(including also those of a religious 
character or having a religious 
inspiration) came to play an 
increasingly important role alongside 
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the classical forms of diplomacy 
undertaken by state representatives.  
 
This occurred in parallel with the 
emergence of new challenges that 
faced traditional inter-state diplomacy 
and that came to the fore with the 
development of armed liberation 
movements to achieve national 
independence in the context of an 
overall decolonization process, the 
legitimacy of which had broad 
international recognition. In these 
developments, matters of “internal” 
conflict increasingly came into 
interaction with external relations as 
can variously be seen in the examples 
of the African National Congress’ 
(ANC) struggle against the apartheid 
state of the Republic of South Africa; 
the Zimbabwe African National Union 
(ZANU) and Zimbabwe African 
People’s Union’s (ZAPU) struggle 
against the illegal 1965 unilateral 
declaration of independence of the 
former Southern Rhodesia colonial 
government; the South-West African 
People’s Organisation’s (SWAPO) 
struggle against the colonial inheritance 
and South African rule of South-West 
Africa; and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation’s (PLO) struggle against 
Israeli occupation.  
 
In these instances the movements 
either themselves achieved some 
degree of international recognition 
and/or international collective action in 
relation to at least the root causes of 
their struggles that involved violent 
action, often characterised by others as 
being “terrorist” in nature. Thus, in 
1962, the United Nations 
Organisation’s (UNO) General 
Assembly called for sanctions against 
the Republic of South Africa and 
established a Special Committee 
Against Apartheid (Reddy, 2012); in 
1966, UNO Security Council sanctions 
were invoked against Rhodesia and in 
1972 SWAPO was recognized by the 
UNO General Assembly as the “sole 
legitimate representative” of the 
Namibia’s people (Nyangongi, 1985); 
and the PLO was recognized by the 
UNO General Assembly as 
“representative of the Palestinian 
people”, and the status of a UNO “non-
member observer entity” (Gresh, 1988).  
 
In the same period, revolutionary 
guerilla movements in South and 
Central America posed even further 
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questions and challenges to classical 
inter-state diplomatic practice such as 
Fidel Castro’s 26th July Movement, 
which eventually came to power in 
Cuba 1959; and in Nicaragua, where 
the Sandinista National Liberation Front 
formed part of a Junta of National 
Reconstruction in 1979, and then 
consolidated power on its own from 
1981 onwards; while in El Salvador the 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation 
Front was locked in an ongoing war with 
the military and government of the 
country. In contrast to the case of the 
African liberation movements, the 
struggles of these movements did not 
take place within the more broadly 
recognized framework of direct and 
formal decolonization. However, in the 
case of El Salvador, the UNO became 
involved in peace negotiations in 1990 
and, on January 16, 1992, the 
Chapultepec Peace Agreement was 
signed in Mexico City, formally ending 
the conflict. 
 
Both the African liberation movements 
and the revolutionary movements of 
                                                        
5  Albeit this should more properly be 
described as “really existing socialism”, since 
Communism  was the ideal to which those 
states aspired while building their 
understanding of socialism. 
Central and Latin America, of course, 
emerged within the broader context of 
the so-called “Cold War” conducted 
between the international social, 
political, economic and military forces 
of what was popularly called 
“Communism” 5  and those of 
“Capitalism”. The former were aligned 
particularly with the USSR (Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics) and its allies 
or with the People’s Republic of China, 
while the latter were aligned with the 
United States of America (USA) and its 
allies. To a large extent, this broader 
alignment of forces shaped the 
parameters of the individual violent 
conflicts even where these had origins 
that were primarily internal – although 
the role of the so-called Non-Aligned 
Movement6 in this period should also 
not be overlooked (Köchler, 1988).  
 
During the Cold War, and given its roots 
in Europe, in relation to the Christian 
Churches in particular there were, on 
the one hand, attempts from within the 
capitalist world to enlist believers into 
what was a broad anti-Communist 
6  Which was the more commonly used 
name for the formally called Conference of 
Heads of State or  Government of Non-
Aligned Countries founded in Belgrade, 
Yugoslavia, in 1961. 
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(Milliband, Saville and Liebmann, 1984) 
front. This was on the basis of such 
figures as the US Secretary of State, 
John Foster Dulles, arguing that the 
states of “really existing socialism” were 
expressions of “godless terrorism” or, 
as it was more generally expressed, as 
part of the forces of atheistic 
materialism ranged against what was 
often called “Christian civilisation”, 
involving the destruction of 
Christendom culture, the appropriation 
of Church property, and at least 
restrictions on religious freedom if not in 
at least some settings and periods, the 
outright persecution of them. Thus 
Dulles, who also played a significant 
role in the World Council of Churches’ 
(WCC), Churches Commission on 
International Affairs (Hudson, 1969) 
tried, albeit without success, at its 1948 
Amsterdam Assembly to enlist the (at 
that point largely Protestant) WCC into 
a Christian anti-Communism (Kuem, 
2016: 120).  
 
At the same time, there were also 
Christians and Marxists who had 
shared experiences in the resistance 
against Nazism (see Kreck, 1988). And 
there were also theologians such as 
Josef Hromádka (see Salajka, 1985; 
Opočenský, 1990) of the Church of 
Czech Brethren who refused to accept 
co-option into the anti-Communist 
discourse which figures such as Dulles 
sought to promote, arguing instead that 
believers living in both socialist and 
capitalist societies faced challenges to 
their Christian faithfulness and integrity. 
Indeed, it was following an intervention 
from Hromádka at the WCC 
Amsterdam Assembly, and which 
offered a biblically-informed critique of 
capitalist society, that the Assembly 
declined to take up an anti-Communist 
position, choosing instead to articulate 
a Christian vision of a “responsible 
society” as being of relevance to a state 
with any social system. 
 
At the same time, among Communists 
and other supporters of “really existing 
socialism”, while there were some such 
as the Czech political philosopher, 
Milan Machovec (1976) who were 
ready to engage in Marxist-Christian 
dialogue, there were others who saw 
the Christian Churches as being 
aligned with the inheritance of ruling 
powers from the old aristocratic, 
monarchical and/or bourgeois capitalist 
social orders. Indeed, many of the 
leaders of the states of “really existing 
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socialism” feared that organized 
religions could potentially act as 
destabilizing fifth-columnists, and this 
was especially so in relation to the 
Roman Catholic Church, given its 
international structure and its 
relationship with the Vatican state (see 
Luxmoore and Babiuch, 1999).   
 
But despite these challenges coming 
from both sides of the Cold War divide, 
and notwithstanding the internal 
contradictions within the Christian 
community, even the fact of the 
existence of ecclesial bodies in the 
same Christian tradition, but on 
different sides of the Iron Curtain 
(Chadwick, 1993), and of related supra-
national organisational networks such 
as the European Baptist Federation 
(Green, 1999), helped to facilitate a 
sense of wider Christian and also 
European community. And in the 
context of what was an otherwise quite 
sharply divided continent where many 
of the supra-national forms of 
professional associations, trade unions 
and similar bodies were organised on a 
basis that reflected the political, 
economic and military lines of 
difference, supra-national ecumenical 
bodies such the World Council of 
Churches, the Conference of European 
Churches and the Prague-based 
Christian Peace Conference (Wirth, 
1988) had Protestant and Orthodox 
Church memberships that straddled the 
political and military blocs. Although 
this community thereby reflected and 
sustained was inevitably limited and 
constrained, it was something not 
entirely determined by the political, 
economic and military divisions of the 
continent. At the very least, it enabled 
communications across the blocs and 
in many ways contributed to the 
building of bridges and channels for 
wider diplomatic and societal 
confidence-building.  
 
In addition, the facilitation of the 
possibility of mutual challenge also 
became possible, not least because the 
Churches and ecumenical bodies had 
contributed to the non-state initiatives 
that helped to lay the groundwork for 
the development and implementation of 
the stabilising framework for 
international relations that eventually 
became known as the Helsinki Final Act 
(Auswätiges Amt, 1984) of 1975, within 
which the states parties concerned also 
signed up to a common commitment 
towards, and framework for, dealing 
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with matters of human rights, within 
which the Governments, civil society 
organisations and Churches were able 
to raise and pursue specific issues and 
cases of human rights. Although 
criticised by some for reifying overall 
spheres of influence and thus for de 
jure as well as de facto recognition of 
“Communist” rule in the countries of the 
East and Central Europe, by 
recognising state borders (a number of 
which had, for some countries, 
remained in question since the Second 
World War) Helsinki helped to facilitate 
a more stable environment for the 
further development of East-West 
diplomacy that, in due course, reduced 
the threat of nuclear escalation and 
Mutually Assured Destruction.  
 
At the same time, this stabilization did 
not address other important (often 
internal) conflicts in Europe and in other 
parts of the world in relation to which, 
however, international level religious 
and religiously-inspired groups were 
often active, either within traditional 
diplomacy, alongside it, or as an 
alternative to it. Just as the existence of 
the Christian Churches on either side of 
the Iron Curtain created an opening for 
wider European diplomacy, so also in 
global terms, religious communities, 
groups and their international networks 
and organisations stand at the 
intersection between the global and the 
local in a world that is both increasingly 
globalising and localising. They are 
simultaneously part of transnational 
communities of (often alternative) 
information and solidarity, while being 
rooted firmly within their wider local 
communities and civic societies of the 
state of which they are citizens. Among 
other things, the channels of 
communication that they open up 
between co-religionists in rich and 
powerful and poor and relatively 
powerless countries help those in the 
relatively rich and powerful countries to 
come to some understanding of why it 
is that, in the title of the book by Meic 
Pearse (2003), Why The Rest Hates 
the West. 
 
In the earlier part of the period under 
review, the World Council of Churches 
offered such through its radical 
Programme to Combat Racism, which 
provided channels of information, 
communication and practical support 
relating to African liberation movements 
(Adler, 1974), as did also the 
development of the movement known 
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as liberation theology (Bonino, 1976). 
Also on an international level, but 
operating on a multi- and inter-religious 
basis, has been the activities of the 
organisations that is now called 
Religions for Peace, but which was 
originally known as the World 
Conference of Religions for Peace 
(WCRP) (see Jack, 1993), a body that 
has consultative status in the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), as well as with UNESCO 
and UNICEF.  
 
As reflected in its name, Religions for 
Peace focuses on the contribution that 
religions can make to establishing, 
preserving and developing peace in the 
world, including through interreligious 
dialogue aimed at overcoming conflicts 
that are rooted in religious differences. 
Following its first meeting in Kyoto in 
1970, it agreed to forward the impetus 
of its initiating conference through four 
key programmes that, since then, have 
continued to form the broad parameters 
for its work. This included: to create a 
climate for the peaceful resolution of 
disputes among and within nations 
without violence by initiating 
interreligious seminars and 
conferences at all levels; to develop an 
interreligious presence at the United 
Nations and other international 
agencies and events, through which the 
influence of religion could be directly 
exerted to resolve conflicts; to 
encourage the further development of 
the science of interreligious dialogue for 
peace; and to encourage the 
establishment of national and regional 
committees for peace.  
 
Today Religions for Peace holds a 
global Assembly every five years and 
has an extensive network of national 
affiliates and a number of regional 
bodies. A European Committee of the 
WCRP (now known as Religions for 
Peace, Europe) and a UK and Ireland 
Chapter (later separating out into a 
distinct UK Chapter and an Irish 
Chapter and today known as Religions 
for Peace, UK) were formed in 1975. 
Significantly, some of its most active, 
creative and productive work in relation 
to violent conflict has been precisely in 
relation to those “internal” contexts with 
implications for wider regions that 
traditional, state representative based 
diplomacy has found it most difficult to 
make progress. Thus, for example, 
Religions for Peace was very active in 
working towards the peace settlement 
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in Sierra Leone’s brutal civil and 
regional war, and undertook notable 
initiatives in the context of the Balkan wars 
(Merdjanova and Brodeur, 2009). 
 
As earlier noted, in the Two Thirds 
World, some of these “internal” conflicts 
became full scale wars, while within 
Europe others remained more of the 
nature of what the UK Army Brigadier 
Frank Kitson (1971) characterized as 
“low intensity” wars. One such example 
was the period of political violence 
known in the north of Ireland as “The 
Troubles” (Kelly, 1982) where, of 
course, religion itself was implicated 
due to sectarian communalisms 
espousing Christian traditions being 
woven into what is, however, more 
fundamentally a conflict between 
divergent national identities (Liechty 
and Clegg, eds., 2001). In this, Catholic 
and nationalist aspirations have been 
broadly aligned, while many northern 
Protestants tended towards unionism 
and some towards types of Loyalism 
that were informed by a strong anti-
Catholicism. At the same time, as in the 
setting of the wider Cold War, in this 
context of this “hot” but “low intensity” 
war, the continuation of all-Irish 
ecclesial structures across the political 
borders of Ireland’s partition into the 
Irish Free State (and later the Republic 
of Ireland) and the UK province of 
Northern Ireland, also contributed to 
facilitating the back channels that 
eventually led to the Good Friday 
Peace agreement.  
 
The majority of these “low intensity” 
wars, both in Europe and beyond, also 
entailed the use of terror (Guelke, 2006; 
Hoffman, 2006) tactics by one or more 
parties to the conflict that, for example, 
included the bombing of civilian 
infrastructure and of civilians. 
Especially among Palestinian armed 
groups the tools of hijack, kidnap and 
ransom, were common. In the 
Lebanon, following what had previously 
been a full scale civil war accompanied 
by the intervention of external powers, 
kidnap and ransom was frequently 
deployed by the various militias. In this 
context one of the most well-known of 
religiously based diplomatic 
interventions tool place via the work of 
Terry Waite (1993). Waite was 
originally the Anglican Archbishop of 
Canterbury’s emissary to the Middle 
East who, after successfully working to 
free a number of hostages, himself 
eventually became a victim of kidnap 
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and was held as a hostage for several 
years. In illustration of just how complex 
and challenging for the religions and 
religious people themselves such 
religiously-based interventions can be 
and become, following his release 
Waite later found himself caught up in 
allegations of complicity, or at least of 
maintaining insufficient distance, from 
US interlocutors in relation to the role in 
the Middle East of Colonel Oliver North 
and the so-called Iran-Contra scandal. 
Similarly, the Christian Peace 
Conference had earlier found its 
religiously-based activities on behalf of 
peace and justice (Bassarak, 1972) 
being identified by the US Department 
of State (1985) as an example of 
“Soviet active measures”. 
 
At the start of the 21st century, although 
there have been exceptions, the vast 
majority of terror actions have been 
associated with individuals and groups 
who have sought to justify their actions 
with reference to the religion of Islam. 
As the veteran British socialist 
politician, Tony Benn, put it at the start 
of the The Satanic Verses controversy 
which highlighted that, following the 
end of the Cold War an important 
paradigm-shift for international conflict 
was underway: 
 
 “Now all of a sudden, arguments 
which had almost disappeared into the 
mists  of time have come into sharp 
focus and are hotly contested across 
the world,  involving diplomatic 
relations, trade arrangements and 
stretching into the  heart of religious 
communities where people of different 
religious convictions  have to live 
side by side.” (Benn, in The Guardian, 
7.4.89) 
 
With the disappearance of the ‘enemy 
others’ of Communism and Capitalism, 
a number of commentators began to 
debate new potential enemies on a 
global scale. Particularly influential in 
this was Samuel Huntington’s so-called 
“Clash of Civilizations” thesis. The 
thesis as Huntington first published it 
appeared in an article in the journal 
Foreign Affairs under the title “The 
Clash of Civilizations?” (Huntington, 
1993). That was followed up by the 
book The Clash of Civilizations and the 
Remaking of Global Order (Huntington, 
1997) in which the question mark of the 
original title had disappeared. Thus 
what had begun as set of questions had 
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evolved into a sharper thesis, which 
was taken up by many Neocons around 
the US government of the time (see 
Bonney, 2014), in particular in terms of 
its argument throughout that “Islam has 
bloody borders” (Huntington, 1993, 35), 
and later providing a communicable 
frame for US foreign policy and military 
interventions.  
 
Over time, the groups appealing to 
Islam in their undertaking of violent 
actions have been variably called 
‘radicals’ ‘Islamists” and/or ‘Jihadists’. 
Initially emerging from US support for 
such groups in the campaign to defeat 
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the 
most prominent among these was 
Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeeda which, 
following US military intervention in the 
Gulf, later went on to plan and carry out 
the spectacular 9/11 attack on the USA 
in 2001, while claiming at least 
inspirational linkages of various sorts 
with the 2004 Madrid and 2005 (7/7) 
London bombings. More recently this 
form of terror violence has become 
associated with IS (Islamic State)/ISIS 
(Islamic State in Syria)/ISL (Islamic 
State in the Levant) – also known in 
Arabic by those who oppose it, as 
Daeesh. The terror actions that Daeesh 
has conducted beyond its geographical 
heartlands in Iraq and Syria have 
ranged from bombings in Beirut, 
through the Paris shootings at the 
Charlie Hebdo magazine offices and 
the Bataclan concert venue, to the lorry 
attack on Bastille Day celebrants in 
Nice, France and the killing of a Roman 
Catholic priest and congregants in 
northern France.  
 
The direct parties involved in such 
actions are neither generally 
recognized states nor (in contrast with 
earlier African and Palestinian 
movements, groups that have achieved 
some form of recognition within the 
international system of the UNO. 
However, just as during the Cold War, 
many states are indirectly involved with 
such groups and in their conflicts in 
terms of providing financial, logistical 
and other support, either openly, 
covertly, and/or through tolerating such 
support from private sources within 
their states. Thus, within the Syrian civil 
war, some groups have been proxies 
for either Saudi Arabia or Turkey, while 
other state parties – including the 
Syrian state itself, the USA and Russia, 
have all been variously directly involved 
in asymmetrical military engagement 
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alongside or against non-state groups 
such as the Free Syrian Army, various 
Kurish groups, Daeesh and others.  
 
In the Cold War period the aims of 
militant groups generally focused on 
one or both the goals of national and/or 
socio-political change in relation to 
specific territorial boundaries. Today 
this is also the case with Boko Haram in 
Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia, 
while at its beginning, Al-Qeeda itself 
was also more defensively and 
reactively oriented to the military 
presence in Saudi Arabia of the USA 
and its allies, with the principal aim of 
Bin Laden’s Declaration of War against 
America being to oust the USA from the 
territory of two of Islam’s most holy 
places (Wright, 2006). But there are 
also important differences with earlier 
conflicts and groups. For example, 
while ready if necessary to pay the price 
of the loss of their lives in pursuit of their 
causes, the militants of the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) or the 
German Bader Meinhof Group, while 
ready to deploy their individual lives to 
achieve political goals through the use 
of hunger strikes, did not generally 
undertake terror attacks on others in a 
deliberately planned way intended to 
incorporate the giving up of their own 
lives. 
 
However, just as post-9/11 there were 
those who argued that the world had 
changed and that something 
qualitatively different had emerged (see 
Lincoln, 2003), so also in relation to 
Daeesh there are many many who 
react to its barbarity by interpreting it as 
being more or less nihilistic and beyond 
the scope of diplomacy. Because of this 
it is important, as far as possible, to try 
to gain an understanding how the group 
sees itself (Saltman and Winter, 2014) 
because “nihilism” – which as a political 
concept had its origin among certain 
Russian groups of the mid-19th century 
- is not really an appropriate descriptor 
for groups that are actually far from 
being politically or morally nihilistic in 
terms of their having both a set of 
proximate temporal goals and also a 
very clearly articulated value system 
that informs their actions.  
 
Thus, when in his “Message to 
America” that accompanied Daeesh’s 
first hostage killing in the beheading of 
the American journalist James Foley, 
the so-called “Jihadi John” (Mohammed 
Emwazi) said: “You are no longer 
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fighting an insurgency. We are an 
Islamic army and a state” (quoted in 
Maher, 2015: 27), he was articulating 
that, in contrast to Al-Queeda, Daeesh 
understands itself as having a territory 
to defend and extend. Indeed, critical to 
Daeesh’s self-understanding is its 
aspiration and claim to have recreated 
the Sunni Muslim ideal of the Caliphate, 
which it believes to be the only 
environment within which Muslims can 
lead fully Islamic lives. This is why 
Daeesh is very much against Muslim 
refugees fleeing from territories that it is 
seeking to incorporate into its Caliphate 
and, by contrast, wants to encourage 
the hijrah (migration) of Muslims living 
in darul-kufr (the land of disbelief) to its 
Caliphate, understood as darul-Islam 
(the land of Islam). And it is precisely 
this invitation and opportunity to find 
personal and historic significance in 
contributing to the building of the 
Caliphate that can make Daeeh’s 
message so attractive to young 
Muslims.  
 
What is often described as ‘radicalisation’ 
has no single cause. For Muslims (and 
especially young Muslims) in Western 
societies who experience at least some 
degree of discrimination and disadvantage 
(Weller, Purdam, Ghanea, and Cheruvallil-
Contractor, 2013) and who see injustice in 
majority Muslim parts of the world, some 
reactive factors may be at work (Hussain, 
2007). There are, of course, important and 
legitimate critiques that both can and 
should be made about the status quo in the 
world. But potentially more powerful and 
seductive is the idea that it might be 
possible to make an important and historic 
contribution to the creation of a 
completely new society (Keles and Sezgin, 
2015). In combination with personal or 
immediate community experiences of 
discrimination and disadvantage, and/or 
awareness of that in relation to other co-
religionists, a “nexus of vulnerability” can 
develop within which: 
 
 “individuals who are targeted for 
recruitment by ISIS and similar groups can 
 start off by apparently discovering 
new forms of personal, social and religious 
 significance in an unjust world. But 
through the use of psychological 
 grooming, these ideals can be 
manipulated and channelled into what 
ends up  as a readiness to justify, 
support and then commit to violent 
extremism and  terror that appeals 
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to a religious justification.” (Harris, Bisset 
and Weller, 2015:  26) 
 
Daeesh’s commitment to creating a 
Caliphate might be taken as an 
indication that, contrary to what many 
think, it could in principle be possible – 
albeit with great difficulty - to conduct 
negotiations with it on a rational self-
interest basis just as it was possible to 
some extent to do with Taliban when 
they were in power in Afghanistan. 
However, it is critically important to 
understand that Daeesh also operates 
within a broader and more apocalyptic 
frame of reference in which the 
contingent and the eternal coincide not 
just in terms of a conviction about the 
absolute rightness of its cause, but also 
about its absolute significance within 
what it interprets to be an “end times” 
struggle between haqq (truth) and batil 
(falsehood) (see El-Badaway, 
Cromerford and Welby, 2015). Thus, 
when following the execution of 21 
soldiers of the Syrian Arab Army, 
Daeesh went on to execute Abdul-
Rahman (originally Peter) Kassig as its 
fifth western hostage, Jihadi John’s 
speech on that occasion took the 
opportunity to highlight that the 
execution was taking place in the north-
western Syrian town of Dabiq. 
 
 “To Obama, the dog of Rome, 
today we’re slaughtering the soldiers of 
Bashar  and tomorrow we’ll be 
slaughtering your soldiers…..We will 
break this last and  final 
crusade…..and here we are burying the 
first of your crusader army in 
 Dabiq” (quoted in Maher, 2015: 
29).  
 
As noted by Maher (2015: 29), soon 
after Russia entered the conflict, a 
Dutch fighter called Yilmaz highlighted 
the eschatological prophecies 
concerning Greater Syria/the Levant by 
stating, “Read the many hadith 
regarding Bilad al Sham and the battles 
that are going to be fought on these 
grounds”. And in the light of this Maher 
(2015: 29) argues:   
  
 “Herein lies the power of Islamic 
State’s reasoning – its fighters, and the 
 movement as a whole, draw 
huge succour from the religious 
importance of  the sites around 
which they are fighting. It serves to 
convince them of the 
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 righteousness of their cause and 
the nobility of their endeavours.” 
 
It is because Daeesh ultimately 
operates within an apocalyptic 
framework that it is currently not 
possible to deal with it in terms of 
classical state representative 
diplomacy. But neither would it be wise 
statecraft to argue to leave Daeesh 
alone in its heartlands as primarily a 
problem for the Middle East. Leaving 
aside humanitarian concern for people 
living in Daeesh’s territory who do not fit 
its particular vision of Islam, and apart 
from the dangers it poses to world 
peace in terms further igniting and 
spreading conflict in its immediate 
region, in its English language 
magazine Dabiq it articulates a global 
strategic aim to remove what it calls the 
“grey-zone”. The aim of this is, through 
terror violence committed outside its 
geographical heartlands and the 
anticipated reaction to it of the 
authorities, security services and 
peoples of the countries concerned, 
that the Muslims of the world will be 
forced to make a binary choice between 
migrating to live in the Land of Islam or 
staying to live in the Land of Disbelief. 
As the Malian-French Amedy Coulibaly 
(quoted in Maher 2015: 29) put it in a 
video explaining his participation in the 
Charlie Hebdo attacks on IS’s  behalf, 
“The time had come for another event – 
magnified by the presence of the 
Caliphate on the global stage – to 
further bring division to the world and 
destroy the grayzone everywhere”. 
Thus as Maher (2015: 29) argues, for 
Daeesh, eschatology is an “important 
motivating principle” that “underwrites 
its remarkable self-assurance and 
certainty and at the same time fuels its 
barbarism.”  
 
In some regards this echoes ‘end time’ 
narratives that one can find among 
Fundamentalist Christian circles 
inspired by the teaching and 
publications of the very widely sold 
book The Late, Great Planet Earth, by 
Hal Lindsey (1971). In this, via a 
Christian Zionism focus on Israel and its 
place in the ‘end times’, and with 
reference to imagery found in the 
biblical Book of Revelation, aspects of 
the Cold War situation of the 1970s 
were interpreted in terms of a predicted 
(and later adjusted to the 1980s and 
beyond) coming earthly and cosmic 
apocalyptic battle of “Armaggedon” 
(Lindsey, 1980). And just as Daeesh 
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have identified Dabiq in Syria as a 
location for such a ‘last battle’ by 
reference to strands of Islamic 
interpretation of the Qur’an, so those 
influenced by the work of Hal Lindsey 
and others have also anticipated that a 
final conflict will take place in the Middle 
East, albeit within their understanding, 
to take place at Megiddo in Israel. 
 
These resonances are potentially 
instructive for understanding the moral 
and epistemological orientations that 
shape current global terror actions of 
these kinds. At the same time, there is 
at least one important difference 
between those whose worldview has 
been shaped by Christian 
“dispensationalism” 7  (see Halsell, 
1999) of the kind promoted by Lindsey, 
and the vision held by followers of 
Daeesh. This is that, by and large, and 
as distinct from some earlier Christian 
millenarian groups (such as in Munster 
in the 16th century) who did seek to 
establish an earthly theocracy, by and 
large the 20th and 21st century 
Christians who have held an 
apocalyptic vision of a coming 
                                                        
7  Dispensationalism teaches that a 
number of stages of history must occur before 
the Second Coming  of Jesus. It is linked 
with the 19th century Plymouth Brother John 
Armageddon have not understood 
themselves to be under any particular 
obligation to initiate violent action 
towards it in their identity as Christians.  
 
The resonance between Christian 
dispensationalism and Daeesh style 
apocalyptic brings into focus the 
possibility that, in contrast to 
Huntington’s thesis that there is a clash 
between civilizational blocs, one might 
more accurately argue that while there 
are civilizational, cultural and religious 
spheres of interest or spheres of 
influence, within each of these there is 
a much more complex, fluid situation 
and contested situation than any more 
solidified notion of a bloc. And this is 
arguably even more the case in the 21st 
century case of conflicts involving 
religions and cultures than in was in 
relation to the blocs of the Cold War, 
given that Christian Palestinians and 
Christian Arabs are an integral part of 
Middle Eastern history and reality, and 
that there are now millions of Muslims 
in the ‘West’, not least in the European 
Union and in the USA. Therefore, as 
argued by the German political 
Darby and was popularised through  the 
so-called Schofield Bible, which contained notes 
supporting the dispensationalist hermeneutic. 
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philosopher, Dieter Sengaas (2002) in 
his book The Clash Within Civilizations: 
Coming to Terms with Cultural 
Conflicts, the main cultural and 
religious fault-lines that do exist actually 
run through, between and within geo-
political and cultural groupings rather 
than between them.  
 
If this is the case, and if it also the case 
that the religious roots and the 
eschatological orientation of Daeesh 
are critical to understanding its 
activities, then this has profound 
implications for how the current wave of 
global terror should be tackled. In the 
first instance, it is difficult for classical 
diplomacy to be conducted (and 
especially from the ‘West’) in a way that 
would not lead to the charge of 
Islamophobic (Allen, 2010) orientations 
and actions. Secondly, the classical 
forms of diplomatic argument, 
negotiation and compromise that 
appeal to self-interest are, in this 
instance, unlikely to be successful 
because there are those at least within 
Daeesh who at present see the 
Caliphate as being within compressed 
time frame leading into the coming 
future cosmic ‘end times’ battle with the 
Crusader armies. Such visions of the 
world and their implications will not be 
defeated either by calls to self-interest 
alone, since that will be viewed as a 
betrayal of ultimate convictions. Also 
brute force and naked power alone will 
not be successful, as that will only 
reinforce the self-righteousness of 
those who experience it. But if it might 
be the case that little or nothing is likely 
to be achieved by classical state 
representative diplomacy, the question 
moves into focus of what might be 
possible to progress from within Islam 
and between Muslims themselves. 
Indeed, the present author argued in a 
previous book chapter on “Conspiracy 
Theories and the Incitement of Hatred” 
that: “On a governmental and societal 
level, preventative and remedial actions 
are important in combating conspiracy 
theories and incitement to hatred. 
Statements, guidelines, codes of 
practice and initiatives in inter-faith 
dialogue are also important. However, 
in the end, it is also crucial to engage 
with these issues from within each 
particular religious and ethnic group.” 
(Weller, 2007: 194-195)  
 
It is argued again here that this is critical 
to understanding the origins and 
responses, and hence how to 
ICDIR 2016 – International Conference on Diplomacy & International Relations    
 
 
81 
derby.ac.uk/lhss 
challenge, the ideas of those who are 
attracted to the kind of vision of the 
world being projected by Daeesh and 
other groups. In other words, that where 
it may not be possible for engagement 
to take place through secular reasoning 
and the instruments of international 
law, there might be a possibility for 
engagement to be developed in 
articulation with the logic and the 
grammar of the religion concerned. And 
this is important, because there can be 
at least perceived to a tension between 
the secular registers in which human 
rights discourse international law 
operates and the values found in 
authentically religious perspectives 
(see Weller, 2006).  
 
Within this it is also important to 
understand that the public shape of 
Islam is not the shape that Christianity 
has, by and large, taken in the modern 
world. Thus, while Islam contains many 
distinct and often competing traditions, 
movements and groups, it does not 
have the equivalent of Church 
organisations. And this is closely 
related to the question of religious 
leadership in the Muslim world which is 
not, generally speaking, of the 
hierarchical or bureaucratic kinds that 
can more readily be found in 
Christianity. These two facts have a 
significant impact on expectations of 
how faith-based diplomacy can function 
when conducted from within the Muslim 
ummah or community, meaning that 
faith-based interventions based on 
Muslim religious identity are likely to be 
more informal and less official in 
character than if expected with 
reference to a Christian paradigm. Thus 
one should not expect so much in the 
way of, for example, agreed 
statements, organised initiatives, or 
authorised individuals acting on behalf 
of wider groups. Rather, the relevant 
initiatives that can offer religiously 
authentic, creative and corrective 
resources that can help contemporary 
Muslims to live in faithful, committed 
and peaceful ways in a religiously 
diverse world are likely to be much 
more informal and decentralised.  
 
One example is of the vision of Islam 
offered by the Hizmet movement, 
inspired by the teaching and example of 
the Turkish Muslim classical scholar 
and peace activist Fehullah Gülen. In 
his op-ed in Le Monde following the 
Bataclan atrocities in France, and 
entitled “Muslims, we have to critically 
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review our understanding of Islam”, 
Fethullah Gülen (2015) argued that 
“We Muslims have a special 
responsibility to ….join hands with 
fellow human beings to save our world 
from the scourge of terrorism” as well 
as “to repair the tarnished image of our 
faith”. Gülen’s vision of Islam offers 
clear challenge as to why the appeals 
of Daeesh and other similar groups to 
Islam are a distortion. It also comes out 
of an experience of dialogical 
engagement both with, and within, the 
secular modernity as it impinged upon 
Turkish society, and also engagement 
with broader “Western” society as a 
whole. But at the same time, and of 
critical import, it is informed by a deep 
and authentic Islamic tradition, practice 
and vision. As Gülen’s Le Monde piece 
said, what is called for is not “a rupture 
from the cumulative Islamic tradition”, 
but rather, “an intelligent questioning” in 
which Muslims are called to “critically 
review our understanding and practice 
of Islam, in the light of the conditions 
and requirements of our age and the 
clariifications provided by our collective 
historic experiences” and in so doing to 
be engaged in “discrediting and 
marginalising the extremist 
interpretations of religious sources.”  
 
Alternative narratives (Capan, 2004) of 
similar kinds, and the kind of actions 
necessary to implement them 
(Kalymanu, 2008) are in fact being 
created among Muslims throughout the 
world (Boase, 2005) who are also 
determined to make clear that the 
actions of violent terror perpetrated by 
some are done ‘not in our name’, 
including in those parts where Muslims 
are in a majority and societies are often 
in fundamental transition, of a very 
unstable and sometimes quite 
dangerous kind for all, including for 
Muslims themselves (Barton, Weller, 
and Yilmaz, eds. 2013).  
Reflecting such approaches are a 
series of publications produced by the 
London-based Dialogue Society and 
which are aimed at challenging the 
particular development of Islamic 
thinking and ideology that undergirds 
the attractiveness of Daeesh to 
Muslims who have a strong sense of 
the wrongness of the present world 
order. Examples of this include 
Deradicalisation by Default: The 
‘Dialogue’ Approach to Rooting out 
Violent Extremism (Dialogue Society, 
2009) that argues for the importance of 
tackling the ideology of violent 
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extremism from within an Islamic frame 
of reference; Dialogue in Islam: Qu’ran, 
Sunnah, History (Dialogue Society, 
2011) that engages with the challenge 
of some of the verses of the Qu’ran that 
are widely cited to justify violent 
extremism; while the related Centre for 
Hizmet Studies published Keles and 
Sezgin’s (2015) A Hizmet Approach to 
Rooting out Violent Extremism, which 
more explicitly and directly articulates 
an approach as informed by the 
teaching and example of Fethullah 
Gülen, 8  and translated into action by 
the so-called Hizmet (or service) 
movement inspired by his teaching and 
life. 
 
There are no easy answers here. But 
there are some actions which are both 
important and worthwhile to support 
and to try to facilitate. The difficulty with 
this is that this is not something that in 
itself is likely to facilitate dialogue with, 
or change among, those who are 
already committed to a Daeesh view of 
the world. Rather it is a ‘preventative’ 
                                                        
8  Especially following the recent 
attempted coup in Turkey it needs to be 
acknowledged that Fethullah  Gülen is a 
controversial figure whom, indeed, the current 
Turkish President and government accuse of 
 being behind the recent coup attempt. 
Having acknowledged this, however, this is not 
activity that might be capable of 
‘heading off’ the intellectual and 
emotional seductions of Daeesh and 
similar groups, and in this way to 
contribute to an attrition of Daeesh’s 
traction in the wider Muslim world. It is 
possible that this is the best that can 
realistically be hoped for in terms of any 
kind of diplomatic practice, whether 
faith-based or not, since it may not be 
without significance that the former 
Pakistani political figure Benazir Bhutto 
of Pakistan, when asked about the kind 
of violence that later played a part in her 
own death, ventured the opinion that it 
could not be defeated, but only 
contained, and that it might in time, die 
out.  
 
There are perhaps here some historical 
resonances here with the past of 
Christianity as it struggled to emerge 
from the bloody legacy of the European 
Wars of Religion and the use of the 
sword of the magistrate to try to enforce 
religious conformity (Ellerbe, 1995). So 
also, what might ultimately defeat this 
the place to go  into this in detail, except to say 
that, from the perspective of the present author, 
such claims are not  compatible with what 
is observable about the Fethullah Gülen himself, 
and the Hizmet movement  inspired by 
him, in terms of public speech and act. 
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form of Islam may be a combination of 
weariness among the faithful, 
combined with the impact and influence 
of those co-religionists whose religious 
vision is one that affirms the dignity of 
the human above and beyond all 
interpretations of the Islamic. As argued 
by Gülen in Le Monde: “We must 
categorically condemn the ideology that 
terrorists propagate and instead 
promote a pluralistic mindset with 
clarity and confidence” in which “before 
our ethnic, national or religious identity 
comes our common humanity, which 
suffers a setback each time a barbaric 
act is committed.” And if the outworking 
of the apocalyptic vision of those who 
are already committed to it can, in the 
meantime, be sufficiently contained, it 
is historically observable that if 
millennial visions of this kind do not 
come to pass within a reasonable 
timescale, they can often lose their hold 
on the faithful and/or become 
reinterpreted to take account of the 
‘end’ not having happened, thus 
potentially opening up the ground for 
more classical forms of diplomacy to 
make some future inroads. 
 
Putting all of this within a wider context, as 
argued for by the present author (Weller, 
2009: 205-206) originally in reflecting on 
the two decades on “The Other Side of 
Terror/War on Terror” following the 
inception of paradign-shifting The Satanic 
Verses controversy, “six “points of 
challenge” were identified that I would 
also argue remain relevant: 
 
1.  Governments must learn from 
history that to combat terror with methods 
that  undermine human rights will only 
strengthen those forces that use terror as 
a  means of advancing their cause. 
 
2.  To ignore or deny the reasons that 
those who use terror to advance their 
 cause give for their actions is 
unlikely to lead to a resolution of the 
problems  caused by terror. 
 
3.  Terror in the name of religion is 
particularly dangerous both to the wider 
politic  and to religions themselves, 
because it harnesses ultimate convictions 
and in  its destructive service. 
 
4.  Attempts by the ‘powers that be’ 
artificially and externally to create a 
‘liberal’  or ‘moderate’ Islam (or 
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indeed any any other religion) are likely to 
prove  ineffective and may also backfire  
 
5.  Muslims (and indeed people of 
other religions) have to accept a greater 
 responsibility for combating the 
dissemination and propagation of ‘enemy 
 images’ among their faithful. 
 
6.  For multiculturalism to continue to 
have a future, governments and societies 
 must acknowledge and tackle 
Islamophobia, and indeed all other forms 
of  hatred and discrimination on the 
grounds of religion or belief. 
 
The arguments of academics can be 
dismissed as setting too much store by the 
importance discourse and of narrative in a 
world that seems ultimately to be 
determined more by power and violence. 
But, as argued from a hard-nosed 
perspective one of the agencies charged 
with ensuring security and combatting 
terror actions, in its publication Words 
Make Worlds: Terrorism and Language, 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police makes 
the case that it really is the case that 
“words make worlds” in the sense that 
from a policing and security perspective 
in relation to (at the time it was written) 
Al-Quaeda type extremism - and 
therefore now by extension also to 
Daeesh: 
 
 The most effective long-term 
strategy against Al-Qai’da-type extremism, 
 whether domestic or global, may 
be rooted in the construction of 
‘alternative 
 narratives’ designed to subvert 
extremist messaging (Royal Canadian 
 Mounted Police: 2007, 3). 
 
While not providing a quick fix in terms of 
results, in the long run such internal pre-
diplomacy is likely to contribute to laying 
foundations for the most productive and 
long lasting potential for positive change.  
 
REFERENCES 
Adler, E. (1974), A Small Beginning: An 
Assessment of the First Five Years of the 
Programme to Combat Racism. Geneva: 
World Council of Churches. 
 
Auswärtiges Amt (Hrsg.) (1984), Sicherheit 
und Zusammenarbeit in Europa: 
Dokumentation zum KSZE-Prozeß. Bonn: 
Auswärtiges Amt. 
 
Allen, C. (2010). Islamophobia. Farnham: 
Ashgate. 
ICDIR 2016 – International Conference on Diplomacy & International Relations    
 
 
86 
derby.ac.uk/lhss 
 
Armstrong, K. (1988), Holy War: The 
Crusades and their Impact on Today’s World. 
London: Macmillan. 
 
Barton, G., Weller, P., and Yilmaz, I. (eds), 
(2013), The Muslim World and 
Politics in Transition: Creative Contributions of 
the Gülen Movement. London: 
Bloomsbury. 
 
Benn, T. (1989), “An End to Blasphemy”, in 
The Guardian, 7.4.89. 
 
Bonino, J.-M. (1974), Christians and Marxists: 
The Mutual Challenge to Revolution. London: 
Hodder and Stoughton. 
 
Bonney, R (2014), False Prophets: The ‘Clash 
of Civilizations’ and the Global War on Terror. 
Oxford: Peter Lang. 
 
Bassarak, G. (1972), Christians Today in the 
Struggle for Peace and Justice. Prague: 
Christian Peace Conference. 
 
Boase, R. (ed.) (2005), Islam and Global 
Dialogue: Religious Pluralism and the Pursuit 
of Peace. Farnham: Ashgate. 
 
Çapan, E. (ed.), (2004), Terror and Suicide 
Attacks: An Islamic Perspective. New Jersey, 
The Light. 
 
Chadwick, O. (1993), The Christian Church in 
the Cold War. Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
 
Dialogue Society, The (2009), Deradicalisation 
by Default: The “Dialogue” Approach to 
Rooting Out Violent Extremism. London: The 
Dialogue Society. 
http://www.dialoguesociety.org/publications/De
radicalisation-Policy-Paper.pdf, accessed 
19.8.16. 
 
Dialogue Society, The (2011), Dialogue in 
Islam: Qur’an, Sunnah, History. London: The 
Dialogue Society. 
 
El-Badaway, E., Comerford, M., Welby, P. 
(2015), Inside the Jihadi Mind: Understanding 
Ideology and Propaganda. London: Centre on 
Religion and Geopolitics. 
 
Ellerbe, H. (1995), The Dark Side of Christian 
History. Windermere: Morningstar and Lark. 
 
Esposito, J. (1995), The Islamic Threat: Myth 
or Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Ferguson, J. (1977), War and Peace in the 
World’s Religions. London: SPCK. 
 
Furedi, F. (2006), Politics of Fear: Beyond Left 
and Right. London: Continuum. 
 
Furedi, F. (2007), Invitation to Terror: The 
Expanding Empire of the Unknown. London: 
Continuum. 
 
Green, B. (1999), Crossing the Boundaries: A 
History of the European Baptist Federation. 
Didcot: The Baptist Historical Society. 
 
ICDIR 2016 – International Conference on Diplomacy & International Relations    
 
 
87 
derby.ac.uk/lhss 
Gresh, A. (1988), The PLO: The Struggle 
Within: Towards an Independent Palestinian 
State. London: Zed Books. 
 
Guelke, A. (2006), Terrorism and Global 
Disorder: Political Violence in the 
Contemporary World. London: I.B. Tauris. 
 
Halsell, G. (1999), Forcing God’s Hand: Why 
Millions Pray for a Quick Rapture – And 
Destruction of Planet Earth. Washington DC: 
Crossroads International Publishing. 
 
Harris, E., Bisset, V. and Weller, P. (2015), 
Violent Extremism: Naming, Framing and 
Challenging. London: Dialogue Society 
http://www.dialoguesociety.org/publications/Vi
olent-Extremism.pdf, accessed 19.8.16. 
 
Haynes, J. (1988), Religion in Global Politics. 
Harlow: Longman. 
 
Hewitt, S. (2008), The British War on Terror: 
Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism on the Home 
Front Since 9/11. London: Continuum. 
 
Hoffman, B. (2006), Inside Terrorism. 
Chichester: Colombia University Press. 
London: Shuster and Shuster 
 
Hudson, D. (1969), The Ecumenical 
Movement in World Affairs. London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
 
Huntington, S. (1993), The Clash of 
Civilizations?”, in Foreign Affairs, September 
1990, pp. 47-60. 
 
Huntington, S. (1996), The Clash of 
Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order.  
 
Hussain, E. (2007), The Islamist: Why I Joined 
Radical Islam in Britain What I Saw Inside and 
Why I Left. London: Penguin. 
 
Jack, H. (1993), A History of the World 
Conference on Religion and Peace. New York: 
World Conference on Religion and Peace. 
 
Kalyoncu, M. (2008), A Civilian Response to 
Ethno-Religious Conflict: The Gülen 
Movement in Southeast Turkey. New Jersey: 
The Light. 
 
Keles, O. and Sezgin, I.M. (2015), A Hizmet 
Approach to Rooting out Violent Extremism. 
London, Centre for Hizmet Studies.  
 
Kelly, K. (1982), The Longest War: Northern 
Ireland and the IRA. London: Zed Books. 
 
Kitson, F. (1971), Low Intensity Operations: 
Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping. 
London: Faber and Faber 
 
Köchler, H. (ed.) (1988), The Principles of 
Non-Alignment: The Non-Aligned Countries in 
the 80s, Results and Perspectives. 
Vienna/London: International Progress 
Organization/Third World Centre for Research 
and Publishing Ltd.  
 
Kuem, J., “The Origins of the Axis of Evil in the 
Korean Peninsula”, in P. Kollontai S. Kim, and 
G. Hoyland (2016), Peace and Reconciliation: 
ICDIR 2016 – International Conference on Diplomacy & International Relations    
 
 
88 
derby.ac.uk/lhss 
In Search of Shared Identity. Routledge, pp. 
109-132. 
 
Kreck, W. (1988) Friedliche Koexistenz statt 
Konfrontation: Vorträge und Aufsätze aus den 
achtziger Jahren. Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein.  
 
Liechty, J. and Clegg, C., (eds.), (2001), 
Moving Beyond Sectarianism: Religion, 
Conflict and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland. 
Dublin: Colomba Press. 
 
Lincoln, B. (2003), Holy Terrors: Thinking 
About Religion After September 11. London: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Lindsey, H. (1971), The Late, Great Planet 
Earth. Grand Rapids: Zondervan. 
 
Lindsey, H. (1980), The 1980s: The 
Countdown to Armaggedon. Bantam Books: 
New York. 
 
Luxmoore, J and Babiuch, J. (1999), The 
Vatican and the Red Flag: The Struggle for the 
Soul of Eastern Europe. London: Continuum. 
 
Maher, S. (2015), “Death to the Grayzone”, in 
New Statesman, 20-26th November, pp. 26-29. 
 
Merdjanova, I. and Brodeur, P. (2009), 
Religion as a Conversation Starter: 
Interreligious Dialogue for Peacebuilding in the 
Balkans. London: Continuum. 
 
Milliband, R., Saville, J, and Liebmann, M. 
(1984), Socialist Register 1984: The Uses of 
Anti-Communism. London: Merlin Press. 
 
Nyangongi, W. (1985), Africa in the United 
Nations System. London and Toronto: 
Associated University Presses. 
 
Opočenský, M. (1990), Josef L. Hromádka: 
The Field is the World. Selected Writings from 
the Years 1918-1968. Prague: Christian Peace 
Conference. 
 
Partner, P. (1997), God of Battles: Holy Wars 
of Christianity and Islam. London: Harper 
Collins. 
 
Pearse, M. (2003), Why the Rest Hates the 
West. London: Society for Promoting Christian 
Knowledge. 
 
Reddy, E.M. (2012), “United Nations and the 
African National Congress: Partners in the 
Struggle Against Apartheid”, in South African 
History Online, at:  
http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/united-
nations-and-african-national-congress-e-s-
reddy, accessed, 19.8.16. 
 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police National 
Security Criminal Investigations  
(2007), Words Make Worlds: Terrorism and 
Language. 
https://shawglobalnews.files.wordpress.com/2
015/07/ps64-98-2007-eng.pdf. Accessed 
19.8.17.     
 
Salajka, M. (1985), Our Time: From the 
Ecumenical Legacy of J.L. Hromádka. Prague: 
Ecumenical Council of Churches in the Czech 
Socialist Republic.   
ICDIR 2016 – International Conference on Diplomacy & International Relations    
 
 
89 
derby.ac.uk/lhss 
 
Saltman, E. Winter, C. (2014), Islamic State: 
The Changing Face of 
Modern Jihadism. London: Quilliam. 
 
Sengaas, D. (2002), The Clash Within 
Civilizations: Coming to Terms with Cultural 
Conflicts. Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
United States Department of State (1985), 
Soviet Active Measures: The Christian Peace 
Conference, Foreign Affairs Note, May 1985. 
Washington DC: United States Department of 
State. 
 
Waite, T. (1993), Taken on Trust. London: 
Hodder and Stoughton. 
 
Weller, P. (2006), “ ‘Human Rights’, ‘Religion’ 
and the ‘Secular’: Variant Configurations of 
Religion(s), State(s) and Society(ies)”, in 
Religion and Human Rights: An International 
Journal, Volume 1, No. 1, 2006, pp. 17-39.  
 
Weller, P. (2007), “Conspiracy Theories and 
the Incitement of Hatred: The Dynamics of 
Deception, Plausibility and Defamation”, in M. 
Fineberg, S. Samuels, and M. Weitzman, eds. 
(2007), Antisemitism: The Generic Hatred. 
Essays in Memory of Simon Wiesenthal. 
London: Vallentine Mitchell, pp. 182-197. 
 
Weller, P. (2010), “The Clash of Civilisations 
Thesis and Religious Responses”, in the 
European Journal of Economic and Political 
Studies, Volume 3, No. 1,  
pp. 83-100.  
 
Weller, P., Purdam, K., Ghanea, N., and 
Cheruvallil-Contractor S. (2013), Religion or 
Belief, Discrimination and Equality: Britain in 
Global Contexts. London: Bloomsbury. 
 
Wirth, G. (1988), 30 Years CPC: A History of 
the Christian Peace Conference. Prague: 
Christian Peace Conference. 
 
Wright, L. (2006), The Looming Tower: Al-
Qaeda’s Road to 9/11. London: Penguin.  
 
ICDIR 2016 – International Conference on Diplomacy & International Relations   
 
 
 
         PAPER 5: 
THE DIMENSIONS OF RURAL UNREST: THE 
MEDITERRANEAN REGION IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 
Dr. Baris Cayli 
Research Fellow in Criminology, College of Law, 
Humanities and Social Sciences,  University of Derby 
 
Abstract 
The multi-ethnic and fertile territories of the Mediterranean region created its 
own socio-cultural orbit that has lured the local agencies into vying for power 
since the nineteenth century. Crime, violence and social exploitation were the 
constant variables that embedded in the daily lives of peasants during the 
process of state restoration and foundation in the long nineteenth century in the 
Ottoman and Italian rural social life. The rural unrest in the nineteenth century 
cannot be conceived entirely if we neglect the role of banditry and brigandage. 
Reading the codes of the notorious existence of bandits and brigands in the 
Mediterranean region also requires the consideration of historical, social, 
economic and cultural context of the region. This study provides the principal 
political and social dynamics to understand the rural crime in the Mediterranean 
region in the nineteenth century. Illuminating the power of the bandits and 
brigands, who were the formidable social agencies both in the Ottoman and 
Italian socio-political life, the paper aims to shed new light on our understanding 
of the common milieus of rural unrest and criminalization of rural communities.  
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Abstract  
Modern slavery is less overt than historical state-sanctioned slavery because 
psychological abuse is typically used to recruit and then control victims. The recent 
UK Draft Modern Slavery Act, and current UK government anti-slavery strategy relies 
heavily on a shared understanding and public cooperation to tackle this crime. Yet, 
UK research investigating public understanding of modern slavery is elusive. We 
report a community survey data from 682 residents of the Midlands of England, where 
modern slavery is known to occur, concerning their understanding of nonphysical 
coercion and human trafficking (one particular form of modern slavery). Analysis of 
quantitative data and themed categorization of qualitative data revealed a mismatch 
between theoretical frameworks and understanding of psychological coercion, and 
misconceptions concerning the nature of human trafficking. Many respondents did not 
understand psychological coercion, believed that human trafficking did not affect them, 
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and confused trafficking with immigration. The public are one of the most influential 
interest groups, but only if well informed and motivated towards positive action. Our 
findings suggest the need for strategically targeted public knowledge exchange 
concerning this crime.
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Abstract 
 
The paper aims to reflect critically on the impact 
of the gender mainstreaming movement upon 
the issue of childcare in South Korea. To 
achieve this, I build on data generated from in-
depth interviews with key policy actors who 
participated in relevant policy implementations 
as well as policy documents collected and 
analysed through a discursive institutionalism 
approach. The paper explores two aspects of 
gender mainstreaming discourse in South 
Korea and is especially related to the transfer of 
childcare duty from the Ministry of Welfare and 
Health to the Ministry of Gender Equality; how 
it was interpreted in front of politics (‘discourse 
as content’) and formulated at the back of it 
(‘discourse as process’). I argue that the 
discourse of gender mainstreaming around the 
transfer decision was variously approached by 
different policy interests and constrained by the 
dominant gender role regarding childcare 
(rhetoric policy dependency).   
 
Key words: gender mainstreaming 
movement, discursive 
institutionalism, South Korea, 
childcare 
 
 
 
 
Introduction   
The paper aims to reflect critically on 
the impact of the gender mainstreaming 
movement especially with 
consideration of the limitations 
remaining around the issue of childcare 
in South Korea. Gender mainstreaming 
movement is a strategy to bring gender 
sensitive perspectives into the policy 
decision making processes in order to 
pursue gender awareness and, as a 
result, advance gender equality in all 
policy agendas (Daly 2005; Squires 
2007; Walby 2005). This ambitious and 
rather ambiguous sounding intent has 
been challenged by questions 
regarding how to adopt this 
transnational policy discourse into each 
nation’s domestic policy decision 
making processes (Kim 
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and Ma 2005). Although there have 
been a number of methodological tools 
and operational frames introduced to 
apply the concept into policy 
implementation processes, such as 
gender analysis, gender based 
assessment and gender budgeting,  
challenges have revolved around the 
initial understanding of what exactly is 
meant by ‘gender mainstreaming’ in 
politics. Nonetheless, significantly, the 
gender mainstreaming movement has 
brought a new policy discourse to many 
East Asian countries including South 
Korea (Kim and Ma 2005; Y-R Park 
2005; T-H Kim 2011). 
 
In South Korea, with the political 
democratisation of the late 1980s and 
earlier, attention to gender related 
issues and the commitment to gender 
equality became incrementally high 
profile.  Women’s issues, such as: the 
economic and political empowerment of 
women, women’s health, and violence 
against women were addressed in all 
presidential elections as primary 
national tasks that needed addressing. 
Among these, the issue of childcare 
was significant, with particular attention 
being paid to the matter of the position 
of women in the labour market (Huh 
2005; Ma 2005). President Roh (Feb 
2003 - Feb 2008) was convinced (The 
Presidential Counsel of Policy Planning 
Committee, 2007) that the matter of 
childcare needed to be considered as a 
women’s issue and decided to transfer 
the duty of childcare away from the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare 
(henceforth ‘MHW’) to the Ministry of 
Gender and Equality (henceforth 
‘MGE’). This transfer of childcare 
between these two ministries can be 
seen as the first step in initiating the 
reform of childcare policy during the 
Roh administration. It might be seen as 
a critical juncture bringing about a shift 
to the government perceiving the 
demand for childcare as being directly 
tied to women’s issues. However, it can 
be also argued that the issue of 
childcare was still only being 
considered as a women’s issue when 
the decision to make the transfer was 
made.  
 
It might be true that assumptions about 
doing childcare in South Korea could 
not change very much after having 
been influenced by the gender 
mainstreaming movement. In fact, the 
gendered role of childcare 
responsibility in South Korea has been 
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attributed to traditional Confucian ideas 
which are likely to lead to women 
having the unconditional obligation to 
take on the roles of housewives and/or 
caregivers in the family, rather than to 
become active workers in the labour 
market (Won and Pascall 2004; Sung 
2003; Palley and Gelb 1994). The 
traditional idea of Confucianism has 
been pointed to when explaining the 
gendered welfare provision in South 
Korea, which is rests on a ‘strong male 
breadwinner’ (Lewis 1992) wherein 
women have been regarded as having 
dependant status within the family as 
wives and mothers. Indeed, this is 
supported by An’s (2008) survey of time 
spent on paid and unpaid care work 
which revealed that married women’s 
mean participation (measured in time) 
in housekeeping was significantly 
longer compared to that of married men 
and single women. The notion of 
gender equality carried with the gender 
mainstreaming movement can be 
contrasted with this Confucian-oriented 
assumption regarding women’s roles.  
 
The paper assesses the discourse 
development of gender mainstreaming 
movement upon the policy discourse 
change regarding the issue of childcare 
in South Korea. There are two concerns 
in this paper, firstly how did the gender 
mainstreaming movement bring the 
issue of childcare into the Korean 
politics to be raised as a main policy 
agenda? Secondly, how was the 
discourse formulated while the Korean 
government responded to it? In order to 
address these questions, I draw on 
discursive institutionalism (Grube 2016; 
Schimidt 2010) which will be followed 
by two aspects of the discourse 
development; firstly how it was 
interpreted in front of the politics 
(discourse as content) and, secondly 
how it was formulated at the back of it 
(discourse as process). This is because 
discursive institutionalism is a useful 
approach to explain how a policy 
discourse can lead policy actors to 
respond to new ideas in order to 
overcome entrenched policy interests, 
institutional obstacles and cultural 
impediments to change (Radaelli and 
Schmidt 2004).  However it does not 
mean that a new policy discourse can 
change policy actors and institutions 
but it is hardly reverse due to earlier 
policy choices (Schmidt 2010; 
Finlayson 2007). I address not only how 
the discourse of gender mainstreaming 
was interpreted and formulated but also 
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the constraints which obstructed the 
initial purpose of the gender 
mainstreaming movement in South 
Korea.  
 
In the following section, in order to build 
an analytical framework, I discuss how 
women’s issues especially care and 
gender have been omitted from main 
stream political studies, which then 
leads to a discussion of how the gender 
mainstreaming movement can offer an 
insight regarding bringing the issue of 
care and gender into politics. However, 
it is also important to address that how 
the issue of gender can be embraced to 
explain the change in institutions 
(Bacchi and Rönnblom 2014).  In order 
to highlight this, discursive 
institutionalism is adopted as it gives 
deeper attention to ideas and 
interactive processes of conveying 
ideas (Schmidt 2008) compared to 
other approaches such as historical 
and rational choice forms of 
institutionalism.  
 
After presenting my research methods, 
the ways in which the discourse of 
gender mainstreaming was interpreted 
and formulated are discussed. I posit 
that the discourse of gender 
mainstreaming was constrained by the 
different policy interests between the 
MGE and MHW and the dominant 
gender assumption regarding childcare 
in South Korea.  
 
Gender and politics dimension 
 
Early feminists claimed that 
mainstream political theory often 
excluded women’s issues and 
underestimated the value of women’s 
caring work (Lovenduski 1981; 
Pateman 1989). Indeed, during the so-
called Golden Age after 1945, welfare 
regimes in many European developed 
countries had clear gendering effects 
that followed as a direct consequence 
of relying on the male breadwinner as 
the citizenship norm (Hernes 1988).  
 
This perspective was underpinned by 
the acceptance that a welfare state 
should be based on the assumption of 
gender differences between men and 
women. For example, women should 
be given the responsibility of caring for 
their family, whereas men were to hold 
the rights of the family that were subject 
to public and rational assessment, 
which resulted in a heterosexual family 
with a male-breadwinner and female-
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housewife (Pateman, 1988). 
Lovenduski (1981) claimed that the 
dominant conception of political studies 
at the time was bound to exclude 
women, since the assumption was that 
women usually were not disposed to 
public power, did not belong to political 
elites nor hold influential positions in 
government institutions. Similarly, 
Pateman (1989) pointed out that for the 
vast majority, women’s issues were 
outside the proper concerns of political 
study, as their private matters had been 
systematically excluded from general 
theorising by the patriarchal 
constructions of the time. This 
perspective leads to the conclusion that 
mainstream political theory has been 
masculinised and women’s issues have 
been undermined, thus largely ignoring 
the gender and politics dimension.  
 
In general, the dimension of gender and 
politics could be found in the theoretical 
analysis of the relationship between 
‘gender’ and ‘state’, called ‘state 
feminism’. This, as Howell (1988) 
explained, referred to the activists and 
policies of structures within the state, 
which were set up officially for the 
purpose of promoting women’s 
interests and rights. However, Carver 
(1999) contended that this should be 
broadly conceptualised as ‘gender 
politics’ and co-defined with other 
concepts for example, class, race, 
ethnicity and localised cultures. In fact, 
during the 1990s, gender politics came 
to the fore over the issue of care, and 
was intensely debated in Western 
European welfare states. With the 
increasing recognition of care and 
gender, it became a norm to integrate 
care and gender into politics (Siim 
2000; Squires 2000). 
 
 In all Western democracies, the 
various feminist movements put gender 
equality with respect to care on the 
political agenda, challenging the 
divisions between public and private, 
paid work and care and between 
equality and difference.  
These new movements emerged as 
supranational forums, involving 
transnational NGOs, international 
forums and networks, shaping the 
discursive resources and various types 
of claim into new social movements.  
 
For example, the gender 
mainstreaming movement emerged 
after the 1995 United Nations 
conference in Beijing, followed by the 
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United Nation’s World Conference on 
Women held in Mexico City in 1975. 
The gender mainstreaming movement 
is primarily focused on its ability to 
facilitate women’s substantive 
representation by introducing a gender 
perspective into the policy making 
process (Squires 2007). It remains 
extremely hard to assess the impact of 
gender mainstreaming on women’s 
substantive representation by relying 
on information derived from data such 
as sex disaggregated statistics.  
Nonetheless, gender mainstreaming 
represents a platform which can pursue 
and/or promote distinctive ‘women’s 
issues’ within the relevant policy 
context for its aim is to advance gender 
equality to become an integral part of all 
public policy-making process 
(McCrudden 2001:75 cited in Squires 
2007).   
 
Gender politics and political opportunity 
structure  
Shifts of gender mainstreaming into the 
main political arena were explained by 
Sperling (1983)  as ‘gender politics’ 
using the ‘political opportunity structure’ 
for women’s movement organisations 
in Moscow after the beginning of 
perestroika (Sperling 1998; 143). 
Sperling (1998) defined political 
opportunity structure as a multi-
dimensional concept enabling the 
analysis of some of the reasons for a 
social movement’s success or failure, 
by drawing on work by McAdam 
(1996:27). This author’s work included 
four elements; 1) the relative openness 
or closure of the institutionalised 
political system, 2) the stability or 
instability of that broad set of elite 
alignments that typically undergird a 
polity, 3) the presence or absence of 
elite allies, 4) the state’s capacity and 
propensity for repression (McAdam 
1996 cited in Sperling 1998: 144).  
 
Gender politics, accordingly, could be 
defined as presenting the relationship 
between women and the state as a 
mutual engagement or interrogation, in 
which, to a certain extent, women have 
power or influence circulate (Waylen 
1998). More practically, Squires (2007) 
identified three key strategies (quotas, 
policy agencies and mainstreaming) 
that have come to represent the 
increasingly widespread commitment to 
gender equality within the political 
sphere, being concerned with parity of 
political equality of women. In general, 
these three strategies focus on 
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presence, voice and process, 
respectively (Squires 2007; 12). Even 
though these are clearly different, they 
have generally been advocated as 
mutually reinforcing ways of securing 
greater political equality between 
women and men and they represent a 
distinctive approach towards gender 
equality (Squires 2000).  
 
Orloff and Palier (2009) extended this 
perspective by setting out to identify the 
ideal dynamics in policy development 
so as to provide a deeper 
understanding of the policy-making 
processes that had previously 
illuminated by interest- and institutional-
based analysis. Regarding this, these 
authors contended that intellectual 
processes, in particular, the role of 
knowledge in politics, are important for 
influencing change in the policy 
paradigm. Padamsee (2009) and 
Beland (2009) also posited that the 
current change within welfare systems 
are of a paradigmatic nature, and 
therefore it is important to include how 
new policy ideas and discourses are 
understood and reflected when 
analysing policy changes and 
advancements. Feminist approaches 
for analysing social policy have tended 
to focus on women in one of two 
institutional sites: the national 
parliament or women’s policy agencies, 
defined as ‘institutional arrangements 
inside democratic states devoted to 
women’s policy questions’ (Stetson & 
Mazur, 1995 cited by Annesley 2010; 
51). 
 
It is certainly important to put women’s 
political activity in the context of the 
institutional configuration of a particular 
political system. This is especially 
demonstrated by Estévez-Abe and Kim 
(2014)’s study which questioned why 
South Korea responded to childcare 
needs much more vigorously than 
Japan. They argued that Korea has 
relatively an open political opportunity 
structure compared to Japan so that 
presidents in Korea can reverse 
policies more easily whereas it is hard 
to contain the strong bureaucratic 
resistance found in Japan. It is true 
when the duty of childcare was 
transferred from the MHW to MGE 
there was not much bureaucratic 
resistance within the government 
although there were civic organisations 
that were against the decision, but the 
Roh government was still able to 
pursue the decision.  
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Discursive institutionalism and 
rhetorical path dependency 
 
The political opportunity structure is not 
sufficient to explain how a certain policy 
discourse cannot change exiting 
institutions and policy actors’ 
behaviours. Traditional institutionalism 
theories including historical 
institutionalism and rational choice 
institutionalism do explain how 
institutions are changed and/or are 
unlikely get changed by focusing on 
historical structure and policy agencies 
(Pierson 1994; Katzenlson 1997). This 
institutionalism approach to policy 
development might be able to examine 
policy interests and/or as the result 
institutional performances, yet it still 
does not explain fully how a certain 
policy idea can affect the policy 
interests and institution changes. In 
particular, in order to bring gender 
perspective into the traditional 
institutionalism approach, it is difficult to 
explore how a policy idea (gender 
mainstreaming in this study) has 
impacted on policy interest change as 
well as institutional changes. A policy 
idea can be subjective as a policy 
discourse (Bacchi and Rönnblom 
2014), it does produce by itself policy 
interest and can even formulate policy 
actors’ decision making. In order to 
explain policy dependency and even 
policy deviation, the approach should 
move from stressing the structure of 
historical legacy (‘history matters’) to 
how the ideas formulates policy 
interests and policy actors’ decisions 
(‘ideas matter’).   
 
This approach of ‘ideas matter’ is well 
argued by Grubes (2016) who 
explained how certain policy rhetoric 
can become sticker (‘rhetoric policy 
dependency’) by existing political 
features. More specifically, he argues 
that policy rhetoric which is more 
central to the concerns of voters is likely 
to have a higher policy dependency 
than policy rhetoric with lower political 
saliency. This means that a new policy 
idea that is not attractive for a citizen’s 
vote is very unlikely to be chosen. He 
also added that the more specific the 
policy rhetoric the more likely it is to 
attract path-dependant effects but it is 
less likely sticker when a general 
commitment was made. Due to this, 
policy ideas and a rhetoric which is 
close to an election promise can 
become more sticker as an election 
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promise. This election promise is 
important not only to the politicians but 
also the electorate who are the most 
engaged in paying attention to the 
rhetoric of political leaders. Under 
doctrines of relevant ministries’ 
responsibility, leaders seek to frame 
their actions in certain ways to minimise 
blame but maintain their authority. 
 
Therefore, politicians can legitimately 
change path in response to changing 
circumstances without being stuck with 
their earlier rhetorical commitments. In 
fact, this rhetoric policy dependency 
reveals that a policy idea can be 
subjective itself but also could be 
formulated by policy interests and 
policy actors’ decision through 
‘interactive communication process’ 
(Carstensen and Schmidt 2016). 
 
In this sense, the key aspects that I 
highlight in this paper as my analytical 
framework were demonstrated by 
Schmidt. She argued that there are two 
political spheres which need to work 
together to shape and change 
institutions, firstly  how things are and 
should be (‘discourse as content’) and 
the front of mind capacity to 
communicate those ideas by framing 
them in a particular fashion (‘discourse 
as process’) (Schmidt 2014: 4, cited in 
Grube 2016). As Schmidt put it, the 
approach to discursive institutionalism 
demonstrates how ‘discursive 
interactions enable actors to overcome 
constraints which explanations in terms 
of interests, path dependence, and/or 
culture present as overwhelming 
impediments to action’ (Schmidt 
2010:4). This explanatory approach 
can be very useful to explain how policy 
actors reshape ideas in order to change 
institutions and even why they are often 
limited by their capacity to make a 
compelling case when advocating for 
change.    
 
With respect to the case of gender 
mainstreaming in South Korea, the 
discursive institutionalism approach 
enables me understand how institutions 
(the government and the MGE in this 
paper) were primarily concerned with 
the idea of gender mainstreaming, in 
order to pursue their interests, values 
and institutional performance especially 
regarding the issue of childcare. Also it 
will allow me to explore the dynamic of 
how the idea of gender mainstreaming 
was drawn to the issue of women’s 
caring work within the relevance of 
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social, political and historical context in 
South Korea. Lastly it provides me with 
the insight of how the idea of gender 
mainstreaming was communicated 
within an interactive political process 
which conveys to the existing ideas 
around the gender role in childcare 
(rhetoric policy dependency).  
 
I set out an analytical framework which 
gives two aspects of the policy 
discourse of gender mainstreaming, 
discourse as content and discourse as 
process, with specific discussion points 
for each, as shown below in Table 1.   
 
Table 1 The analytical framework for the 
study 
Discourse as 
content 
 What did the policy 
discourse initially aim for? 
 How did the policy 
discourse become a main policy 
agenda?  
 What factors were 
influencing? 
 What was the most 
relevant issue and why? 
 
Discourse as 
process 
 What were the relevant 
policy initiatives proposed? 
 Who proposed it and what 
were the policy interests? 
 How did the policy options 
reinforce or challenge exiting 
ideas?   
 
The following section explains how I 
gathered the data in order to apply the 
discursive institutionalism approach to 
the gender mainstreaming movement. 
Then I move to explore how the gender 
mainstreaming discourse was 
formulated in South Korea and as the 
result how it impacted on the issue of 
childcare in Korean childcare policy.  
 
Research methods 
 
As with institutional approaches, 
including Schmidt (2010), I take a 
constructionist view of the social world, 
that is, my epistemological perspective 
considers social phenomena to be 
constructed by people or their actions. 
This also relates to my research 
method approach as an 
epistemological basis; how concept 
and/or theory are generated to interpret 
social phenomena and there are 
extensive debates as to whether a 
researcher can be objective and 
produce objectivity in a study (Ritchie 
and Lewis 2003). With respect to this, 
the studies that engage in qualitative 
investigations more usually involve an 
inductive stance.  
 
This differs from undertaking that are 
from the quantitative paradigm in that 
these start with a theory or proposition 
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which is relied on to shape loosely the 
subsequent data collection (Silverman 
2011). The qualitative epistemological 
approach tends to allow theory to 
emerge from the data that has been 
gathered. Proponents of 
constructionism look to external social 
structures and institutions and consider 
the ways in which these shape social 
reality as they contend that the world is 
socially constructed through different 
forms of knowledge (Goodman 1978, 
cited in Flick 2009).  
 
Thus given my adopted epistemological 
foundation of constructivism, which 
largely lies within the qualitative 
paradigm, qualitative tools are 
appropriate as they allow me to capture 
the actions and interpretations of 
people during their social interactions 
(Flick 2009; Silverman 2011). Because 
of the nature of the study, qualitative 
research tools can capture individual 
policy actors’ emotions and other 
subjective aspects associated with the 
evolving lives of policy interests as well 
as policy groups (Becker 2004; Berg 
2007). In particular Nelson (1990) 
delineated that in-depth interviews are 
the best way to gather information that 
is somewhat sensitive and subjective. 
These advantages prompted me to 
employ in-depth interviews as a 
technique with the aim of exploring the 
policy discourse change around the 
issue of care while the duty of childcare 
was transferred from the MHW to MGE.  
In Table 2 below, I present details 
regarding the sixteen interviewees 
recruited through purposive sampling 
with whom I held in-depth interviews 
and who responded to semi-structured 
questionnaires. Each interviewee 
played an important role as a key policy 
actor during the period of interest. Over 
time, many of them held different 
positions within the policy making arena 
and hence, were deemed well 
equipped to provide insights regarding 
the focal interest, i.e. the transfer of the 
duty of childcare from MHW to MGW.  
Table 2 Background information on the 
selected interviewees 
Interviewees Position and 
role 
Main activities 
1 Political 
appointee  
A chairperson in a 
presidential 
advisory body in 
the Blue House1 
2 Governmental 
researcher 
A senior researcher 
on childcare and 
family in the Korea 
Institute for Health 
and Social Affairs 
3 Academic 
consultant / 
Professor 
A main actor who 
worked on the 
revision of the 
Childcare Act in 
2004 and a 
professor in a 
department of 
Social Welfare  
4 Women’s group 
organisation 
leader 
A secretary general 
in the Korean 
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Women’s 
Association United 
5 Parents’ group 
organisation 
leader 
A secretary general 
of the parental 
corporation 
association 
6 The first 
minister of the 
Ministry of 
Gender and 
Equality 
Previously the 
representative of 
the Korean 
Women’s 
Association United  
7 Senior civil 
servant 
A head of 
department of 
childcare in the 
Ministry of Gender 
and Equality 
8 Governmental 
researcher 
A senior researcher 
in the Korea 
Institute of Child 
Care and 
Education under 
the Prime Minister  
9 Parliamentary 
member 
The Director of the 
Bureau of Women 
in Democratic Party 
10 Academic 
consultant / 
NGO group 
leader / 
Professor 
The leader on the 
issue of childcare in 
the Committee of 
Social Welfare in 
the People’s 
Solidarity for 
Participatory 
Democracy 
11 Political 
appointee 
A public official in 
special services in 
social policy in the 
Blue House 
12 Senior civil 
servant 
A leader of the 
planning team on 
childcare in the City 
Hall of Seoul 
13 Academic 
consultant / 
Professor 
A professor in a 
department of 
Economics and 
currently the 
President of the 
Korean Association 
of Public Finance 
14 The second 
minister of the 
Ministry of 
Gender and 
Equality 
Previously a 
professor in a 
department of 
Sociology and 
previously the 
director in the 
Korean Women’s 
Development 
Institute 
15 Academic 
consultant / 
Professor 
A professor in a 
department of 
Children and 
Family 
16 Governmental 
researcher 
A senior researcher 
on childcare and 
family in the 
research 
department in the 
City Hall of Seoul 
Note: 1. The Blue House is the Korean 
presidential residence and is called 
‘Cheongwadae’ 
 
In addition, documentary analysis was 
undertaken in order to establish the 
policy environment and to provide the 
context to the in-depth interviews. 
Yanow (2000) claimed that document 
analysis can provide background 
information for conversational 
interviews with key actors. Thus, the 
matters covered in the relevant policy 
documents could supply me with 
background information for the 
interviews with the selected key policy 
actors (Scott 1990). The relevant policy 
documents were deemed to serve as 
the principal artefacts from which I 
could understand how, according to the 
documentary records, a policy issue 
was conceptualised and evaluated 
(Freeman & Maybin 2011).  
 
Before employing the qualitative data in 
the analytical framework, the following 
section introduces the background of 
the gender mainstreaming movement 
in South Korea, especially focused on 
the Kim (Feb 1998 – Feb 2003) and 
Roh (Feb 2003 – Feb 2008) 
governments, which were politically 
committed to bringing gender equality 
into politics.  
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Gender mainstreaming 
movement in the Korean 
governments; the Kim and Roh 
administrations 
 
The gender mainstreaming movement 
in South Korea was accepted as a key 
strategy for achieving women’s 
empowerment followed by the United 
Nations issuing their statement on 
gender mainstreaming in the Platform 
for Action at the fourth World 
Conference on Women held in Beijing 
in 1995 (Huh 2005; Ma 2005). This 
transnational policy discourse had 
brought substantial awareness in policy 
decision making process to South 
Korea.  
 
For example, a gender sensitive policy-
making process was pursued in order to 
recognise different policy impacts on 
gender. Moreover, the Korean 
government passed the ‘Basic Act on 
Women’s Development’ at the end of 
1995 as one of the most noticeable 
efforts was to realise a gender equal 
society. In fact the awareness of gender 
was assisted by the creation of the 
Presidential Commission on Women’s 
Affairs in 1995, subsequently made into 
the Ministry of Gender Equality in 2001 
under President Kim Dae-jung (1998-
2003). In fact, this initiation of the MGE 
had been long awaited by women’s 
associations such as the Korean 
National Council of Women (KNCW) 
and the Korean Women’s Association 
United (KWAU). Under initiatives of the 
lead agency, the MGE especially from 
2001 to 2006, there were great number 
of technical tools which had been 
developed to enhance awareness of 
gender, such as gender impact 
assessment, gender sensitive 
budgeting and gender awareness 
training as the key ingredients of 
gender mainstreaming. The Roh 
government which was in the power at 
the time embraced the notion of gender 
mainstreaming as a new tool which 
could be used to transform the whole 
policy making process.  
 
Given such institutional developments 
in progressing gender equality 
promoted by these global movements 
during this period, the Korean 
government already had fertile ground 
in which to sow the seeds of further 
action on promoting equality of 
opportunity (Y-h Kim 2001; C-B Park 
ICDIR 2016 – International Conference on Diplomacy & International Relations    
 
 
106 
derby.ac.uk/lhss 
2005). This opening up of the Korean 
political arena towards equal 
opportunities may have been significant 
in providing space for bringing gender 
issues into politics and assisted in 
setting up structures for promoting 
women’s interests and rights (Siim 
2000; Sperling 1998; Squires 2000).  
 
Gender mainstreaming 
discourse as content 
 
There is no doubt that this gender 
mainstreaming movement was radically 
driven through the two governments of 
Kim and Roh. Especially President 
Roh, who was the successor of Kim 
reshuffled his cabinet with a fair number 
of female politicians. This was a 
completely new departure from 
previous governments even from the 
Kim. To being with, President Roh 
appointed Mrs Myeong-Sook Han as 
Prime Minister. The appointment of Mrs 
Han as Prime Minister could be a 
critical point which the Korean 
government actively started to appoint 
femocrats within the government. Mrs 
Han previously had worked for 
                                                        
9 The article is available from 
http://www.sisapress.com/journal/article/132
238 [accessed 13rd August 2016] 
women’s empowerment and rights, 
especially for marginalised women, in 
feminist activist groups such as the 
‘Korean Women-link’ and ‘Korean 
Women Association United’ (KWAU). 
Following her, Mrs Gum-Sil Kang was 
elected as the minister in the Ministry of 
Justice. She had worked as an NGO 
lawyer protecting basic human rights 
and for social justice for minority 
groups. Most daily newspapers, at that 
time, reported her appointment as 
being ‘sensational and a ground-
breaking initiation’ with comments 9 
that remarked on the fact that she was 
the first female minister in the Ministry 
of Justice and the youngest to date. 
Under Minister Mrs Hwa-jung Kim in the 
MHW, there were a number of female 
chairpersons of committees appointed, 
including Professor Hye-kyoung Lee to 
the Presidential Committee on Social 
Inclusion, one of the presidential 
advisory bodies. In fact, the increasing 
place of women’s representation in 
politics is one of key strategies which 
the gender mainstreaming discourse 
presents (Squires 2007).   
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I propose that these increased number 
of female politicians within the cabinet 
truly helped the government to be 
relatively more open-minded towards 
gender matters as compared to the 
situation under previous 
administrations. An interview I held with 
the former minister in the MGE 
demonstrates that the higher numbers 
of female politicians had contributed to 
the active public discussion of diverse 
gender issues, and in so doing, they 
helped to bring these to register at the 
centre of the policy agenda.  
I was quite lucky to be with other 
female politicians in my ministerial 
period. For example, the Prime 
Minister, Mrs Han, the two ministers, 
Mrs Kang in Justice and Mrs Kim in 
the Ministry of Health and Welfare and 
some female bureaucrats as well. 
Surprisingly, there were some female 
members in the Cabinet as well, who 
had feminist perspectives. That was 
not all. In the National Assembly too, 
you know. I reckon there were a fair 
number of female members in the 
Congress. I think these environments 
worked with me very well, especially 
to bring the issue of caring work into 
the public arena. They were actually 
willing to discuss this and never asked 
why it was important, which is a 
surprise, as male politicians often do.  
(Interviewee 6, the first minister of 
MGE)  
Within this gender friendly landscape 
forming the policy making environment, 
it can be said that the decision to 
transfer the duty of childcare from the 
MHW to the MGE was not a casual 
decision. That is, the decision to take 
this responsibility away from the MHW 
can be termed ‘a critical point’ which the 
government started taking the issue of 
childcare with the perspective of gender 
equality as the name of MGE 
represented. Indeed, the Presidential 
Counsel of Policy Planning Committee 
within the Blue House clarified the key 
decision underlying that ‘the view of 
caring work, especially that for children, 
needed to be approached by taking into 
account the woman’s perspective, 
women being the main carers in the 
home’ (The Presidential Counsel of 
Policy Planning Committee, 2007).  
Study indicates that in fact the decision 
was driven by President Roh and his 
strong commitment to childcare can be 
found as one of his election pledges, 
declaring that ‘Once you give a birth, 
the Government will strongly support all 
childcare’ (Congratulatory address 
given in the Women’s Week 
Celebration, 4th July 2003). This 
presidential promise was also directly 
connected to addressing the policy 
agenda of childcare being considered 
to be a national undertaking and 
demonstrates the intention to share 
responsibility for childcare between the 
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family and the state. Moreover, this 
address emphasised how determined 
President Roh was to achieve transfer 
of the matter to the MGW, as revealed 
in the interview with a senior civil 
servant within the MGE:  
I had doubt saying that the transfer 
was achieved by the President’s 
strong will. As long as the 
President kept saying that the duty 
should be transferred to the MGE, 
who could have been against him?   
(Interviewee 7, senior civil servant) 
This decision to transfer responsibility 
for childcare was also actively driven by 
appraisals criticising that while it had 
been within the MHW it had been 
administered without any specific 
gender perspectives. One interviewee 
(interviewee 3, academic consultant / 
professor) confirmed that there had 
been little discussion of why the issue 
of gender mattered to childcare and 
how to improve the service quality. 
Moreover, the proportion of the total 
budget available for the ministry to 
allocate to childcare had historically 
been fairly small compared to its other 
welfare spending allocations. Further, 
childcare provision was only available 
to low income families without sufficient 
resources to look after their own 
children whilst the parents were 
working (H-J Yoo 2002). The service 
was, therefore, not universal and it is 
little wonder that the matter of childcare 
was not taken as a priority within the 
MHW, according to interviewee 4, they 
also had to manage major social 
security systems such as those for 
national pensions, health insurance 
and employment. Similarly, interviewee 
7, a senior civil servant who had worked 
for the department of childcare in the 
MHW summed up the lowly status of 
the work:  
The task of childcare used to be 
regarded as a very trivial business 
within the MHW, and it was not 
popular at all. No one wanted to 
have this job in their role, because 
of the fairly small budget and even 
smaller political kudos it attracted. 
All the documents relating to this 
job were always put at the bottom 
of the pile in their in-tray.  
(Interviewee 7, senior civil servant) 
From such developments, it appears 
that President Roh strongly believed 
that the issue of childcare should be 
resolved in ways that considered both 
women’s career demands and their 
responsibilities as carers. One 
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respondent, a senior civil servant, gave 
testimony that Mr Roh studied the 
diverse debates around care and 
gender, and another the minister said 
he had been willing to take on board the 
arguments made by feminists and 
advocates of change located in the 
progressive camp (interviewees 7 and 
6). Likewise, one of the senior 
governmental researchers revealed in 
the interview that ‘President Roh 
strongly convinced himself that the 
issue of childcare needed to be 
categorised as a women’s issue’. This 
appreciation of the relation between 
caring work and women’s issues 
appears to have prompted the 
President’s decision to transfer 
childcare between the MHW and MGE, 
as soon as he came into power. He 
publicly announced that childcare 
should be a more urgent and significant 
issue for working mums than any other 
matter (The Presidential Counsel of 
Policy Committee, 2007).  
Thus, with President Roh’s strong 
commitment to gender and childcare, 
the achievement of the transfer can be 
the critical point which emphasised the 
issue of women as vital in relation to the 
business of childcare. The next section 
more specifically focuses on what were 
the relevant policy initiatives proposed, 
who proposed them and what were the 
policy interests and how did the policy 
options reinforce or challenge exiting 
ideas. 
 
 
Gender mainstreaming 
discourse as process 
 
If so, who were deeply involved with this 
transfer process? The following brings 
forward two dynamics of policy interest; 
one it between the Korea Women’s 
Association United (henceforth 
‘KWAU’) and the People’s Solidarity for 
Participatory Democracy (henceforth 
‘PSPD’), the other is between The 
Korea Edu-Care Association (KECA) 
and the Korean Private Nursery 
Education Association (KPNEA). 
Policy interest between KWAU and 
PSPD 
 
Facilitating the decision to the transfer 
the responsibility for childcare to the 
MGE was arduous owing to bitter 
opposition from social welfare 
professions which included 
practitioners in social welfare and 
scholars from the academic community 
who reacted strongly against this 
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decision. Together they organized 
protests in front of the national 
assembly to object to the transfer of 
childcare responsibility from the MHW 
to the MGE (interviewees 7 and 10, a 
senior civil servant and an NGO group 
leader, respectively). One of these 
informants, a senior civil servant, 
described the situation at that time as 
their ‘being surrounded by enemies on 
all sides’. In fact, their response was not 
so surprising considering that up until 
that time, the main work of social 
welfare professionals, including 
childcare professionals, had been 
handled by the MHW and they did not 
want it to be handed over to the MGE.  
 
The social welfare interest group 
plausibly claimed that childcare policy 
needed to be approached with 
children’s well-being and development 
as the priority rather than women and 
gender matters being put to the fore 
(interviewee 10, NGO group leader). 
He added that ‘there was no matter of 
gender in understanding childcare, 
even in the civil organisation PSPD 
(People’s Solidarity for Participatory 
Democracy) that was representing the 
professionals at that time’.  
The issue of the transfer of childcare 
away from the MHW was a concern to 
one particular civil organisation, the 
PSPD.  The insistence that child 
wellbeing should be prioritised was 
shared by this civil group. To date, they 
have been working on promoting 
people’s participation in governmental 
decision making processes and socio 
economic reforms, as well as on 
strengthening social security and 
securing minimum living standards.  
This civil organisation apparently could 
not help but take up the role of 
advocating on behalf of the social 
welfare professionals and the scholars 
who were opposed to the transfer 
(interviewee 10, NGO group leader). It 
transpired that the PSPD’s 
subcommittee which dealt with general 
affairs of social welfare, their ‘Social 
Welfare Committee’, had been working 
in support of social workers in the field 
and most of the committee members 
were professors in relevant university 
departments.  
 
It might therefore be taken for granted 
that this civil organisation would take up 
the fight on behalf of social welfare 
workers and scholars, given the 
PSPD’s background and its 
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membership, but it appears that, in the 
end, regarding the transfer, its position 
was rather unclear. On the wider matter 
of childcare, the PSPD had been 
working with the KWAU which was in 
favour of the governmental decision on 
the transfer. Often, both these 
organisations tended to share opinions 
regarding childcare policy directions, 
announcing similar statements. 
However, at around the time of the 
governmental decision, when 
statements by the KWAU which 
advocated for the transfer were made 
public, the group leader of PSPD 
admitted that ‘the name of the PSPD 
was dropped from the list of its 
supporters’. 
 
The KWAU is a long standing 
representative NGOs for women’s 
rights and empowerment in South 
Korea. They have been very active in 
monitoring and developing progressive 
childcare policy and have constantly 
argued that the issue of childcare 
should not be separated from issues of 
the family and the nature of caring work 
as this is mainly undertaken by women 
in the home (interviewee 4, women’s 
group organisation leader). The 
interviewee from the women’s group 
explained that ‘the KWAU aims to stand 
for women’s working rights so that the 
socialisation of care could not be more 
important than from this point of view’. 
With regard to the transfer of childcare 
out of the remit of the MHW, they had 
argued that the duty of childcare had to 
be given to the MGE when this was first 
established under Kim’s government in 
2001. When the issue of the transfer 
became a public debate, they reiterated 
how the policy setting for childcare 
matters was closely related to women’s 
situations in the labour market and the 
improvement of gender equality. With 
this perspective on childcare issues, 
the KWAU was a significant critic of the 
ways in which the MHW had dealt with 
childcare policy. In fact, one of their 
main points of contention was that the 
MHW focused only on the suppliers 
providing childcare services in the 
market place whereas they argued that 
the services should, in fact, be centred 
on the needs of service users 
(Namyoon 2005).  
 
As mentioned above, the PSPD and 
KWAU tended to share similar opinions 
over government actions especially 
those on childcare issues. That is, the 
PSPD had been inclined to be on the 
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side of the KWAU. However, regarding 
this issue of the transfer, the PSPD had 
struggled with finding their own voice. 
The interviewee from the PSPD 
revealed that they decided to have their 
name dropped from the KWAU 
statement on the issue of transfer and 
then, instead, they complained that the 
decision had been taken by the 
government unilaterally. They 
expressed their anger at this unilateral 
action, and even with the minister of the 
MHW who carried it out. The statement 
by the PSPD shows their anger: 
We are unclear about what the 
transfer of the childcare duty from 
the MHW to the MGE will 
contribute to the current affairs on 
the childcare issue we have at this 
time. We also must ask the 
government why the decision had 
to be taken unilaterally without 
enough discussion to gather social 
consensus.  (Statements by the 
PSPD, 1st Apr 2003) 
The understanding of children’s well-
being and comprehension of child 
development were considered as the 
main principle among the social welfare 
groups, whilst concerns about parents’ 
work-life balance and the extant 
imbalance in gender relations in caring 
work were strongly voiced by women’s 
groups, particularly the KWAU at this 
time. These conflicting focuses placed 
on childcare policy eventually drove a 
split between the two groups, i.e. the 
group advocating for social welfare 
profession and their counterparts 
representing women. This divide was 
even felt in academia between the 
disciplines of social welfare and 
women’s studies. Within this situation, 
the PSPD’s position appears to be 
ambiguous regarding whether they 
were on the side of either the social 
welfare or the women’s groups. In fact, 
the concern that they finally chose to 
voice in public statements was based 
on the argument that the decision for 
the transfer should have been through 
a full democratic procedure involving 
different opinions collected from many 
relevant parties.  
Policy interest between KECA and 
KPNEA 
 
On the other hand, the governmental 
trial to test run the idea of the transfer 
of the duty for childcare from the MHW 
to the MGE resulted in serious conflict 
emerging between these two 
associations. Previously, when the duty 
was managed by the MHW, the KECA 
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members (i.e. public sector providers) 
were supported by central and local 
governmental subsidies which were 
used to cover their operational costs, 
including paying for care workers’ 
salaries. In contrast, there had been 
little money for the KPNEA members 
(i.e. private sector providers), since the 
MHW had followed a certain policy that 
prohibited this, thus illustrating central 
governmental support was only for 
public and national facilities (MHW, 
2004).  
 
However, the MHW did announce that 
in special circumstances, they would 
support some private day-care centres 
but only when the private centres 
accommodated children from families 
that were below a minimal income 
threshold (MHW, 2004). This served to 
cut the waiting lists of poorer families 
who were often left waiting, trying to 
register their children at the more 
popular public facilities. Obviously, this 
additional clause did not provide any 
comfort to those private owners who 
remained excluded from receiving 
governmental aid. Moreover, children 
from low income families were 
prioritised when applying to attend 
public facilities and in fact these 
families, as well as many others not 
classified as being on low income, 
preferred their children to attend 
publicly run provision as it offered a 
better quality of service with lower 
service cost (MOGEF, 2006).  
As indicated by one of the interviewees, 
resolving this unequal treatment by the 
government regarding the subsidy, 
meant the KPNEA was very keen on 
being placed under the MGE, when the 
transfer was up for discussion within the 
government (interviewee 7, senior civil 
servant). She explained the reason for 
this was because ‘the KPNEA was 
poorly treated by the MHW while they 
were under the MHW’.  Then she 
described the conflict between the 
KPNEA and the MHW during the period 
when it was responsible for childcare:  
The private association (KPNEA) 
must have been upset about what 
MHW had done for them so far. At 
the beginning, when the 
government needed to build 
childcare facilities in the late 1980s, 
the government encouraged them 
to build and the government 
borrowed the money from the 
National Pension Fund. Then the 
number of childcare facilities 
dramatically increased and they 
(the private providers) were over 
the moon, imagining that they 
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would get golden eggs within a 
short time. However, they must 
have felt that they were then 
abandoned by the MHW and must 
have been quite upset about the 
governmental unfairness in the 
way they were treated.  
(Interviewee 7, senior civil servant)  
In contrast, the public association, the 
Korea Edu-Care Association (KECA) 
was against the decision regarding the 
transfer proposed by the Roh 
government. Another comment from 
this senior servant shows that they 
were truly worried that the subsidy for 
public childcare centres which they 
obtained from the government could be 
reduced and their preferential treatment 
by the government might be lost 
(interviewee 7, senior civil servant). 
She simply explained the reason for 
this, ‘Of course they cannot be happy 
about this, because the size of the pie 
they get to share from the MHW will be 
reduced. Won’t it?’  
 
The governmental decision to transfer 
the duty therefore brought about 
conflict between the KECA and the 
government, and possibly worsened 
the relation between the KECA and the 
private association KPNEA. According 
to the interview comments from her, 
these two childcare facilities 
associations could be described as the 
‘prominent range of mountains in the 
Korean care market, being staked out 
against each other as competitors 
wanting to have more children 
registered. The root cause of this 
competitive relationship started from 
the differentiated governmental subsidy 
which was only given to the public 
ones’.  
 
The rhetoric policy 
dependency  
 
Apart from these different policy 
interests between different policy 
agencies, it should be also noted that 
from the beginning, the discourse of 
gender mainstreaming itself was 
merely political rhetoric with an 
ambiguous meaning (Y Kim & Ma 
2004). That is, following the Beijing 
World Conference on Women (1995), 
the terminologies of gender and gender 
mainstreaming had been used without 
any exact explanation. In fact, these 
terms were widely used among civil 
servants and lawmakers without ever 
being defined, even by governmental 
ICDIR 2016 – International Conference on Diplomacy & International Relations    
 
 
115 
derby.ac.uk/lhss 
researchers (Han, Jang, Kim & Huh 
2008; E-S Kim 2008; Ma 2007). 
Moreover, during my interviews it 
transpired that, in the opinion of one 
governmental researcher, the notion of 
gender mainstreaming was not fully 
embedded among civil servants and 
politicians.  
We could make the foundations for 
the discourse of gender equality in 
our society through the gender 
mainstream movement. However, 
it is doubtful whether we reached 
compliance with the discourse in 
the policy making process. It might 
have been too early to have those 
gender perspectives in our society, 
particularly when some male 
governmental bureaucrats were 
still not aware of gender sensitive 
policies.  (Interviewee 2, 
governmental researcher) 
For instance, this dominant idea of 
gender role can be seen in the several 
changes of the name of the Ministry of 
Gender and Equality. Regarding the 
name, it changed four times after the 
department was first established in 
2001 with the name of the Ministry of 
Gender Equality, which was simply 
called, in Korean, the Ministry of 
Women (see Table 2 below).  
Table 2 The name changes of the Ministry 
of Gender and Equality 
 English Korean 
Jan 2001 Ministry of 
Gender Equality 
Planning and 
complication of 
women’s 
policies, 
prevention and 
relief of gender 
discrimination  
Ministry of Women 
여성부 
(Yeosungboo) 
 
June 2005 Ministry of 
Gender Equality 
and Family  
Dealing with 
women, family 
and infant care 
duties 
Ministry of Women 
and Family 
여성가족부 
(Yeosunggajokboo)  
Feb 2008 Ministry of 
Gender Equality  
Planning and 
complication of 
women’s 
empowerment 
and status 
improvement 
Ministry of Women 
여성부 
(Yeosungboo) 
March 
2010 -
presence 
Ministry of 
Gender Equality 
and Family  
Dealing with 
women, young 
people and 
family 
Ministry of Women 
and Family 
여성가족부 
(Yeosunggajokboo)  
Source: The website of the Ministry, which is available 
from 
http://www.mogef.go.kr/korea/view/intro/intro01_03.jsp  
[accessed 11th August 2016] 
 
The name was changed to the Ministry 
of Gender Equality and Family in 2005, 
but was again actually called, in 
Korean, the Ministry of Women and 
Family, with the duties of family and 
childcare having been transferred to it 
in June 2004 from the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare (MHW). Next, it was 
entitled the Ministry of Gender Equality 
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in 2008 and once again10 was changed 
to be called the Ministry of Gender 
Equality and Family in 2010.  
There can be several reasons 
advanced for why these changes were 
made, but the key point is the instability 
regarding the Ministry’s name. With 
respect to the Korean terminology of 
the phrase ‘gender equality’, this may 
not have been a comfortable phrase, 
even for policy makers to use and so 
the term ‘women’s policy’ may have 
been adopted as being more 
acceptable. Also, the terminology 
surrounding the matter of gender 
equality in Korean politics shows that 
the issue of gender equality might have 
only been understood as women issues 
rather than understanding gender 
driven differences in opportunities 
between men and women. Moreover, 
as discussed earlier, the idea of 
childcare still remaining a women’s role 
followed the traditional Confucian path.  
Conclusion and discussion 
                                                        
10 The change in February 2008 happened with the 
new administration under President Lee who 
came into power after President Roh. With this 
change in the name, the Lee government handed 
the duty of childcare back to the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare. My interview with one 
 
So, what did we learn from the gender 
mainstreaming movement and what did 
we miss out? Through the lens of 
discursive institutionalism, it is apparent 
that the initial idea of the gender 
mainstreaming movement was 
sufficiently strong to bring an 
awareness of gender into the politics.  
 
As a result, a number of technical tools 
such as gender assessment and 
gender budgeting was made feasible 
and implemented. Moreover it inspired 
the President to appoint femocrats 
within the Korean political system and 
the interview data revealed that the 
political environment had become more 
gender friendly. Within this political 
arena, it must have been relatively open 
to the idea of gender with and finally, 
the decision to make a transfer of the 
duty of childcare from the MHW to the 
MGE was made which was consistent 
with President Roh’s strong 
commitment to gender and care.  
political appointee/academic consultant 
commented on this transfer saying that ‘the 
concern about gender issues in caring work was 
reduced after this transfer under the Lee 
government’. 
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However, in this paper, I highlight two 
limitations of this state-oriented gender 
mainstreaming discourse in South 
Korea. Firstly, the discourse of the 
gender mainstreaming movement has 
largely remained as just political 
rhetoric with an ambiguous meaning 
rather than being absorbed into Korean 
politics as a fully-fledged direction of 
travel (Han, Jang, Kim & Huh 2008; 
Huh, 2005; T.-H Kim 2011, Ma 2005; 
C.-B Park 2005). Real political efforts 
were made to bring gender awareness 
into the policy making process 
especially in the area of childcare, but 
the interview data collected for this 
paper have shown that the 
terminologies of ‘gender’ and ‘gender 
mainstreaming movement’ were often 
used without any exact explanation 
even among civil servants and 
governmental researchers. The name 
changes of the Ministry of Gender and 
Equality (MGE) indicate that the term 
‘gender equality’ still had a long way to 
go in order to be absorbed seamlessly 
into the name of the ministry in the 
Korean language. Moreover, regarding 
the transfer of the duty of childcare from 
the Ministry of Health and Welfare 
(MHW) to the Ministry of Gender and 
Equality (MGE), it may have been that 
the social expectation of a woman 
assuming the traditional role as the 
main carer within a family was still 
dominant throughout the decision 
making over the transfer. 
Notwithstanding this, I argue strongly 
that the event of the transfer should be 
considered as a turning point when 
concern was being expressed about 
childcare along with women’s issues in 
politics. At the same time, the transfer 
also shed light on the prevailing limited 
understanding of care and gender. 
Thus, moving the duty of childcare to 
the ‘Ministry of Women’ is consistent 
with the stereotyped view regarding the 
role of women as carers, which further 
underlines what the role of women was 
expected to be at the time of the 
decision to make the transfer.  
 
Secondly, despite considerable political 
endeavour to bring gender issues into 
politics, a lack of maturity in 
understanding the relations between 
care and gender has been clearly 
revealed. The understanding of 
‘gender’ in respect to undertaking 
caring work, does not only refer to the 
issue of women’s roles as a caregiver, 
but also needs to include 
comprehension of the different 
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structural limitations that men and 
women experience in employing care 
services in the care market as well as 
when they are participating in the labour 
market (Millar 2006). As long as 
women’s position in the labour market 
is marginalised they will often have a 
dual role, and their roles are principally 
defined as those of caregivers at home, 
unlike men’s (Huh, 2005; Y. Kim & Ma 
2004; Ma 2005, Peng, 2009).  
 
More specifically these dissimilar 
conditions might bring about different 
impacts on decision making between 
men and women, particularly regarding 
whether to employ childcare services or 
to do the childcare work themselves, as 
well as whether a woman should take 
part time or full time employment, or not 
work at all (Connelly, 1992; Joshi, 1995; 
Joshi et al, 1999). Such potentially 
negative impacts on women should 
have been considered within the policy 
discourse context but the data in this 
study show very little evidence of an 
awareness of the dissimilar conditions 
between men and women with regards 
structural limitations.  
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  PAPER 8: 
THE EFFORTS AND LEVEL OF SUCCESS 
ACHIEVED IN ESTABLISHING INTERNATIONAL 
UNIFORMITY IN STANDARDS, RELATED TO 
THE ROLE OF COMPANY AUDITORS AND 
MAINTENANCE OF THEIR INDEPENDENT 
POSITION 
Larry Mead 
 
College of Law, Humanities and Social Sciences 
University of Derby 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The independence of auditors is a vital factor in maintaining respect for and reliance 
upon the audit report produced. How protection of this independence is sought, with 
emphasis on the desired global uniformity, will be examined. Numerous factors can 
be seen as serving to encroach on this independence, and they also will be considered 
in the international context to assess the level of variance and uniformity.  
Audit firms, in carrying out an audit, will be subject to demands from a range of 
sources. These include professional body regulatory demands, law and regulations. 
Demands of these sources on a Jurisdictional and regional basis will be explored to 
assess the levels of disparity and evident shifts towards harmonisation. 
The establishing of international bodies with the objective of working towards global 
harmonisation applicable for the auditing profession is relatively recent. The work and 
achievements of international bodies in developing global uniformity will be explored. 
Progress made and the extent to which further harmonisation can be achieved will be 
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explored taking account of ongoing localised aims to monitor and improve standards 
related to the audit and protect auditor independence. 
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OF TERRORIST FINANCING AND 
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PhD Candidate 
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PhD Candidate 
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Abstract  
 
The fear associated with a number of the national and international challenges in the 
early 21st century is underpinned by a real and perceived lack of control.  Victorian-
era approaches continue to dominate many justice systems in which efficiency and 
effectiveness seems overwhelmed by the modern threat environment.  Financial 
investigation has been under-recognised and under-utilised, and there is a consistent 
lack of sustained focus on the economic aspects that underpin the structure, 
organisation and sustainability of priority problems.  At the national and international 
level, there is a need to begin the process of re-conceptualising the threat environment 
with much greater focus upon the broad spectrum of acquisitive crime.  With this 
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approach we begin to understand the channels to market as well as the money 
laundering instruments.  This focus will raise some (perhaps undiplomatic) questions 
as to those who directly, indirectly, or through wilful blindness, support contemporary 
threats, including extremist groups such as the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL).  Illicit trade and commerce is a ‘necessary evil’ that ties ISIL and others 
to the ‘real world’, and thus makes them vulnerable to financial investigation without 
resort to military force and risk to intelligence capabilities. 
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       PAPER 10: 
POLITICAL DISCONTENT AND THE 21ST 
CENTURY’S THREATS TO GLOBAL PEACE, 
SECURITY AND HUMAN PROGRESS 
 
Dr. Francis Jegede 
Senior Lecturer & Programme Leader, International 
Relations & Diplomacy 
University of Derby 
Abstract 
This paper examines 21st century relations between the State and the communities 
over which it, nominally at least, has jurisdiction.  More specifically the aim of the paper 
is to explain both why and how so called mainstream politics is failing to engage with 
many peoples and communities around the world.  To this end the paper identifies key 
areas of conflicts, tensions, mistrusts and other issues in both the domestic and 
international politics that could compromise the long term stability of nation states and 
threatens the peace, and security of peoples around the world.  Cases are sited of 
hostile and un-diplomatic relations between states and ill-considered foreign policies 
that focus on narrow national interests rather than wider societal good.  Based on the 
analysis presented, the paper concludes that the way politics is being played in the 
21st century is a principal contributing factor  to the current sense of despair and 
disconnection between the State and the governed.  Tentative proposals are 
advanced towards forming  a new politics which addresses the fear and concerns of 
other states, cultures and peoples as an integral part of any foreign policy and 
diplomatic relations.  
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 PAPER 11: 
THE NEED FOR NEW EMOTIONALLY 
INTELLIGENT CRIMINAL JUSTICE & 
CRIMINOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO HELP 
END THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ 
 
By Dr. David Patton 
Positive Criminologist and Senior Lecturer, Learning, 
Teaching & Quality lead for Law, Criminology and Social 
and Political Sciences, University of Derby 
 
Abstract 
 
Violent attacks in the West in recent years by 
terrorist groups have reinforced the fact that 
acts of violence by extremist groups are 
increasingly becoming a feature of 21st Century 
life.  Understandably, such acts have been met 
with outrage, condemnation, horror and fear.  In 
addition, the West’s responses to such events 
have been amongst other things, more 
bombing for Syria; more resources given to the 
police; more powers for security agencies, 
greater surveillance employed and new laws 
passed which highlight that the war on terror is 
active. However, George Bush’s declaration 
that the ‘war on terror’, "will not end until every 
terrorist group of global reach has been found, 
stopped and defeated" is unrealistic.  The state 
response to terrorism broadly follows a ‘war on 
terror’ approach; similarly current criminal 
justice and criminological approaches also 
broadly follow a retributive style approach.  This 
paper will argue that a new paradigm for an 
emotionally intelligent CJS is needed, one 
which utilises theories and models of criminal 
justice that are also emotionally intelligent, in 
order to put an end to the patterns of 
separation, exclusion, excessive punishment, 
shaming and humiliation and thus end the 
misguided approach used at present 
specifically in relation to terrorism (and more 
generally in relation to criminality). 
 
 
Introduction 
The state response to terrorism broadly 
follows a ‘war on terror’ approach.  
Similarly current criminal justice and 
criminological approaches also broadly 
follow a retributive style approach.  This 
paper will argue that what is needed is 
a new paradigm to allow for the 
emergence of a new emotionally 
intelligent criminal justice system (CJS) 
with new models and forms of 
emotionally intelligent justice to 
accompany it, to end the cycle of further 
acts of ‘violence’.  The paper concurs 
with a radical feminist view that 
Peacemaking criminologists have 
utilised when observing that violence is 
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inherent within the CJS.  Thus a violent 
CJS is seeking to help eradicate and 
reduce acts of violence by extremist 
groups who seek to terrorize.  The irony 
is obvious, and the track record of the 
CJS’s effectiveness in dealing with 
terrorism shows that the current 
approach is not working.    
 
Therefore, a new paradigm for an 
emotionally intelligent CJS is needed, 
one which utilises theories and models 
of criminal justice that are also 
emotionally intelligent and end the 
patterns of separation, exclusion, 
excessive punishment, shaming and 
humiliation (some of the very forces and 
mechanisms that have in part 
contributed to the creation of such 
extreme groups in the first place).  
Whilst the emphasis of this paper is 
more towards the need for emotionally 
intelligent justice in relation to terrorist 
offences, it is believed that an 
emotionally intelligent CJS and models 
of emotionally intelligent justice is 
needed more broadly when dealing 
with anyone who enters into the CJS.  
 
The term "emotional intelligence" 
seems first to have appeared in 1964 
(Beldoch, 1964) but was popularised by 
Goleman (1996). Mayer & Salovey, 
(1997: 10) define emotional intelligence 
as a set of interrelated skills: 
“the ability to perceive accurately, 
appraise, and express emotion; 
the ability to access and/or 
generate feelings when they 
facilitate thought; the ability to 
understand emotion and 
emotional knowledge; and the 
ability to regulate emotions to 
promote emotional and intellectual 
growth.”  
 
Therefore emotional intelligence 
provides an understanding and 
management of emotional data to help 
inform resultant judgments and 
decisions that promote positive growth.   
 
Sherman (2003:26) argues that an 
emotionally intelligent justice system 
would be comprised of firstly, knowing 
the systems emotions in the form of 
CJS staff being aware of and being able 
to manage their emotions more 
effectively; secondly, recognising the 
emotional states of victims, offenders 
and others involved in the system; 
thirdly, being aware of the effects of 
decisions and the administration of 
‘justice’ on those involved in the 
system.  
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It is advocated that Positive 
Criminology holds the greatest potential 
at present to help provide some of the 
much needed answers as to ‘what’ and 
‘how’ this new paradigm of emotionally 
intelligent CJS and forms of justice may 
look moving forward.   
“Positive Criminology (not to be 
confused with Positivist 
Criminology) is a new conceptual 
criminological perspective that 
scientifically targets crime, 
violence and "bad" experiences at 
the individual and social levels 
with goodness and with positively 
experienced encounters. Positive 
Criminology places an emphasis 
on social inclusion and on unifying 
and integrating forces at 
individual, group, social and 
spiritual levels that are associated 
with the limiting of crime.”  
(Positive Criminology, 2016) 
 
The existing criminal justice 
system: 
Critical criminologists along with others 
have rightly highlighted that crime is a 
social construct and thus the resultant 
response by the CJS, the public, media, 
etc. depends on who is accused 
(Pepinsky, 2013; Young, 2009; Taylor 
et al, 1973).  Labelling theory, social 
reaction and moral panic theory have 
evidenced the powerful role that 
hegemonic labels and narratives can 
have on the social construction and 
reaction of crime and they have 
highlighted the central role the CJS 
plays in this (Young, 2009; Cohen, 
1973; Becker, 1963; Goffman, 1959).   
 
Terrorists and terrorism, whilst being a 
reality, also have a socially constructed 
‘reality’ that has given rise to moral 
panic, stereotypes, and increased fears 
and anxieties.  To date in 2016 there 
have been 23 terrorist attacks in 
France, USA, UK, Germany & Belgium 
(Humphrey’s, 2016).  Extreme acts of 
non-state violence, political upheaval, 
mass migration and conflicts have 
evoked a great deal of fear, anger, 
hatred, uncertainty and a heightened 
sense of risk in the West (Coaffee, 
2009).  The increasing frequency and 
the scale of acts of non-state violence 
against the West have become a 
feature of 21st Century living.  However, 
the resultant levels of moral panic, fear 
and perceptions of threat and risk of 
attack articulated in a media fuelled 
social construct of terrorism in the UK 
and the West, do not appear to be in 
alignment with the fact that since the 
year 2000 only 2.6% of all deaths from 
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terrorism have occurred in the West, 
(and this figure lowers to 0.5% when the 
911 attacks are excluded) (Global 
Terrorism Index, 2015). 
 
The social construct that has been 
created about terrorists in the West has 
not aided the public or political 
discourses or the responses.  Karstedt 
(2002) has noted that the public and 
political discourse is fuelled with 
emotionality in its response to crime.  
 
“The ‘return of emotions’ to 
criminal justice and penal policies 
has occurred in two arenas: the 
emotionalization of public 
discourse about crime and 
criminal justice, and the 
implementation of sanctions in the 
criminal justice system that are 
explicitly based on—or designed 
to arouse—emotions. Both 
developments corresponded to 
the changing space of emotions 
and the emotional culture of late 
modern societies” Karstedt, 
2002:301). 
Emotional reactions to crime in the 
public discourse tend to be focused on 
disgust, outrage and anger at what has 
occurred (the crime). Then typically 
emotions of sympathy, empathy and 
sadness are expressed in relation to the 
victim of a crime.  Yet, it is shame, 
remorse and guilt that are the emotions 
‘we’ typically want to see the offender 
experience.   
 
When this ‘emotionality’ moves into the 
realm of criminal justice sanctions, it 
also seems that modern punishment 
has become “a realm for the expression 
of social value and emotion as well as 
a process for asserting control’ 
(Garland, 1990: 4).  This potent mix of 
emotionalization has only exacerbated 
the situation in relation to terrorism. 
 
“Governments today are on a war 
footing in respect to…violent 
crime, and they are expected to 
produce an instant response 
whenever this is called for…high 
visibility crime cases become the 
focus of a great deal of media 
attention and public outrage, 
issuing in urgent demands that 
something be done.  These cases 
typically involve a predatory 
individual, an innocent victim, and 
a prior failure of the criminal justice 
system to impose effective 
controls…Almost inevitably the 
demand is for more effective penal 
control.” (Garland, 2001: 172-173) 
Peacemaking Criminology observes 
that violence is inherent within the CJS, 
its models of justice and the practices 
of its staff (Pepinsky, & Quinney, 1991).  
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It is believed that patriarchy plays a key 
role in creating violence within the CJS 
following a radical feminist view that 
violence is ‘power over others’ or 
against ‘power sharing’ (Pepinsky, 
2006:3). Thus structures, narratives, 
knowledge, policies, roles and 
practices based on someone (‘Father’) 
knowing best and being best placed to 
defend and protect has created the 
politics and practices of violence and 
fear.  It is not difficult to observe 
patriarchy at play in policies and 
practices that seek to punish, exclude, 
shame, seek retribution and claim to be 
in the best interests of the majority and 
to offer the greatest protection.  
 
In response to the rise of terrorist 
attacks in the West, the affected 
countries have been quick to respond 
with the creation of new laws to help 
control and protect their citizens from 
further harms, and in some cases this 
has led to a tension in the appropriate 
balance between the rule of law, 
upholding the human rights of the 
accused terrorist as well as ensuring 
that adherence to democratic 
processes have been followed. (United 
Nations 2009; Wouters & Naert, 
(2004)).  It would seem that ‘the 
terrorist’ has become the target for the 
expression of public and political fear, 
anger, outrage, anxiety and has 
trumped other criminal actors such as 
rapists, drug dealers and child sex 
abusers both in terms of the resultant 
public discourse and the increased 
powers given to agencies within the 
CJS to detain, monitor and punish, as 
evidenced in the long list of new 
terrorist legislations the UK has created 
since 2000 and the measures they 
have introduced: 
The Terrorism Act 2000 
The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act 2001  
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 
The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005  
The Terrorism Act 2006  
The Terrorism (United Nations 
Measures) Order 2006  
The Counter-Terrorism Act 2008  
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
The Terrorism (United Nations 
Measures) Order 2009  
The Terrorist Asset-Freezing 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 2010  
Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 
2015 
 
Whilst there is not space, nor a focus 
here to explore each piece of legislation 
in turn including CONTEST, the British 
Government’s overarching counter-
terror strategy (HM Government, 
2011a: 40), it is clear that there has 
been an increase in control and 
surveillance.  
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These acts gave sweeping and 
vastly increased new powers of 
stop and search, surveillance, 
arrest and detention, as well as 
creating new crimes, for example, 
the dissemination of material 
deemed to ‘glorify terrorism’. 
Whilst ostensibly directed at all 
forms of ‘extremism’ (including far 
right groups and individuals) such 
legislative measures also 
impacted disproportionately, and 
negatively, upon Muslims in 
Britain, raising fears of an unstated 
policy of ‘racial profiling’ in policing 
practice and the application of the 
law, and leading many critics to 
argue that British Muslims were a 
new ‘suspect community’ 
(Coppock & McGovern, 2014: 
243) 
 
Further examples that demonstrate an 
increase in control and surveillance can 
be observed by the fact that the U.K. 
has one of the longest periods of pre-
charge detention of any comparable 
democracy, currently at fourteen days 
(and previously at twenty eight days).  
In the USA the limit is two days, in 
Ireland it is seven days, in Italy it is four 
days and in Canada it is one day 
(Liberty, 2016).  Further, stop and 
search statistics indicate that ethnic 
minorities are up to 42 times more likely 
to be stopped and searched by the 
police under anti-terror measures 
(Dodd, 2011; Travis, 2009).  A further 
example is that British Muslim children 
and young people have been noted as 
being a key population group that the 
children and young people’s services 
have been given a clear role by the 
state to control, monitor and 
‘police’.(Hickman et al., 2012; 
McGovern, 2010; Pantazis and 
Pemberton, 2009, 2011).  
 
Policies, ideologies and acts of 
retribution, exclusion, excessive 
punishments, excessive powers being 
given to criminal justice agents, a 
disregard for human rights etc. are 
counter-productive, especially when 
dealing with extreme groups and their 
acts of violence.  Such themes 
contributed in part to their creation and 
in some measure sustain their 
continuance.  For example, the whole 
notion of ‘radicalisation’ where 
somebody becomes a terrorist or 
comes to support terrorism, is more 
likely to occur when an individual 
becomes or feels so excluded, 
separated, detached, resentful or 
‘punished’ by British society/culture and 
it’s institutions that they turn to an 
‘alternative system’ (Jackson, 2009; 
Kundnani, 2012).   
Therefore, continuing to apply 
dominant models of criminal justice, 
namely the models of Crime Control, 
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Status Passage and Power (King, 
1981) that promote further violence and 
exclusion, will not and cannot succeed 
in attaining the results that are needed 
especially in relation to terrorism.  The 
Crime Control model is defined by its 
social function of punishment and being 
typically defined by its creation of high 
conviction rates due to it’s disregard for 
legal controls, support of the police and 
implicit presumption of guilt as well as 
the desire to highlight the 
unpleasantness of the experience for 
the offender. The Status Passage 
model is defined by its social function of 
denunciation and degradation along 
with its focus on public shaming and 
asserting the agent’s control over the 
process.  The Power model is defined 
by its social function of maintenance of 
class domination thereby promoting the 
labelling, stigmatisation, alienation and 
punishment of large classes of people.   
 
The political and public discourses, 
social constructs, and moral panic that 
need to be created and maintained in 
order to justify the continuance of the 
above models can only be based on 
fear, hate, condemnation, labelling and 
stigmatisation, fostering a ‘them’ and 
‘us’ mindset, highlighting ‘risks’ to the 
majority, which in turn can only evoke 
negative emotions and responses from 
the general public towards the 
‘other’/criminal/terrorist, and also, 
importantly can only evoke negative 
emotions and responses from those on 
the receiving end of the punishment 
provided by each of the above models.  
When the models are administered in 
an adversarial system as we have in the 
UK, which is premised on conflict and 
opposition and the emphasis of the trial 
is on the suspected persons guilt, and if 
convicted their punishment, and latterly 
their remorse, this only serves to 
entrench the patterns of negativity and 
violence. 
 
The response of many western states 
to acts of violence inflicted upon their 
citizens has been to retaliate in kind 
through further violence.  President 
Obama in a recent speech following the 
Orlando shooting stated: 
 
“At the outset, I want to reiterate 
our objective in this fight. Our 
mission is to destroy ISIL…Over 
the past two months, I've 
authorized a series of steps to 
ratchet up our fight against ISIL. … 
Our B-52 bombers are hitting ISIL 
with precision strikes. Targets are 
being identified and hit even more 
quickly. So far, 13,000 
airstrikes…So far we have taken 
out more than 120 top ISIL leaders 
and commanders. And our 
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message is clear, that if you target 
America and our allies, you will not 
be safe. You will never be safe.” 
(Obama, 2016) 
 
The pattern continues with more 
casualties and fatalities on both sides 
but the observation that "An eye for an 
eye only ends up making the whole 
world blind" (Ghandi, 1942) highlights 
the fact that a negative act, responded 
to in a negative way can only produce a 
further negative result.  What is needed 
is an input/response of a different kind, 
as Martin Luther King noted “Hate 
cannot drive out hate; only love can do 
that” (King, 1987?).  If we want to see a 
different result in relation to terrorism, 
then a different 
input/approach/response is needed 
from the State, the CJS, and society in 
relation to terrorism.  In addition, if we 
want to see a different result, one that 
is positive, then it is advocated here that 
the input/approach/response needs to 
be positive in nature to ensure that the 
means are inherent in the ends in order 
to provide the much needed 
congruency and alignment with the 
desired positive outcome.  
 
The United Nations (2009:5) 
commented that 
“Many criminal justice systems are 
currently better at responding to 
and punishing crimes after the fact 
than at preventing them in the first 
place. Often, existing criminal 
justice practices are ineffective 
when it comes to preventing 
terrorist conspiracies from 
achieving their aim…The goal is to 
proactively integrate substantive 
and procedural mechanisms to 
reduce the incidence and severity 
of terrorist violence, and to do so 
within the strict constraints and 
protections of the criminal justice 
system and the rule of law.” 
 
A new paradigm of an emotionally 
intelligent CJS & model of justice 
 
If the pattern of fear, control and 
punishment continues to be repeated, 
this will do little to alleviate the situation. 
It is advocated here that a new 
paradigm is needed to allow for models 
and form(s) of emotionally intelligent 
justice that will allow for the creation of 
an emotionally intelligent CJS.  One 
that draws upon a non-violent 
approach, integrates all parties into 
society, offering the possibility for a 
transformative and positive experience 
and to administer effective justice for 
all. New theories, paradigms and 
approaches in criminology need to be 
created and developed further, and 
existing ones brought to the fore of the 
discipline to support the creation of 
such emotionally intelligent justice.   
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“The new paradigm criminology 
could build is one in which a justice 
system becomes emotionally 
intelligent in all of its interactions 
with suspected, accused, and 
convicted offenders, as well as 
with victims, their families and 
communities…criminology can 
also invent ways to foster such 
intelligence at the level of social 
systems.” (Sherman, 2003: 25-26) 
 
Sherman (2003) highlighted two major 
tasks in making justice more 
emotionally intelligent, the first was to 
increase the capacity for the justice 
system to process cases with an 
awareness of all actors involved in the 
case so as not to increase the likelihood 
of recidivism. Therapeutic 
jurisprudence (TJ) would seem to be 
most appropriate here: 
 
“Therapeutic jurisprudence (“TJ”) 
has sought to look at the law in a 
richer way by pondering the 
therapeutic and antitherapeutic 
impact of “legal landscapes” (legal 
rules and legal procedures) and of 
the “practices and techniques” 
(legal roles) of actors such as 
lawyers, judges, and other 
professionals operating in a legal 
context.” (Wexler, 2013: 463) 
 
TJ has significant potential in reforming 
certain parts of the CJS.  For example, 
if lawyers and judges were sensitive to 
and aware of the therapeutic or anti-
therapeutic consequences that their 
words, actions and decisions can foster 
with those they are interacting with, and 
were adequately trained in how to do 
this effectively (Wexler, 2012), this 
alone would have a major impact within 
the CJS in terms of enabling it to 
become more emotionally intelligent.  
The ‘affective turn’ within the social 
sciences  (Gregg & Seigworth, 2010) 
has brought about an interest in 
emotions, and in relation to emotionally 
intelligent justice occurring amongst 
criminal justice staff this would not be 
too dissimilar to the ‘emotional labor’ 
researched amongst customer service 
staff where emotions are managed for 
the benefit of the customer (Hochschild, 
1983).  One of the central aims of 
training CJS staff to be emotionally 
intelligent would be to increase their 
emotional intelligence (Goleman, 
1996). Peacemaking Criminology 
would also seek to change the power 
dynamics and therefore the nature of 
the interactions between actors 
involved in the CJS, moving away from 
language, narratives and practices 
based on violence, to peacemaking 
(Pepinsky, 2006).  
 
The second major task Sherman 
highlighted was to begin creating 
‘bolder experiments’ that produce a 
broader range of tools which help 
people to remain law-abiding citizens 
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but which are non-threatening to them.  
This will require new justice inventions, 
processes and practices that are 
diverse in nature and which are 
evaluated.   
 
It is advocated here that Positive 
Criminology has great potential to 
create new experiments and a range of 
tools to support citizens, as it posits an 
alternative to the traditional focus on 
imprisonment, exclusion and shaming 
by utilising integrative, inclusive and 
positive forces and mechanisms. 
 
Positive Criminology encompasses 
several theories and models. It 
broadens the focus of traditional 
criminology, from simply understanding 
the journey into deviant and criminal 
behaviour.  Rather, with Positive 
Criminology, the focus is on positive 
components such as acceptance, 
altruism, compassion, encouragement, 
faith, forgiveness, goodness, gratitude, 
hope, humour, optimism, positive 
modelling, strengths, self-efficacy, 
social integration, spirituality with 
individuals and groups (Ronel & Segev; 
2014; Ronel & Elisha, 2011).  It is 
hoped that such foci will allow the 
transformation to occur to reproduce 
the positive component/experience for 
everybody’s benefit. They go on to 
advocate the adoption of Positive 
Criminology throughout the entire CJS.  
This paper would support this. It would 
seem that this move would afford the 
system coherence, ensuring that the 
means are inherent in the ends whilst 
still allowing for diversity in approaches.   
] 
 
Flynn, (2013) adds a third major task, 
the need to include the involvement of 
the wider public in the creation of 
emotionally intelligent justice given their 
role in shaping criminal justice policy via 
political/election voting power (Loader, 
2006; Ryan, 2003).  Positive 
criminologists would support this, 
especially in relation to social 
integration, where they place a call for 
society to ‘positively and intelligently 
use its power, institutions, and means 
toward this end’ (Ronel & Segev; 
2014:1394).  The problem at present is 
that, 
“Criminal Justice is now less 
autonomous than it was three 
decades ago, and more forcefully 
directed from the outside…A new 
relationship between politicians, 
the public and penal experts has 
emerged in which politicians are 
more directive, penal experts are 
less influential, and public opinion 
becomes a key reference point for 
evaluating options.  Criminal 
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justice is now more vulnerable to 
shifts of public mood and political 
reaction.” (Garland, 2001: 172)  
 
There would clearly need to be a shift 
away from the popular forms of 
retribution that dominate political and 
public opinion to allow for the possibility 
of new forms of emotionally intelligent 
justice to emerge. 
 
Table 1: The existing and the new 
‘emotionally intelligent’ criminal justice 
systems in comparison 
 
 
 
 
The CJS in the UK is dominated by 
negative responses and reactions to 
crime and criminality that are focused 
on retributive punishment and 
exclusion.  What is needed is a new 
paradigm to create an emotionally 
intelligent CJS with new forms of 
emotionally intelligent justice to 
accompany it. One that is non-violent in 
its approach and is focused on inclusion 
and integration, that utilises positive 
encounters and forces in offering a 
transformative not punitive experience, 
and one that is resolute in raising the 
emotional intelligence and awareness 
of its staff of the therapeutic or anti-
therapeutic effect of their words, 
actions, decisions and working 
practices/systems.  The role of 
empathy should not be ignored here.  
One that includes and is informed by all 
of the voices of those affected by crime 
and criminality. Further, a new 
paradigm for an emotionally intelligent 
CJS system and model of emotionally 
intelligent justice is needed that has a 
congruence between their aims, 
means, theories, spirit/values and the 
principles upon which they are based 
and the positive outcomes that they 
aspire to produce. We must ensure that 
new forms of justice are not excessively 
 Existing New 
Philosophy Retributive Transmutive 
 
Method Punitive Utilising positive 
and unifying forces 
 
Examples of 
some of the 
Key Values 
Control 
Domination 
Oppression 
Punishment 
Deterrence 
Power 
Alienation 
Emotional 
Intelligence 
Non violent 
Integration 
Inclusion 
Positive 
encounters 
Transformation 
Rehabilitation 
 
Some 
Potential 
Outcomes 
Social exclusion 
Shame/humiliation 
High recidivism rates 
Anger/Pain/ 
Resentment/ 
Hatred/Rejection/ 
Blame/ 
Vengeance/Alienatio
n 
Social inclusion 
Social Integration 
Desistence from 
crime 
Atonement/Accept
ance/ Taking 
responsibility for 
actions/Positive 
self-identity 
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focused on ‘order’ as opposed to 
justice, as this is likely to perpetuate the 
current system of control and power 
over equality and transformation.   
 
 
The challenges of creating an 
emotionally intelligent CJS 
 
Current academic thinking around 
notions of emotionally intelligent justice, 
and positive experiences for offenders 
is very much in its infancy. It should  be 
noted, however, that the current CJS in 
the UK has pockets of emotional 
intelligence operating within it already. 
For example, emotional intelligence 
within the current CJS can be found in 
the emergence of various problem 
solving courts: drug courts, domestic 
violence courts and community courts 
following more of a TJ approach (Nolan, 
2009); the use of restorative justice by 
the Youth Offending Teams, by the 
police when working with victims (HMIC 
et al, 2012); and the Good Lives Model 
which is a strengths based 
rehabilitative approach when working 
with offenders (Ronel & Segev, 2014).    
[Nonetheless, it will remain a challenge 
to the CJS and policy makers as well as 
a challenge to traditional criminology to 
adopt such propositions.  As with all 
new forms of knowledge and practice, 
there needs to be an appropriate time 
for the process of trial and error, action 
and reflection and evaluation to allow 
an appropriate time for this body of 
work to find its feet and mature further.   
 
Academics, practitioners and others 
working in this field should not shy away 
from admitting that at present we know 
little about the ‘how’ in terms of 
achieving an emotionally intelligent 
justice system and understanding how 
it would function, though there have 
been suggestions from restorative 
justice advocates, TJ advocates, 
Peacemaking and Positive 
criminologists (Ronel & Segev, 2014; 
Wexler, 2012; Pepinsky, 2006; Zehr, 
2002).   
 
The priority of the first stage of this 
endeavour must focus on defining the 
best description of ‘what’ an 
emotionally intelligent CJS is and 
indeed what it would look like in 
practice, along with defining the related 
emotionally intelligent models of justice 
that would underpin this new system.  
Central to this discussion going forward 
are the questions of: what is justice? 
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and how should power be exercised 
within it? It would seem that the current 
CJS has not got the right answer to 
such questions given the current results 
produced.  A later phase should focus 
more exclusively on the creation of new 
tools, technologies and practices that 
would provide the operations of the new 
system. 
 
Positive Criminology offers a 
perspective that pulls together common 
principles from a range of different 
theories, approaches, and models for 
example restorative justice (Zehr, 
2002), the sociology of acceptance 
(Bogdan & Taylor, 1987), desistence 
Burnett & Maruna, 2004; LeBel et al., 
2008; Martin & Stermac, 2010), 
Peacemaking Criminology (Pepinsky, 
2013); emotionally intelligent justice 
(Flynn, 2014); and TJ (Wexler, 2012). 
This new found ‘home’ for such a wide 
range of theories and models may 
provide a much needed critical mass of 
people working in the area of Positive 
Criminology to allow for new synergies 
and innovations to be created which 
allow for the much needed 
experiments, programmes, 
technologies and tools needed for an 
emotionally intelligent system to 
operate successfully. 
 
There appears to be a range of views 
as to which emotions should be evoked 
in emotionally intelligent justice and by 
which party 
(victim/offender/community): shame 
(Braithwaite, 1989, Kahan, 1996,1998), 
remorse (Karstedt, 2002; Van Stokkom, 
2002), empathy (Strang, 2002) and a 
whole range of positive emotions 
advocated by positive criminologists 
(Ronel & Segev; 2014; Ronel & Elisha, 
2011).  There will need to be clarity, 
alignment and agreement as to which 
emotions should be evoked and by 
which party, in both the procedures of 
the CJS and the models of justice 
underpinning it, and this will then need 
to be reviewed and evaluated, and 
changes made in accordance.  Further, 
if shame is to feature in the new models 
of emotionally intelligent justice then 
care needs to be exercised as evoking 
shame can conflict at times with the 
principles of fairness and procedural 
justice not to mention the effectiveness 
of this approach in terms of recidivism 
and more holistically on the person. 
Indeed there is a thin line between 
shame, humiliation and stigmatisation.  
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It would seem that reintegrative 
shaming offers the best insight at 
present in terms of differentiating 
between the crime committed and the 
person (Braithwaite, 1989).  It is 
acknowledged that it may be some time 
before an agreement can be reached 
as to which emotions should be evoked 
and by which party. 
 
A key challenge for the establishment of 
emotionally intelligent justice and also a 
challenge to TJ is that at present in the 
UK we have a judiciary made up of 
predominantly older white males from 
the higher social classes (Cavadino et 
al, 2013).  There is an obvious disparity 
between the judges and the judged in 
terms of race, religion and social class 
that has the potential to impede the 
successful implementation of TJ. The 
judiciary is not renowned for their 
openness to training or interventions 
that can limit their decision-making 
capacity (Cavadino et al, 2013).  The 
contribution of TJ is a positive one by 
raising the awareness of criminal 
justice staff of the impact of their 
interactions on others involved in the 
CJS.  The impact of this alone will be 
significant.  However, a further 
challenge should be noted that it is hard 
to create authentic interactions that 
genuinely meet the aim of what is trying 
to be achieved in TJ and it is questioned 
as to whether such empathic intentions 
and interactions can truly be passed on 
via training or regulation in the 
workplace.  This does not mean that 
such an attempt should be abandoned, 
rather that such matters will need to be 
considered in the operational strategy 
going forward. 
 
A key challenge in including the ‘voice’ 
of the public in the creation of new 
emotionally intelligent models of justice 
is that this is not a simple task to 
achieve given current levels of 
understanding and emotionality, nor will 
it be achieved overnight. As Flynn 
(2014:365) has noted: 
 
“Establishing an alternative 
paradigm of emotionally intelligent 
justice requires systems of 
communication and public 
engagement which acknowledge 
and are capable of challenging the 
gamut of cognitions, attitudes, 
values, beliefs, feelings and moral 
emotions which together underpin 
and legitimize traditional forms of 
punishment. Methods of 
communication must be 
developed which resonate with the 
symbols and ideals ordinary 
people find meaningful. The task 
of emotionally intelligent justice is 
to affirm new values of forgiveness 
reconciliation and recompense. To 
achieve this, nothing less than a 
complete reconfiguration of 
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emotional and intelligent life is 
required. “ 
 
The powers, structures and 
mechanisms that have created current 
criminal justice policy and informed 
public and political discourse are 
unlikely to have a sudden awakening or 
desire to want to reform.  Therefore we 
can expect a continuance of the 
hegemonic mechanisms operating 
through for example the government, 
the media and other agencies/actors in 
order to ensure that their position is 
secured and that the current punitive 
status quo is maintained (Nussbaum, 
1996).  This cannot be ignored in the 
challenge ahead especially in relation 
to engaging the public with the 
possibility of this task.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The need for and benefits of a new 
paradigm for an emotionally intelligent 
CJS, one that utilises theories and 
models of criminal justice that are also 
emotionally intelligent is clear.  The 
existing criminal justice system, its 
related anti-terrorist legislation and 
moreover many of the negative 
principles and values on which they are 
based are likely only to exacerbate the 
situation further and continue a 
negative pattern of further ‘violence’.   
 
The magnitude of the task of creating a 
new paradigm for an emotionally 
intelligent CJS or new models of 
emotionally intelligent justice in the UK 
is not underestimated.  However, the 
task cannot be ignored given some of 
the current outputs and harms created 
by the CJS in the UK as well as some 
of the dynamics present in 
contemporary life in the West: the 
increase in terrorist attacks, the 
negative public discourse dividing 
people along racial and religious lines, 
further draconian anti-terrorist 
legislation as well as the continuance of 
a  ‘war on terror’ style response of the 
State against specific groups.   The 
scale of the task ahead should not deter 
those who are committed to such an 
endeavour, as each step made along 
the way has the potential to reduce the 
levels of ‘violence’ and harms occurring 
in the CJS and beyond.  We are 
presented with a great opportunity and 
only time will tell if we embrace this 
opportunity of creating a more 
emotionally intelligent understanding of 
justice for the benefit of all.  
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PAPER  12:  
CHILDREN, HUMANITARIANISM AND 
DIPLOMACY IN A DIGITAL AGE 
Dr Helen Brocklehurst  
Senior Lecturer in International Relations,College of Law, 
Humanities and Social Sciences University of Derby 
 
 
Abstract 
There are three aims to this paper. First, is to outline the ways in which children and 
young people have increasing instrumentality in a digital, networked world. Second, is 
to examine the means by which young people may, on the one hand, be used or 
targeted by violent groups (e.g. Nice 2016) while, on the other hand, may resist 
violence and become symbols and tools of diplomacy (e.g., Malala Yousafzai, the 
Pakistani activist for female education and Nobel Prize laureate). Finally the paper 
considers how the unregulated circulation of images of children in conflict situations 
raises new ethical issues in a digital world.  Based on the analysis presented, the 
paper argues for a norm of ‘digital safeguarding’ to be fostered so that future users 
and archivists of online images, including young people, might be better informed 
about the rights of such children to privacy and dignity, and the ongoing risks that 
particular images may pose. 
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PAPER  13:  
THE EVOLUTION OF THE MARGIN OF 
APPRECIATION DOCTRINE: A CASE OF 
DIPLOMACY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS ADJUDICATION? 
Mrs Rachael Ita  
Lecturer in Law, College of Law, Humanities and Social 
Sciences University of Derby 
 
 
Abstract 
International human rights courts are faced with the challenge of protecting human 
rights standards whilst still acknowledging the sovereignty of member states from 
which they derive their authority. An important tool that is needed in such situations is 
an approach to the interpretation of the international human rights treaties that 
contemporaneously protects the rights of individuals and respects the sovereignty of 
the state parties. In this paper, it is argued that this form of interpretation that tries to 
strike a balance between these two competing interests of sovereignty on the part of 
the state, and the protection of the individual’s rights, is a ‘diplomatic’ approach to 
interpretation because it seeks to ensure a balance for both parties. The paper 
examines the margin of appreciation doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights 
(‘the Court’) and proffers it as an example of such a ‘diplomatic tool’ of interpretation. 
Through an examination of case law on the evolution of the margin of appreciation in 
the jurisprudence of the Court, it concludes that the fluid nature of the doctrine has 
made it a useful diplomatic tool of interpretation. The margin of appreciation doctrine 
remains a necessary part of international human rights in Europe and contributes to 
the continued legitimacy of the Court. 
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the recipient of Human Resource Excellence Award in Research in 2011. He has an 
interdisciplinary research focus that covers the sub-fields of sociology, anthropology, 
history, criminology, politics, law and philosophy. Some of the key areas of his 
research relate to the Sociology of Gangs and Mafias, Criminology & Criminal Justice, 
Ottoman Empire and the Middle East, Terrorism and Security Studies and 
Transnational Crime. Before his current role, he was a Fellow at the University of 
Stirling in Scotland, United Kingdom.   
 
ICDIR Role: Abstract author 
 
  
CHARLOTTE   HARGREAVES  
Head of Criminology and Social Sciences and Deputy Head of Department, 
University of Derby 
 
 
Charlotte Hargreaves is currently the Head of Criminology and 
Social Sciences and Deputy Head of Department at  the University 
of Derby.  
 
Before her present role, she was a  practitioner in youth justice and 
trainer of youth justice professionals.  She  specialises in teaching 
modules with a youth justice focus those relating to  Crime and 
Society.  She has a number of undergraduates and post graduate 
students under her supervision. 
 
ICDIR Role: Chief Host 
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DR PHILIP    HENRY  
Director of the Multi-Faith Centre and Sociologist, University of Derby 
 
 
 
Dr Philip Henry is a sociologist with special interests in policy, 
politics and religion. He developed his training as a researcher at 
the University of Liverpool exploring Buddhist social movements, 
activism, and minority groups in the global landscape.  
 
These professional interests include: inter-faith dialogue, religion 
and society, cultural identity, social movements and crime, and 
deviance within society. 
 
Philip’s professional interests relates to issues around radicalisation and 
counterterrorism, Roma and gypsy migration, community cohesion and development. 
He is also interested in religion and belief matters relating to policy, diversity and 
religious literacy/education and also inter-, intra- and multi-faith engagement.  
His research covers a wide area of Religion and Society, Cultural identity, Social 
Movements, Crime and Deviance - including Radicalisation and contemporary social-
psychological approaches to motivation and belonging.  He has also done some work 
on Sociology of Health and migration studies. 
 
ICDIR Role: Paper author, member of special joint panel session. 
 
DR DAVID HICKS  
Senior Lecturer in Criminology, Head of Research in Postgraduate Criminology, 
MSc Criminal Investigation Programme Leader, University of Derby 
 
 
 David is a Senior Lecturer in Criminology, Head of Research in 
Postgraduate Criminology, and also MSc Criminal Investigation 
Programme Leader. He has over 20 years of academic, research 
and professional experience. This includes national and 
international recognition as a specialist in financial crime and 
financial investigation, criminal/financial intelligence, organised 
crime, and crime prevention. He also has experience lecturing in 
criminology at Cardiff University (Wales) and the University of Ottawa (Canada). 
 
He has completed a substantial volume of funded research, and published in leading 
academic venues such as Taylor and Francis, Cambridge University Press, Sage and 
ICDIR 2016 – International Conference on Diplomacy & International Relations    
 
 
151 
derby.ac.uk/lhss 
others.  He currently supervises a number of PhD students in addition to a number of 
postgraduates/undergraduates. He welcomes prospective doctoral research 
applicants with interests in the areas of financial crime, financial investigation, cyber-
crime, digital investigation and intelligence, and organised crime.  
 
ICDIR Role: Paper co-author. 
 
 
 
DR PHILIP HODGSON  
Head of Department, Law, Criminology and Social Sciences, University of Derby 
 
 
 Dr Philip Hodgson is currently the Head of Department for Law, 
Criminology and Social Sciences and Deputy Director of the 
International Policing and Justice Institute (IPJI). 
 
He also acts as the UK lead on Policing for IPJI. He has conducted 
research within a number of areas of criminology which include 
young people, exclusion, policing, partnerships, drugs, probation 
and anti-social behaviour. 
 
He is a member of a number of professional bodies, including: The 
Howard League, British Society of Criminology, Health and Care Professional Council, 
Institute Leadership and Management and Society of Evidence Based Policing. He 
has worked within the criminal justice sector in various capacities for over twenty 
years. These include policing, probation, youth justice and the drugs areas. 
 
ICDIR Role: Chief Host, Editor. 
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PROFESSOR ROBERT HUDSON  
Professor of European History and Cultural Politics and College Lead of the 
Identity, Culture and Representation Research Cluster, University of Derby 
 
 
Professor Robert Hudson is University Professor in European 
History and Cultural Politics at the University of Derby, and former 
Director of the Identity, Conflict and Representation Research 
Centre. He is also International Visiting Professor at the University 
American College Skopje (UACS), Macedonia and in 2016 was 
nominated to the International Academic Council at UACS. 
 
He is a graduate of the School of Slavonic and East European 
Studies, University of London, and held a Yugoslav government 
scholarship as a Post-Graduate Fellow at the University of 
Sarajevo.  
 
In the 1980s he lectured at Exeter College of Art and Design, whilst serving as an 
officer in the Royal Naval Reserve, and then taught at the University of Rennes 
(France). Hudson was  a faculty member of the EU (DGXXII) and Marie Curie-funded 
European Doctoral Enhancement Programme (EDEN) in Peace and Conflict Studies 
(1997-2010). He has re-visited Yugoslavia and its successor states frequently since 
1995, and during the 1990s participated in six missions with the OSCE (Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe) as an election supervisor. More recently he 
has been working in Macedonia on a regular basis. Hudson  is the co-editor of Politics 
of Identity: Migrants and Minorities in Multicultural States (Palgrave/Macmillan, 2000), 
Different Approaches to Peace and Conflict Research (University of Deusto, 2008),  
Peace, Conflict and Identity: Multidisciplinary Approaches to Research (University of 
Deusto, 2009), After Yugoslavia: Identities and Politics Within the Successor States 
(Palgrave/Macmillan, 2012), Land and Identity: Theory, Memory, and Practice 
(Rodopi, 2012) and Affective Landscapes in Literature, Art and Everyday Life: 
Memory, Place and the Senses (Ashgate, 2015). He has also co-edited a trilogy of 
books on European Integration with colleagues in Macedonia (2013, 2014 and 2015) 
in which his own contributions have focused on security and identity issues. 
 
ICDIR Role: Paper author, member of special joint panel session 
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MR CRAIG HUGHES  
PhD Candidate, University of Derby 
 
 
 Craig has been involved in law enforcement for over thirty years.  
The last 20 of which he has been a financial investigator and 
manager at regional and national levels for the Police and Home 
Office departments and, most recently, the Serious Fraud Office.  
 
Craig was part of the Implementation Team for the set up of the 
Assets Recovery Agency in 2002.  He is currently researching a 
PhD on the nature of financial investigation within the UK, and is 
an Associate Lecturer on the MSc Criminal Investigation programme at the University 
of Derby. 
 
 
 
 
RACHAEL ITA   
Lecturer in Law, University of Derby 
 
 
 Rachael Ita is a lecturer in Law at the University of Derby. She has 
considerable experience in teaching law at undergraduate and post 
graduate levels. Her dominant areas of teaching have been public 
international law, administrative law and international human rights 
law. She has  also taught contract law, tort law, employment law, 
and company law on accounting, media studies and journalism 
studies courses. 
She is a qualified barristers and solicitor of the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria and was called to the Bar in 2003. She initially practiced as a legal adviser to 
the Ministry of Justice, Akure where she dealt with criminal matters. She moved on to 
pursue her academic career in Law at the University of Derby in 2011. Her main 
professional interests in law include, advocacy, legal research and pedagogy. 
ICDIR Role: Abstract author.  
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DR FRANCIS JEGEDE  
Senior Lecturer and Subject Leader in International Relations and Diplomacy, 
University of Derby 
 
 
Francis is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations 
and Diplomacy and also the Subject Leader for 
International Relations and Diplomacy at the 
University of Derby. He oversees the academic 
delivery and management of this specialist course and 
provides students with varied learning experience 
through which they develop necessary skills and 
training required for a career in international politics 
and diplomacy. 
 
He runs study visits to a number of international institutions such as the United Nations 
Office in Geneva (UNOG), the European Parliament in Brussels, where students learn 
about key functions of international political institutions and the role these institutions 
play in promoting democracy, world peace, political stability and development around 
the world. He also coordinates work-based learning for all International Relations and 
Diplomacy students through external opportunities for internships and vocational 
training. 
 
ICDIR Role: Host, Conference Organiser, Author and Editor-in-Chief. 
 
 
JOEL KLAFF 
Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Derby 
 
Joel Klaff graduated with an LLB (Hons) in 1986 (University of 
London), and an LLM in 1989 (University of Miami). His 
undergraduate and postgraduate degrees were heavily 
influenced by the contextual approach to law. In this capacity, he 
became interested in the social, economic and political 
application of law during his time as a student. As a student, the 
American Realist movement in jurisprudence had the most 
significant impact on the development of his approach to, and 
application of law.  
 
He has continued with this approach to law with respect to his teaching, scholarship 
and research. All the modules he teaches have at their core the interrelationship 
between law and politics. This manifests itself in the politics of development, 
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sustainability and human rights. With respect to the actual engagement with his 
students he makes as little distinction as he possibly can between the application of 
law and the use of politics to understand that application of law. In this respect his 
teaching represents a fusion of the ideas of both legal and political scholars.  
 
His current scholarship and research focuses on the creation of a ‘sustainable 
jurisprudence’ for the purposes of ensuring the fair and just application of law. In this 
capacity, he explains how the incidents of inequality which are manifested through 
acts of discrimination such as racial, sexual or gender discrimination will never be 
curbed or contained by our current jurisprudential approach to these matters. 
 
ICDIR Role: Member of special joint panel session. 
 
 
DR SUNG-HEE LEE 
Lecturer in Sociology & Social Policy, University of Derby 
 
 
Dr Sung-Hee Lee is a Lecturer in Sociology and Social 
Policy within the College of Law, Humanities and Social 
Sciences at the University of Derby. She is the organiser of 
the Sociology Research Seminar Series (SSRS) and has 
published a number of research articles. 
She is currently the module leader for 'Researching the 
Social World' and 'Family Forms and Personal Ties'. She 
also teaches 'Social Inequalities in Britain Today', 
'Sociology of Health and Illness', 'Capitalism, Culture and 
Class' and 'Sociological Research Methods' at 
undergraduate level. 
 
She is currently working on a comparative study across East Asian societies entitled 
‘Gender Politics and the Socialisation of Care in East Asian Countries: South Korea, 
Japan, China and Taiwan’. Since completing her PhD thesis entitled ‘The Impact of 
Gender Politics on the Socialisation of Care in South Korea’, in 2014 at the University 
of Bath, she has been continuing to develop this work to incorporate other East Asian 
countries. She completed the first fieldwork phase in South Korea in June 2015, 
second stage in Japan in June 2016 and currently working on the third phase on China 
and Taiwan in June 2017. The rich information and primary data gathered through her 
research projects in these countries enables her to explore further the nexus between 
gender politics and the socialisation of care. 
ICDIR Role: Paper author.  
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LARRY MEAD 
Principal Lecturer in Law, University of Derby 
 
 
Larry Mead is a Principal Lecturer in Law, University of 
Derby.  
He has pursued an academic career in Law for more than 
37 years. He has extensive experience of teaching on 
undergraduate, postgraduate and professional courses in 
Law.  
 
The dominant areas of his teaching have been; Contract 
Law, Commercial Law, Business Law Company Law and 
Corporate governance. He has taught modules in these 
areas on law across accounting, business and management 
disciplines.  
 
He is currently Programme Leader.for the LLM course and also teaching modules 
across undergraduate and post-graduate levels, such as Company Law and Evidence, 
Legal Scholarship and Independent Studies. 
 
He combines an academic career with practice as a barrister. He was called to the 
Bar in 1977 and completed pupillage in 1978. He is currently a Door Tenant at Derwent 
Chambers in Derby. 
 
ICDIR Role: Abstract author. 
 
 
DR PAUL NIXON    
Principal Lecturer & Head of Research, The Hague University of Applied Sciences, 
Netherlands 
 
 
 Paul G. Nixon is a Principal Lecturer in Political Science and Head 
of Research at European Studies, Faculty of Management and 
Organisation, The Hague University of Applied Sciences, The 
Netherlands. He has contributed chapters to many edited 
collections on the use of ICTs particularly in the fields of political 
parties, electronic democracy and social welfare. He has co-edited 
the following collections for Routledge Digital Media Usage Across 
the Life Course (with Rajash Rawal & Andreas Funk 2016) 
Lobbying in the EU: Changing Minds Changing Times (with Paul 
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Shotton 2015) Politics and the Internet in Comparative Context: Views from the cloud 
(with Rajash Rawal & Dan Mercea 2014) Understanding E Government in Europe: 
Issues and Challenges (with Vassiliki Koutrakou and Rajash Rawal 2010) E-
Government in Europe (with Vassiliki Koutrakou 2007), Political Parties and the 
Internet (with Steve Ward and Rachel Gibson 2003.) and Cyberprotest (with Wim van 
der Donk, Brian Loader and Dieter Rucht, 2004) He has also published in the fields of 
culture and literature including editing a collection entitled Representations of 
Education in Literature (Edwin Mellen Press 2000). 
  
 
ICDIR Role: Author/discussion Co-presenter. 
 
 
PROFESSOR ALEXANDER  NUNN 
Professor of International Political Economy, Leeds Beckett University, UK 
 
 
Alex Nunn is a Professor of Political Economy at the Leeds 
Beckett University, United Kingdom.  He has fifteen years of 
experience in academic and applied social policy research and 
consultancy.  His academic research focuses on governance, 
political economy and social and labour market policy. He has a 
keen interest in transitions between forms of governance and the 
effects of these in terms of social justice.  He has undertaken a 
large number of applied research and consultancy projects on 
behalf of central and local government organisations in the UK and for international 
organisations such as the Council of Europe and European Commission. 
 
ICDIR Role: Chair of paper presentation session, member of special joint panel 
session 
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DR DAVID PATTON 
Positive Criminologist and Senior Lecturer, Learning, Teaching & Quality lead for 
Law, Criminology and Social and Political Sciences, University of Derby 
 
David is a quantitative and qualitative researcher and has 
conducted research for Cambridge University and the Home 
Office.  The research he helped conduct for the Home Office 
influenced part of the creation of the Drugs Act 2005, which 
specifically gave the police the power to conduct a drug test for 
any arrestee who was arrested for an acquisitive type crime.   
 
He has been involved in various projects aimed at young people 
and/or drugs, for example, David was Director of a (Communities 
Against Drugs funded) Drugs Education Project based at Sheffield 
Youth Offending Team, aimed at drug prevention, reduction, crime 
reduction and harm minimisation amongst young offenders and school children.  
 
He has trained Community Panel Members to administer restorative justice sentences 
to young offenders who had received a Referral Order by the Youth Court.  The Youth 
Justice Service recently commissioned David to deliver Life Coaching sessions to high 
risk young offenders on a 10 week alternative to custody programme to help them 
consider their progression into further education, training and employment as well as 
reduce the frequency and gravity of their offending. 
 
ICDIR Role: Paper author, Chair of paper presentation session 
 
 
PROFESSOR RAJASH RAWAL    
Professor of European Studies, The Hague University of Applied Sciences, 
Netherlands 
 
 
Rajash Rawal is a professor of European Studies and Faculty 
Director at The Hague University of Applied Sciences, 
Netherlands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ICDIR Role: Author/discussion Co-presenter. 
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DR JOHN STUBBS 
External Editorial Review Advisor and Retired University Lecturer  
 
 
Dr John Stubbs is a retired University Lecturer. Until his retirement 
in 2015, Dr John Stubbs was Senior Lecturer in Geography at the  
University of Derby.  His research interests have largely followed a 
dual focus: one has been transport development, particularly 
related to sustainable transportation systems and the other is 
population studies with a specific focus on demographic change.  
Much of his research has been underpinned by extensive overseas 
field work particularly in the Middle East, North  and  sub-Saharan 
Africa.  In addition to teaching in these fields of research, his teaching experience has 
also included development studies related to low income countries as well as statistical 
analysis. 
 
 
ICDIR Role: External Review Consultant - Editorial. 
 
PROFESSOR MALCOLM TODD  
Dean of Law, Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Derby 
 
Professor Todd is the Dean of the College of Law, 
Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Derby, 
UK and member of the Corporate Management Team.   
 
He has a particular interest in how to best support the student 
learning experience. he was awarded a National Teaching 
Fellowship in 2014 and has published widely on learning and 
teaching matters, especially around the themes of learner 
autonomy, work-based learning and the teaching of 'race' 
and ethnicity.  
 
He was, until 2010, the Associate Director of the national 
Subject Centre for Sociology, Anthropology and Politics, part 
of the Higher Education Academy (HEA). Currently he is leading on a national project 
for the HEA and HEFCE on teaching about Islam in the Social Sciences. He was a 
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Trustee of the British Sociology Association and member of the Heads and Professors 
of Sociology.   Prof Todd has been involved with transnational education, and has 
developed strong partnership relationships with HEIs in Hong Kong, the Netherlands 
and the USA. 
He is recently appointed as the Deputy Vice Chancellor of the University of Derby with 
responsibility for the enhancement of students’ experience.  
 
ICDIR Role: Chief Host, Editor 
 
 
MR NIR TOLKOVSKY 
PhD Candidate, University of Derby 
 
Nir is an Associate Lecturer on the MSc Criminal Investigation 
programme at the University of Derby, and a final year PhD candidate.  
His background includes counter terrorism and proliferation project 
management within the Israeli Intelligence community, and Research 
and Development in the private sector and academia in the United 
Kingdom.   Among his recent engagements are projects utilising a 
variety of analytical disciplines in criminal justice systems, security and 
commercial contexts, ranging from cyber intelligence analysis to complex corporate 
fraud litigation and electronic discovery.   Nir’s doctoral research studies the interplay 
between ‘criminal’ and a range of ‘commercial’ and ‘civil’ fraud resolution mechanisms 
in English law and practice. 
 
ICDIR Role: Paper co-author. 
 
DR DAVID WALSH   
University Reader in Criminal Investigation, Departmental Research Lead & Deputy 
Director of the International Policing and Justice Institute, University of Derby 
 
Dr David Walsh is a University Reader in Criminal 
Investigation, Deputy Director of the International Policing 
and Justice Insititute of the University of Derby. He is also, the 
Departmental Research Lead and the Chair of the School's 
Research Ethics Group. 
His teaching interests include: the psychology of 
investigation, criminology and criminal justice, 
psychological understanding of criminal behavior and 
examination of the psychology of criminal justice processes. 
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He is the founding member of the International Investigative Interviewing 
Research Group ( www.iiirg.org) and an editorial board member for the 
Canadian Journal of Police and Security Services and the Open 
Access Journal of Forensic Psychology. 
ICDIR Role: Abstract co-author. 
 
 
PROFESSOR  PAUL WELLER    
(Fractional) Professor, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry 
University; Emeritus Professor, University of Derby; and (Non-Stipendiary) 
Research Fellow in Religion and Society, Regent's Park College, University of 
Oxford 
 
 
Until he retired at the end of July 206 from his substantive 
roles at the University of Derby, Paul Weller (Cert Ed, MA, 
Phil, PhD, DLitt) was Professor of Inter-Religious Relations 
and Head of Research (MPhil and PhD Students and REF 
[REF Outputs] He was a founder and is a Trustee of the Multi-
Faith Centre at the University of Derby. During the Cold War 
he was engaged in the international peace and justice work 
of the Prague-based Christian Peace Conference. Towards 
the end of that period he was a member of the European 
Churches Working Group on Asylum and Refugees of the 
Conference of European Churches and the World Council of Churches, while being 
involved in aspects of the sanctuary movement in support of the rights of refugees and 
migrants.  
  
Towards the end of the New Labour Government in the UK, he was a member on the 
Expert Panel on Faith Advising the Secretary of State for Communities, Other 
Ministers and Civil Servants in the Department of Communities and Local 
Government.  
 
More recently he has undertaken research for, and has been a member of various 
advisory groups, including the UK's Equality and Human Rights Commission. Among 
relevant publications he is author of A Mirror for our Times: 'The Rushdie Affair' and 
the Future of Multiculturalism (London, Continuum, 2008); "Human Rights’, ‘Religion’ 
and the ‘Secular’: Variant Configurations of Religion(s), State(s) and Society(ies)”, in 
Religion and Human Rights: An International Journal, Volume 1, No. 1, 2006, pp. 17-
39;“Conspiracy Theories and the Incitement of Hatred: The Dynamics of  Deception, 
Plausibility and Defamation”, in M. Fineberg, S. Samuels, and M. Weitzman, eds. 
(2007), Antisemitism: The Generic Hatred. Essays in Memory of Simon Wiesenthal, 
Vallentine Mitchell, London, pp. 182-197; and “The Clash of Civilisations Thesis and 
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Religious Responses”, European Journal of Economic and Political Studies, Volume 
3, No. 1, 2010, pp. 83-100. He is also co-author, with Emma Jane Harris and Victoria 
Bisset of Violent Extremism: Naming, Framing and Challenging (London: Dialogue 
Society, 2015). 
  
 
ICDIR Role: Paper author, Chair of special joint panel session. 
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